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Subject: [OASIS Issue Tracker] Commented: (OFFICE-3703) Proposal: ODF 1.3 Protection-Key Enhancements
[ http://tools.oasis-open.org/issues/browse/OFFICE-3703?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel&focusedCommentId=30582#action_30582 ] Dennis Hamilton commented on OFFICE-3703: ----------------------------------------- IMPORTANT When unsalted SHA1 hash values are used to authenticate passwords, those passwords are compromised when the hash value becomes known. The ODF 1.0/1.1/1.2 protection-key values are never secret and can be extracted from ODF documents quite easily. Recent prominent cases of mass disclosures of hash values and crowd-sourced cracking of the passwords demonstrate that this use of passwords for protection keys is forever unsafe and must be repaired. Use of "stronger" digest algorithms and addition of salt values are not strong remedies. Consequently, I will replace the current proposal (version 1.04). The new proposal will introduce a default method that can never be used to compromise a password. In case there is some requirement where a password must still be usable, there will be a protection-key method that makes discovery of the associated password extremely difficult. Neither form of protection-key value is usable, by itself, in a transitive attack (e.g., on an ODF encryption). The new version will be available in the next few days. > Proposal: ODF 1.3 Protection-Key Enhancements > --------------------------------------------- > > Key: OFFICE-3703 > URL: http://tools.oasis-open.org/issues/browse/OFFICE-3703 > Project: OASIS Open Document Format for Office Applications (OpenDocument) TC > Issue Type: Improvement > Components: Table, Text > Affects Versions: ODF 1.2 COS 1 > Environment: This is an enhancement, described in terms of changes to OpenDocument-v1.2-cs01. > Reporter: Dennis Hamilton > Assignee: Dennis Hamilton > Fix For: ODF 1.3 CSD 01 > > > The use of password hashes in easily-discovered XML element and attribute values is subject to compromise of the hashed password. Although the use of increasingly-stronger digest algorithms may lengthen the time required for carrying out a brute-force attack on the hash, memorable passwords remain subject to compromise and the attack becomes easier as processor technology advances. > > In addition, the presence of hashes in plain sight in XML documents allows the digest value to be easily compared with the same digest value elsewhere, revealing worthy targets to an adversary. In addition, the digest value is easily removed/replaced. And an extracted digest value can be repurposed for malicious purposes. > > This proposal introduces two protection-key digest algorithms that are intended to mitigate (but not eliminate) risks associated with use of digest algorithms and provision of the digests in plain view in XML documents. -- This message is automatically generated by JIRA. - If you think it was sent incorrectly contact one of the administrators: http://tools.oasis-open.org/issues/secure/Administrators.jspa - For more information on JIRA, see: http://www.atlassian.com/software/jira
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