



Web Services Security: SOAP Message Security

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Abstract:

This specification describes enhancements to the SOAP messaging to provide quality of protection through message integrity, and single message authentication. These mechanisms can be used to accommodate a wide variety of security models and encryption technologies.

This specification also provides a general-purpose mechanism for associating security tokens with messages. No specific type of security token is required; it is designed to be extensible (e.g. support multiple security token formats). For example, a client might provide one format for proof of identity and provide another format for proof that they have a particular business certification.

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26 Additionally, this specification describes how to encode binary security tokens, a
27 framework for XML-based tokens, and describes how to include opaque encrypted keys.
28 It also includes extensibility mechanisms that can be used to further describe the
29 characteristics of the tokens that are included with a message.

30


31 **Status:**

32 This is an interim draft. Please send comments to the editors.

33

34 Committee members should send comments on this specification to the [wss@lists.oasis-](mailto:wss@lists.oasis-open.org)
35 [open.org](mailto:wss-comment@lists.oasis-open.org) list. Others should subscribe to and send comments to the [wss-](mailto:wss-comment@lists.oasis-open.org)
36 [comment@lists.oasis-open.org](mailto:wss-comment@lists.oasis-open.org) list. To subscribe, visit [http://lists.oasis-](http://lists.oasis-open.org/ob/adm.pl)
37 [open.org/ob/adm.pl](http://lists.oasis-open.org/ob/adm.pl).

38 For information on whether any patents have been disclosed that may be essential to
39 implementing this specification, and any offers of patent licensing terms, please refer to
40 the Intellectual Property Rights section of the Security Services TC web page
41 (<http://www.oasis-open.org/who/intellectualproperty.shtml>).



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114

1 Introduction

115

This specification proposes a standard set of SOAP extensions that can be used when building secure Web services to implement message level integrity and confidentiality. This specification refers to this set of extensions as the "Web Services Security Core Language" or "WSS-Core".

118

This specification is flexible and is designed to be used as the basis for securing Web services within a wide variety of security models including PKI, Kerberos, and SSL. Specifically, this specification provides support for multiple security token formats, multiple trust domains, multiple signature formats, and multiple encryption technologies. The token formats and semantics for using these are defined in the associated profile documents.

123

This specification provides three main mechanisms: ability to send security token as part of a message, message integrity, and message confidentiality. These mechanisms by themselves do not provide a complete security solution for Web services. Instead, this specification is a building block that can be used in conjunction with other Web service extensions and higher-level application-specific protocols to accommodate a wide variety of security models and security technologies.

129

These mechanisms can be used independently (e.g., to pass a security token) or in a tightly coupled manner (e.g., signing and encrypting a message and providing a security token path associated with the keys used for signing and encryption).

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1.1 Goals and Requirements

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The goal of this specification is to enable applications to conduct secure SOAP message exchanges.

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This specification is intended to provide a flexible set of mechanisms that can be used to construct a range of security protocols; in other words this specification intentionally does not describe explicit fixed security protocols.

138

As with every security protocol, significant efforts must be applied to ensure that security protocols constructed using this specification are not vulnerable to any one of a wide range of attacks.

141

The focus of this specification is to describe a single-message security language that provides for message security that may assume an established session, security context and/or policy agreement.

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The requirements to support secure message exchange are listed below.

145

1.1.1 Requirements

146

The Web services security language must support a wide variety of security models. The following list identifies the key driving requirements for this specification:

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- Multiple security token formats

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- Multiple trust domains

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- Multiple signature formats

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- Multiple encryption technologies

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- 152
- End-to-end message-level security and not just transport-level security

153 **1.1.2 Non-Goals**

154 The following topics are outside the scope of this document:

- 155
- Establishing a security context or authentication mechanisms .
- 156
- Key derivation.
- 157
- Advertisement and exchange of security policy.
- 158
- How trust is established or determined.
- 159



2 Notations and Terminology

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This section specifies the notations, namespaces, and terminology used in this specification.

161

2.1 Notational Conventions

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The keywords "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119.

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When describing abstract data models, this specification uses the notational convention used by the XML Infoset. Specifically, abstract property names always appear in square brackets (e.g., [some property]).

166

167

168

When describing concrete XML schemas, this specification uses the notational convention of WSS: SOAP Message Security. Specifically, each member of an element's [children] or [attributes] property is described using an XPath-like notation (e.g., /x:MyHeader/x:SomeProperty/@value1). The use of {any} indicates the presence of an element wildcard (<xs:any/>). The use of @{any} indicates the presence of an attribute wildcard (<xs:anyAttribute/>).

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This specification is designed to work with the general SOAP message structure and message processing model, and should be applicable to any version of SOAP. The current SOAP 1.2 namespace URI is used herein to provide detailed examples, but there is no intention to limit the applicability of this specification to a single version of SOAP.

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Readers are presumed to be familiar with the terms in the [Internet Security Glossary](#).

179

2.2 Namespaces

180

The XML namespace URIs that MUST be used by implementations of this specification are as follows (note that elements used in this specification are from various namespaces):

181

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183

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```
http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2002/06/secext  
http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2002/06/utility
```

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The following namespaces are used in this document:

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186

Prefix	Namespace
S	http://www.w3.org/2002/12/soap-envelope
ds	http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#
xenc	http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#

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wsse	http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2002/06/secext	Deleted: xx
wsu	http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2002/06/utility	Deleted: xx

187 2.3 Terminology

188 Defined below are the basic definitions for the security terminology used in this specification.

189 **Attachment** – An *attachment* is a generic term referring to additional data that travels with a
190 SOAP message, but is not part of the SOAP Envelope.

191 **Claim** – A *claim* is a declaration made by an entity (e.g. name, identity, key, group, privilege,
192 capability, etc).

193 **Claim Confirmation** – A *claim confirmation* is the process of verifying that a claim applies to
194 an entity

195 **Confidentiality** – *Confidentiality* is the property that data is not made available to
196 unauthorized individuals, entities, or processes.

197 **Digest** – A *digest* is a cryptographic checksum of an octet stream.

198 **End-To_End Message Level Security** – *End-to-end message level security* is
199 established when a message that traverses multiple applications within and between business
200 entities, e.g. companies, divisions and business units, is secure over its full route through and
201 between those business entities. This includes not only messages that are initiated within the
202 entity but also those messages that originate outside the entity, whether they are Web Services
203 or the more traditional messages.

204 **Integrity** – *Integrity* is the property that data has not been modified.


205 **Message Confidentiality** - *Message Confidentiality* is a property of the message and
206 encryption is the service or mechanism by which this property of the message is provided.

207 **Message Integrity** - *Message Integrity* is a property of the message and digital signature is
208 the service or mechanism by which this property of the message is provided.

209 **Proof-of-Possession** – *Proof-of-possession* is authentication data that is provided with a
210 message to prove that the message was sent and or created by a claimed identity.

211 **Signature** - A *signature* is a value computed with a cryptographic algorithm and bound
212 to data in such a way that intended recipients of the data can use the signature to verify that the
213 data has not been altered since it was signed by the signer..

214 **Security Token** – A *security token* represents a collection (one or more) of claims.



215

216 **Signed Security Token** – A *signed security token* is a security token that is asserted and
217 cryptographically signed by a specific authority (e.g. an X.509 certificate or a Kerberos ticket).
218 **Trust** - *Trust* is the characteristic that one entity is willing to rely upon a second entity to execute
219 a set of actions and/or to make set of assertions about a set of subjects and/or scopes.
220 **Trust Domain** – A *Trust Domain* is a security space in which the target of a request can
221 determine whether particular sets of credentials from a source satisfy the relevant security
222 policies of the target. The target may defer trust to a third party thus including the trusted third
223 party in the Trust Domain.
224
225
226



227

3 Message Protection Mechanisms

228

When securing SOAP messages, various types of threats should be considered. This includes, but is not limited to: 1) the message could be modified or read by antagonists or 2) an antagonist could send messages to a service that, while well-formed, lack appropriate security claims to warrant processing.

230

To understand these threats this specification defines a message security model.

232

3.1 Message Security Model

234

This document specifies an abstract *message security model* in terms of security tokens combined with digital signatures to protect and authenticate SOAP messages.

236

Security tokens assert claims and can be used to assert the binding between authentication secrets or keys and security identities. An authority can vouch for or endorse the claims in a security token by using its key to sign or encrypt (it is recommended to use a keyed encryption) the security token thereby enabling the authentication of the claims in the token. An X.509 certificate, claiming the binding between one's identity and public key, is an example of a signed security token endorsed by the certificate authority. In the absence of endorsement by a third party, the recipient of a security token may choose to accept the claims made in the token based on its trust of the sender of the containing message.

244

Signatures are used to verify message origin and integrity. Signatures are also used by message senders to demonstrate knowledge of the key used to confirm the claims in a security token and thus to bind their identity (and any other claims occurring in the security token) to the messages they create.

248

It should be noted that this security model, by itself, is subject to multiple security attacks. Refer to the Security Considerations section for additional details.

250

Where the specification requires that the elements be "processed" this means that the element type be recognized well enough to return appropriate error if not supported.

252

3.2 Message Protection

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Protecting the message content from being disclosed (confidentiality) or modified without detection (integrity) are primary security concerns. This specification provides a means to protect a message by encrypting and/or digitally signing a body, a header, an attachment, or any combination of them (or parts of them).

257

Message integrity is provided by leveraging XML Signature in conjunction with security tokens to ensure that messages are received without modifications. The integrity mechanisms are designed to support multiple signatures, potentially by multiple SOAP roles, and to be extensible to support additional signature formats.

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Message confidentiality leverages XML Encryption in conjunction with security tokens to keep portions of a SOAP message confidential. The encryption mechanisms are designed to support additional encryption processes and operations by multiple SOAP roles.

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264 This document defines syntax and semantics of signatures within `<wsse:Security>` element.
265 This document also does not specify any signature appearing outside of `<wsse:Security>`
266 element, if any.

267 3.3 Invalid or Missing Claims

268 The message recipient SHOULD reject a message with a signature determined to be invalid,
269 missing or unacceptable **claims** as it is an unauthorized (or malformed) message. This
270 specification provides a flexible way for the message sender to make a **claim** about the security
271 properties by associating zero or more **security tokens** with the message. An example of a
272 security **claim** is the identity of the sender; the sender can **claim** that he is Bob, known as an
273 employee of some company, and therefore he has the right to send the message.

274 3.4 Example

275 The following example illustrates the use of a username security token containing a claimed
276 security identity to establish a password derived signing key. The password is not provided in the
277 security token. The message sender combines the password with the nonce and timestamp
278 appearing in the security token to define an HMAC signing key that it then uses to sign the
279 message. The message receiver uses its knowledge of the shared secret to repeat the HMAC
280 key calculation which it uses to validate the signature and in the process confirm that the
281 message was authored by the claimed user identity. The nonce and timestamp are used in the
282 key calculation to introduce variability in the keys derived from a given password value.

```
283 (001) <?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" ?>
284 (002) <S:Envelope xmlns:S="http://www.w3.org/2001/12/soap-envelope"
285       xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">
286 (003)   <S:Header>
287 (004)     <wsse:Security
288           xmlns:wsse="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2002/06/secext">
289 (005)       <wsse:UsernameToken wsu:Id="MyID">
290 (006)         <wsse:Username>Zoe</wsse:Username>
291 (007)         <wsse:Nonce>FKJh...</wsse:Nonce>
292 (008)         <wsu:Created>2001-10-13T09:00:00Z</wsu:Created>
293 (009)       </wsse:UsernameToken>
294 (010)       <ds:Signature>
295 (011)         <ds:SignedInfo>
296 (012)           <ds:CanonicalizationMethod
297                 Algorithm=
298                 "http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#" />
299 (013)           <ds:SignatureMethod
300                 Algorithm=
301                 "http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#hmac-shal" />
302 (014)           <ds:Reference URI="#MsgBody">
303 (015)             <ds:DigestMethod
304                   Algorithm=
305                   "http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#shal" />
306 (016)             <ds:DigestValue>LyLsF0Pi4wPU...</ds:DigestValue>
307 (017)           </ds:Reference>
308 (018)         </ds:SignedInfo>
309 (019)         <ds:SignatureValue>DUbchm5gK...</ds:SignatureValue>
310 (020)         <ds:KeyInfo>
311 (021)           <wsse:SecurityTokenReference>
```

Annotations on the right side of the XML code:

- Line 288: Deleted: xx
- Line 290: Formatted: German (Germany)
- Line 297: Formatted: English (U.S.)
- Line 303: Formatted: German (Germany)
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```

312      (022)          <wsse:Reference URI="#MyID" />
313      (023)          </wsse:SecurityTokenReference>
314      (024)          </ds:KeyInfo>
315      (025)          </ds:Signature>
316      (026)          </wsse:Security>
317      (027)          </S:Header>
318      (028)          <S:Body wsu:Id="MsgBody">
319      (029)          <tru:StockSymbol xmlns:tru="http://fabrikaml23.com/payloads">
320                    QQQ
321                    </tru:StockSymbol>
322      (030)          </S:Body>
323      (031)          </S:Envelope>

```

324 The first two lines start the [SOAP envelope](#). Line (003) begins the headers that are associated
325 with this [SOAP message](#).

326 Line (004) starts the [Security](#) header defined in this specification. This header contains
327 security information for an intended recipient. This element continues until line (026)

328 Lines (005) to (009) specify a [security token](#) that is associated with the message. In this case, it
329 defines *username* of the client using the [UsernameToken](#). Note that here the assumption is
330 that the service knows the password – in other words, it is a shared secret and the [Nonce](#) and
331 [Created](#) are used to generate the key

332 Lines (010) to (025) specify a digital signature. This signature ensures the [integrity](#) of the signed
333 elements. The signature uses the [XML Signature](#) specification identified by the ds namespace
334 declaration in Line (002). In this example, the signature is based on a key generated from the
335 user's password; typically stronger signing mechanisms would be used (see the [Extended](#)
336 [Example](#) later in this document).

337 Lines (011) to (018) describe what is being signed and the type of canonicalization being used.
338 Line (012) specifies how to canonicalize (normalize) the data that is being signed. Lines (014) to
339 (017) select the elements that are signed and how to digest them. Specifically, line (014)
340 indicates that the `<S:Body>` element is signed. In this example only the message body is
341 signed; typically all critical elements of the message are included in the signature (see the
342 [Extended Example](#) below).

343 Line (019) specifies the signature value of the canonicalized form of the data that is being signed
344 as defined in the [XML Signature](#) specification.

345 Lines (020) to (024) provide a *hint* as to where to find the [security token](#) associated with this
346 signature. Specifically, lines (021) to (023) indicate that the [security token](#) can be found at (pulled
347 from) the specified URL.

348 Lines (028) to (030) contain the *body* (payload) of the [SOAP](#) message.

349



350

4 ID References

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There are many motivations for referencing other message elements such as signature references or correlating signatures to security tokens. However, because arbitrary ID attributes require the schemas to be available and processed, ID attributes which can be referenced in a signature are restricted to the following list:

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- ID attributes from XML Signature
- ID attributes from XML Encryption
- wsu:Id global attribute described below

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In addition, when signing a part of an envelope such as the body, it is RECOMMENDED that an ID reference is used instead of a more general transformation, especially XPath. This is to simplify processing.

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4.1 Id Attribute

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There are many situations where elements within SOAP messages need to be referenced. For example, when signing a SOAP message, selected elements are included in the scope of the signature. XML Schema Part 2 provides several built-in data types that may be used for identifying and referencing elements, but their use requires that consumers of the SOAP message either to have or be able to obtain the schemas where the identity or reference mechanisms are defined. In some circumstances, for example, intermediaries, this can be problematic and not desirable.

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Consequently a mechanism is required for identifying and referencing elements, based on the SOAP foundation, which does not rely upon complete schema knowledge of the context in which an element is used. This functionality can be integrated into SOAP processors so that elements can be identified and referred to without dynamic schema discovery and processing.

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This section specifies a namespace-qualified global attribute for identifying an element which can be applied to any element that either allows arbitrary attributes or specifically allows a particular attribute.

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4.2 Id Schema

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To simplify the processing for intermediaries and recipients, a common attribute is defined for identifying an element. This attribute utilizes the XML Schema ID type and specifies a common attribute for indicating this information for elements.

380

The syntax for this attribute is as follows:

381

```
<anyElement wsu:Id="...">...</anyElement>
```

382

The following describes the attribute illustrated above:

383

.../@wsu:Id

384
385

This attribute, defined as type xsd:ID, provides a well-known attribute for specifying the local ID of an element.

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387

Two wsu:Id attributes within an XML document MUST NOT have the same value. Implementations MAY rely on XML Schema validation to provide rudimentary enforcement for

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388 intra-document uniqueness. However, applications SHOULD NOT rely on schema validation
389 alone to enforce uniqueness.

390 This specification does not specify how this attribute will be used and it is expected that other
391 specifications MAY add additional semantics (or restrictions) for their usage of this attribute.

392 The following example illustrates use of this attribute to identify an element:

```
393 <x:myElement wsu:Id="ID1" xmlns:x="..."  
394 xmlns:wsu="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2002/06/utility"/>
```

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395 Conformant processors that do support XML Schema MUST treat this attribute as if it was
396 defined using a global attribute declaration.

397 Conformant processors that do not support dynamic XML Schema or DTDs discovery and
398 processing are strongly encouraged to integrate this attribute definition into their parsers. That is,
399 to treat this attribute information item as if its PSVI has a [type definition] which {target
400 namespace} is "http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" and which {name} is "Id." Doing so
401 allows the processor to inherently know *how* to process the attribute without having to locate and
402 process the associated schema. Specifically, implementations MAY support the value of the
403 `wsu:Id` as the valid identifier for use as an [XPointer](#) shorthand pointer for interoperability with
404 XML Signature references.

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5 Security Header

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The `<wsse:Security>` header block provides a mechanism for attaching security-related information targeted at a specific recipient in a form of a [SOAP role](#). This MAY be either the ultimate recipient of the message or an intermediary. Consequently, elements of this type MAY be present multiple times in a [SOAP](#) message. An intermediary on the message path MAY add one or more new sub-elements to an existing `<wsse:Security>` header block if they are targeted for its [SOAP](#) node or it MAY add one or more new headers for additional targets.

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As stated, a message MAY have multiple `<wsse:Security>` header blocks if they are targeted for separate recipients. However, only one `<wsse:Security>` header block MAY omit the `S:role` attribute and no two `<wsse:Security>` header blocks MAY have the same value for `S:role`. Message security information targeted for different recipients MUST appear in different `<wsse:Security>` header blocks. The `<wsse:Security>` header block without a specified `S:role` MAY be consumed by anyone, but MUST NOT be removed prior to the final destination or endpoint.

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As elements are added to the `<wsse:Security>` header block, they SHOULD be prepended to the existing elements. As such, the `<wsse:Security>` header block represents the signing and encryption steps the message sender took to create the message. This prepending rule ensures that the receiving application MAY process sub-elements in the order they appear in the `<wsse:Security>` header block, because there will be no forward dependency among the sub-elements. Note that this specification does not impose any specific order of processing the sub-elements. The receiving application can use whatever order is required.

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429

When a sub-element refers to a key carried in another sub-element (for example, a signature sub-element that refers to a binary security token sub-element that contains the [X.509](#) certificate used for the signature), the key-bearing security token SHOULD be prepended to the key-using sub-element being added, so that the key material appears before the key-using sub-element.

430

The following illustrates the syntax of this header:

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432
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```
<S:Envelope>
  <S:Header>
    ...
    <wsse:Security S:role="..." S:mustUnderstand="...">
      ...
    </wsse:Security>
    ...
  </S:Header>
  ...
</S:Envelope>
```

441

The following describes the attributes and elements listed in the example above:

442

`/wsse:Security`

443

This is the header block for passing security-related message information to a recipient.

444

`/wsse:Security/@S:role`

445

This attribute allows a specific [SOAP](#) role to be identified. This attribute is optional

446

however, no two instances of the header block may omit a role or specify the same role.

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447 */wsse:Security/{any}*
448 This is an extensibility mechanism to allow different (extensible) types of security
449 information, based on a schema, to be passed.
450 */wsse:Security/@{any}*
451 This is an extensibility mechanism to allow additional attributes, based on schemas, to be
452 added to the header.
453 All compliant implementations MUST be able to process a `<wsse:Security>` element.
454 All compliant implementations MUST declare which profiles they support and MUST be able to
455 process a `<wsse:Security>` element including any sub-elements which may be defined by that
456 profile.
457 The next few sections outline elements that are expected to be used within the
458 `<wsse:Security>` header.



6 Security Tokens

459

460 This chapter specifies some different types of security tokens and how they SHALL be attached
461 to messages.

6.1 Attaching Security Tokens

462 This specification defines the `<wsse:Security>` header as a mechanism for conveying security
463 information with and about a SOAP message. This header is, by design, extensible to support
464 many types of security information.

465 For security tokens based on XML, the extensibility of the `<wsse:Security>` header allows for
466 these security tokens to be directly inserted into the header.

6.1.1 Processing Rules

467 This specification describes the processing rules for using and processing XML Signature and
468 XML Encryption. These rules MUST be followed when using any type of security token. Note
469 that this does NOT mean that security tokens MUST be signed or encrypted – only that if
470 signature or encryption is used in conjunction with security tokens, they MUST be used in a way
471 that conforms to the processing rules defined by this specification.

6.1.2 Subject Confirmation

472 This specification does not dictate if and how claim confirmation must be done; however, it does
473 define how signatures may be used and associated with security tokens (by referencing the
474 security tokens from the signature) as a form of claim confirmation.

6.2 User Name Token

6.2.1 Usernames

475 The `<wsse:UsernameToken>` element is introduced as a way of providing a username. This
476 element is optionally included in the `<wsse:Security>` header.

477 The following illustrates the syntax of this element:

```
483 <wsse:UsernameToken wsu:Id="...">  
484   <wsse:Username>...</wsse:Username>  
485 </wsse:UsernameToken>
```

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486 The following describes the attributes and elements listed in the example above:

487 `/wsse:UsernameToken`

488 This element is used to represent a claimed identity.

489 `/wsse:UsernameToken/@wsu:Id`

490 A string label for this security token.

491 `/wsse:UsernameToken/Username`

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492 This required element specifies the claimed identity.

493 `/wsse:UsernameToken/Username/@{any}`

494 This is an extensibility mechanism to allow additional attributes, based on schemas, to be
 495 the `<wsse:Username>` element.

496 `/wsse:UsernameToken/{any}`

497 This is an extensibility mechanism to allow different (extensible) types of security
 498 information, based on a schema, to be passed.

499 `/wsse:UsernameToken/@{any}`

500 This is an extensibility mechanism to allow additional attributes, based on schemas, to be
 501 added to the UsernameToken.

502 All compliant implementations MUST be able to process a `<wsse:UsernameToken>` element.

503 The following illustrates the use of this:

```

504 <S:Envelope xmlns:S="http://www.w3.org/2001/12/soap-envelope"
505           xmlns:wsse="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2002/06/secext">
506   <S:Header>
507     ...
508     <wsse:Security>
509       <wsse:UsernameToken >
510         <wsse:Username>Zoe</wsse:Username>
511       </wsse:UsernameToken>
512     </wsse:Security>
513     ...
514   </S:Header>
515   ...
516 </S:Envelope>
517
  
```

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518 6.3 Binary Security Tokens

519 6.3.1 Attaching Security Tokens

520 For binary-formatted security tokens, this specification provides a
 521 `<wsse:BinarySecurityToken>` element that can be included in the `<wsse:Security>`
 522 header block.

523

524 6.3.2 Encoding Binary Security Tokens

525 Binary security tokens (e.g., X.509 certificates and Kerberos tickets) or other non-XML formats
 526 require a special encoding format for inclusion. This section describes a basic framework for
 527 using binary security tokens. Subsequent specifications MUST describe the rules for creating
 528 and processing specific binary security token formats.

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529 The `<wsse:BinarySecurityToken>` element defines two attributes that are used to interpret
 530 it. The `ValueType` attribute indicates what the security token is, for example, a Kerberos ticket.
 531 The `EncodingType` tells how the security token is encoded, for example Base64Binary.

532 The following is an overview of the syntax:

```

533 <wsse:BinarySecurityToken wsu:Id=...
534                               EncodingType=...
535                               ValueType=.../>

```

536 The following describes the attributes and elements listed in the example above:

537 */wsse:BinarySecurityToken*

538 This element is used to include a binary-encoded security token.

539 */wsse:BinarySecurityToken/@wsu:Id*

540 An optional string label for this [security token](#).

541 */wsse:BinarySecurityToken/@ValueType*

542 The `ValueType` attribute is used to indicate the "value space" of the encoded binary data (e.g. an [X.509](#) certificate). The `ValueType` attribute allows a qualified name that defines the value type and space of the encoded binary data. This attribute is extensible using [XML namespaces](#). Subsequent specifications MUST define the `ValueType` value for the tokens that they define.

547 */wsse:BinarySecurityToken/@EncodingType*

548 The `EncodingType` attribute is used to indicate, using a QName, the encoding format of the binary data (e.g., `wsse:Base64Binary`). A new attribute is introduced, as there are issues with the current schema validation tools that make derivations of mixed simple and complex types difficult within [XML Schema](#). The `EncodingType` attribute is interpreted to indicate the encoding format of the element. The following encoding formats are pre-defined:

QName	Description
<code>wsse:Base64Binary</code>	XML Schema base 64 encoding

554 */wsse:BinarySecurityToken/@{any}*

555 This is an extensibility mechanism to allow additional attributes, based on schemas, to be added.

557 All compliant implementations MUST be able to support a `<wsse:BinarySecurityToken>` element.

559 When a `<wsse:BinarySecurityToken>` is included in a signature—that is, it is referenced from a `<ds:Signature>` element—care should be taken so that the canonicalization algorithm (e.g., [Exclusive XML Canonicalization](#)) does not allow unauthorized replacement of namespace prefixes of the QNames used in the attribute or element values. In particular, it is RECOMMENDED that these namespace prefixes be declared within the `<wsse:BinarySecurityToken>` element if this token does not carry the validating key (and consequently it is not cryptographically bound to the [signature](#)). For example, if we wanted to sign the previous example, ~~we need to include the consumed namespace definitions.~~

567 In the following example, a custom `ValueType` is used. Consequently, the namespace definition for this `ValueType` is included in the `<wsse:BinarySecurityToken>` element. Note that the definition of `wsse` is also included as it is used for the encoding type and the element.

```

570 <wsse:BinarySecurityToken

```

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573
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576

```
xmlns:wsse="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2002/06/secext "  
wsu:Id="myToken"  
ValueType="x:MyType" xmlns:x="http://www.fabrikaml23.com/x"  
EncodingType="wsse:Base64Binary">  
MIEZzCCA9CgAwIBAgIQEmtJZc0...  
</wsse:BinarySecurityToken>
```

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577 6.4 XML Tokens

578 This section presents the basic principles and framework for using XML-based security tokens.
579 Subsequent specifications describe rules and processes for specific XML-based security token
580 formats.

581

582 6.4.1 Identifying and Referencing Security Tokens

583 This specification also defines multiple mechanisms for identifying and referencing security
584 tokens using the *wsu:id* attribute and the `<wsse:SecurityTokenReference>` element (as well
585 as some additional mechanisms). Please refer to the specific profile documents for the
586 appropriate reference mechanism. However, specific extensions MAY be made to the
587 `wsse:SecurityTokenReference` element.

588

589



7 Token References

590

591 This chapter discusses and defines mechanisms for referencing security tokens.

7.1 SecurityTokenReference Element

592 A **security token** conveys a set of **claims**. Sometimes these claims reside somewhere else and
593 need to be "pulled" by the receiving application. The `<wsse:SecurityTokenReference>`
594 element provides an extensible mechanism for referencing **security tokens**.
595

596 This element provides an open content model for referencing security tokens because not all
597 tokens support a common reference pattern. Similarly, some token formats have closed
598 schemas and define their own reference mechanisms. The open content model allows
599 appropriate reference mechanisms to be used when referencing corresponding token types.

600 If a `SecurityTokenReference` used outside of the `<Security>` header block the meaning of the
601 response and/or processing rules of the resulting reference are **MUST** be specified by the
602 containing element and are out of scope of this specification.

603 The following illustrates the syntax of this element:

```
604 <wsse:SecurityTokenReference wsu:Id="..." >  
605   ...  
606 </wsse:SecurityTokenReference>
```

607 The following describes the elements defined above:

608 `/wsse:SecurityTokenReference`

609 This element provides a reference to a security token.

610 `/wsse:SecurityTokenReference/@wsu:Id`

611 A string label for this **security token** reference. This identifier names the reference. This
612 attribute does not indicate the ID of what is being referenced, that is done using a
613 fragment URI in a `<Reference>` element within the `<SecurityTokenReference>`
614 element.

615 `/wsse:SecurityTokenReference/@wsse:Usage`

616 This optional attribute is used to type the usage of the `<SecurityToken>`. Usages are
617 specified using QNames and multiple usages **MAY** be specified using XML list
618 semantics.

QName	Description
TBD	TBD

619

620 `/wsse:SecurityTokenReference/{any}`

621 This is an extensibility mechanism to allow different (extensible) types of security
622 references, based on a schema, to be passed.

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623 `/wsse:SecurityTokenReference/@{any}`
 624 This is an extensibility mechanism to allow additional attributes, based on schemas, to be
 625 added to the header.
 626 All compliant implementations MUST be able to process a
 627 `<wsse:SecurityTokenReference>` element.
 628 This element can also be used as a direct child element of `<ds:KeyInfo>` to indicate a hint to
 629 retrieve the key information from a security token placed somewhere else. In particular, it is
 630 RECOMMENDED, when using [XML Signature](#) and [XML Encryption](#), that a
 631 `<wsse:SecurityTokenReference>` element be placed inside a `<ds:KeyInfo>` to reference
 632 the [security token](#) used for the signature or encryption.
 633 There are several challenges that implementations face when trying to interoperate. In order to
 634 process the IDs and references requires the recipient to *understand* the schema. This may be an
 635 expensive task and in the general case impossible as there is no way to know the "schema
 636 location" for a specific namespace URI. As well, the primary goal of a reference is to uniquely
 637 identify the desired token. ID references are, by definition, unique by XML. However, other
 638 mechanisms such as "principal name" are not required to be unique and therefore such
 639 references may be unique.
 640 The following list provides a list of the specific reference mechanisms defined in WSS: SOAP
 641 Message Security in preferred order (i.e., most specific to least specific):
 642 **Direct References** – This allows references to included tokens using URI fragments and external
 643 tokens using full URIs.
 644 **Key Identifiers** – This allows tokens to be referenced using an opaque value that represents the
 645 token (defined by token type/profile).
 646 **Key Names** – This allows tokens to be referenced using a string that matches an identity
 647 assertion within the security token. This is a subset match and may result in multiple security
 648 tokens that match the specified name.

649 7.2 Direct References

650 The `<wsse:Reference>` element provides an extensible mechanism for directly referencing
 651 [security tokens](#) using URIs.

652 The following illustrates the syntax of this element:

```
653 <wsse:SecurityTokenReference wsu:Id="..." >
654   <wsse:Reference URI="..." ValueType="..." / >
655 </wsse:SecurityTokenReference>
```

656 The following describes the elements defined above:

657 `/wsse:SecurityTokenReference/Reference`

658 This element is used to identify an abstract URI location for locating a security token.

659 `/wsse:SecurityTokenReference/Reference/@URI`

660 This optional attribute specifies an abstract URI for where to find a security token. If a
 661 fragment is specified, then it indicates the local ID of the token being referenced.

662 `/wsse:SecurityTokenReference/Reference/@ValueType`

663 This optional attribute specifies a QName that is used to identify the *type* of token being
 664 referenced (see `<wsse:BinarySecurityToken>`). This specification does not define

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665 any processing rules around the usage of this attribute, however, specifications for
666 individual token types MAY define specific processing rules and semantics around the
667 value of the URI and how it SHALL be interpreted. If this attribute is not present, the URI
668 SHALL be processed as a normal URI.

669 */wsse:SecurityTokenReference/Reference/{any}*

670 This is an extensibility mechanism to allow different (extensible) types of security
671 references, based on a schema, to be passed.

672 */wsse:SecurityTokenReference/Reference/@{any}*

673 This is an extensibility mechanism to allow additional attributes, based on schemas, to be
674 added to the header.

675 The following illustrates the use of this element:

```
676 <wsse:SecurityTokenReference  
677     xmlns:wsse="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2002/06/secext">  
678     <wsse:Reference  
679         URI="http://www.fabrikam123.com/tokens/Zoe#X509token"/>  
680 </wsse:SecurityTokenReference>
```

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681 7.3 Key Identifiers

682 Alternatively, if a direct reference is not used, then it is RECOMMENDED to use a key identifier to
683 specify/reference a security token instead of a ds:KeyName. The `<wsse:KeyIdentifier>`
684 element SHALL be placed in the `<wsse:SecurityTokenReference>` element to reference a
685 token using an identifier. This element SHOULD be used for all key identifiers.

686 The processing model assumes that the key identifier for a security token is constant.
687 Consequently, processing a key identifier is simply looking for a security token whose key
688 identifier matches a given specified constant.

689 The following is an overview of the syntax:

```
690 <wsse:SecurityTokenReference>  
691     <wsse:KeyIdentifier wsu:Id="..."  
692         ValueType="..."  
693         EncodingType="...">  
694         ...  
695     </wsse:KeyIdentifier>  
696 </wsse:SecurityTokenReference>
```

697 The following describes the attributes and elements listed in the example above:

698 */wsse:SecurityTokenReference/KeyIdentifier*

699 This element is used to include a binary-encoded key identifier.

700 */wsse:SecurityTokenReference/KeyIdentifier/@wsu:Id*

701 An optional string label for this identifier.

702 */wsse:SecurityTokenReference/KeyIdentifier/@ValueType*

703 The `ValueType` attribute is used to optionally indicate the type of token with the
704 specified identifier. If specified, this is a *hint* to the recipient. Any value specified for
705 binary security tokens, or any XML token element QName can be specified here. If this
706 attribute isn't specified, then the identifier applies to any type of token.

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707 */wsse:SecurityTokenReference/KeyIdentifier/@EncodingType*

708 The optional `EncodingType` attribute is used to indicate, using a QName, the encoding
 709 format of the binary data (e.g., `wsse:Base64Binary`). The base values defined in this
 710 specification are used:

QName	Description
<code>wsse:Base64Binary</code>	XML Schema base 64 encoding (default)

711 `/wsse:SecurityTokenReference/KeyIdentifier/@{any}`

712 This is an extensibility mechanism to allow additional attributes, based on schemas, to be
 713 added.

714 7.4 Embedded References

715 In some cases a reference may be to an embedded token (as opposed to a pointer to a token
 716 that resides elsewhere. To do this, the `<wsse:Embedded>` element is specified within a
 717 `<wsse:SecurityTokenReference>` element.

718 The following is an overview of the syntax:

```
719 <wsse:SecurityTokenReference>
720   <wsse:Embedded wsu:Id="...">
721     ...
722   </wsse:Embedded>
723 </wsse:SecurityTokenReference>
```

724 The following describes the attributes and elements listed in the example above:

725 `/wsse:SecurityTokenReference/Embedded`

726 This element is used to embed a token directly within a reference (that is, to create a
 727 *local* or *literal* reference).

728 `/wsse:SecurityTokenReference/Embedded/@wsu:Id`

729 An optional string label for this element.

730 `/wsse:SecurityTokenReference/KeyIdentifier/{any}`

731 This is an extensibility mechanism to allow any security token, based on schemas, to be
 732 embedded.

733 `/wsse:SecurityTokenReference/KeyIdentifier/@{any}`

734 This is an extensibility mechanism to allow additional attributes, based on schemas, to be
 735 added.

736 The following example illustrates embedding a SAML assertion:

```
737 <S:Envelope>
738   <S:Header>
739     <wsse:Security>
740       ...
741       <wsse:SecurityTokenReference>
742         <wsse:Embedded wsu:Id="tok1">
743           ...
744         </wsse:Embedded>
745       </wsse:SecurityTokenReference>
746     </wsse:Security>
747   </S:Header>
748 </S:Envelope>
```

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748
749

```
<wsse:Security>  
  </S:Header>  
  ...  
</S:Body>
```

750 7.5 ds:KeyInfo

751 The <ds:KeyInfo> element (from [XML Signature](#)) can be used for carrying the key information
752 and is allowed for different key types and for future extensibility. However, in this specification,
753 the use of <wsse:BinarySecurityToken> is the RECOMMENDED way to carry key material
754 if the key type contains binary data. Please refer to the specific profile documents for the
755 appropriate way to carry key material.

756 The following example illustrates use of this element to fetch a named key:

757
758
759

```
<ds:KeyInfo Id="..." xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">  
  <ds:KeyName>CN=Hiroshi Maruyama, C=JP</ds:KeyName>  
</ds:KeyInfo>
```

760 7.6 Key Names

761 It is strongly RECOMMENDED to use key identifiers. However, if key names are used, then it is
762 strongly RECOMMENDED that <ds:KeyName> elements conform to the attribute names in
763 section 2.3 of RFC 2253 (this is recommended by XML Signature for <X509SubjectName>) for
764 interoperability.

765 Additionally, defined for e-mail addresses, SHOULD conform to RFC 822:

766


```
EmailAddress=ckaler@microsoft.com
```

767 7.7 Token Reference Lookup Processing Order

768 There are a number of mechanisms described in [XML Signature](#) and this specification
769 for referencing security tokens. To resolve possible ambiguities when more than one
770 of these reference constructs is included in a single KeyInfo element, the following
771 processing order SHOULD be used:

- 772 1. Resolve any <wsse:Reference> elements (specified within
773 <wsse:SecurityTokenReference>).
- 774 2. Resolve any <wsse:KeyIdentifier> elements (specified within
775 <wsse:SecurityTokenReference>).
- 776 3. Resolve any <ds:KeyName> elements.
- 777 4. Resolve any other <ds:KeyInfo> elements.

778 The processing stops as soon as one key has been located.



779

8 Signatures

780 Message senders may want to enable message recipients to determine whether a message was
781 altered in transit and to verify that the claims in a particular [security token](#) apply to the sender of
782 the message.

783 Demonstrating knowledge of a confirmation key associated with a token key claim supports
784 confirming the other token claims. Knowledge of a confirmation key may be demonstrated using a
785 key to create an XML Signature, for example. The relying party acceptance of the claims may
786 depend on confidence in the token . Multiple tokens may have a key claim for a signature and
787 may be referenced from the signature using a SecurityTokenReference. A key claim can be an
788 X.509 Certificate token, or a Kerberos service ticket token to give two examples.

789 Because of the mutability of some [SOAP](#) headers, senders SHOULD NOT use the *Enveloped*
790 *Signature Transform* defined in [XML Signature](#). Instead, messages SHOULD explicitly include
791 the elements to be signed. Similarly, senders SHOULD NOT use the *Enveloping Signature*
792 defined in [XML Signature](#).

793 This specification allows for multiple signatures and signature formats to be attached to a
794 message, each referencing different, even overlapping, parts of the message. This is important
795 for many distributed applications where messages flow through multiple processing stages. For
796 example, a sender may submit an order that contains an orderID header. The sender signs the
797 orderID header and the body of the request (the contents of the order). When this is received by
798 the order processing sub-system, it may insert a shippingID into the header. The order sub-
799 system would then sign, at a minimum, the orderID and the shippingID, and possibly the body as
800 well. Then when this order is processed and shipped by the shipping department, a shippedInfo
801 header might be appended. The shipping department would sign, at a minimum, the shippedInfo
802 and the shippingID and possibly the body and forward the message to the billing department for
803 processing. The billing department can verify the signatures and determine a valid chain of trust
804 for the order, as well as who authorized each step in the process.

805 All compliant implementations MUST be able to support the [XML Signature](#) standard.

8.1 Algorithms

807 This specification builds on [XML Signature](#) and therefore has the same algorithm requirements as
808 those specified in the [XML Signature](#) specification.

809 The following table outlines additional algorithms that are strongly RECOMMENDED by this
810 specification:

Algorithm Type	Algorithm	Algorithm URI
Canonicalization	Exclusive XML Canonicalization	http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#
Transformations	XML Decryption Transformation	http://www.w3.org/2001/04/decrypt#

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811 The [Exclusive XML Canonicalization](#) algorithm addresses the pitfalls of general canonicalization
812 that can occur from *leaky* namespaces with pre-existing signatures.
813 Finally, if a sender wishes to sign a message before encryption, they should use the [Decryption
814 Transformation for XML Signature](#).

815 8.2 Signing Messages

816 The `<wsse:Security>` header block MAY be used to carry a signature compliant with the [XML
817 Signature](#) specification within a [SOAP](#) Envelope for the purpose of signing one or more elements
818 in the [SOAP](#) Envelope. Multiple signature entries MAY be added into a single [SOAP](#) Envelope
819 within the `<wsse:Security>` header block. Senders SHOULD take care to sign all important
820 elements of the message, but care MUST be taken in creating a signing policy that will not to sign
821 parts of the message that might legitimately be altered in transit.

822 [SOAP](#) applications MUST satisfy the following conditions:

823 The application MUST be capable of processing the required elements defined in the [XML
824 Signature](#) specification.

825 To add a signature to a `<wsse:Security>` header block, a `<ds:Signature>` element
826 conforming to the [XML Signature](#) specification SHOULD be prepended to the existing content of
827 the `<wsse:Security>` header block. All the `<ds:Reference>` elements contained in the
828 signature SHOULD refer to a resource within the enclosing [SOAP](#) envelope, or in an attachment.
829 [XPath](#) filtering can be used to specify objects to be signed, as described in the [XML Signature](#)
830 specification. However, since the [SOAP](#) message exchange model allows intermediate
831 applications to modify the Envelope (add or delete a header block; for example), [XPath](#) filtering
832 does not always result in the same objects after message delivery. Care should be taken in using
833 [XPath](#) filtering so that there is no subsequent validation failure due to such modifications.

834 The problem of modification by intermediaries is applicable to more than just [XPath](#) processing.
835 Digital signatures, because of canonicalization and [digests](#), present particularly fragile examples
836 of such relationships. If overall message processing is to remain robust, intermediaries must
837 exercise care that their transformations do not occur within the scope of a digitally signed
838 component.

839 Due to security concerns with namespaces, this specification strongly RECOMMENDS the use of
840 the "[Exclusive XML Canonicalization](#)" algorithm or another canonicalization algorithm that
841 provides equivalent or greater protection.

842 For processing efficiency it is RECOMMENDED to have the signature added and then the
843 security token pre-pended so that a processor can read and cache the token before it is used.

844 8.3 Signing Tokens

845 It is often desirable to sign security tokens that are included in a message or even external to the
846 message. The XML Signature specification provides several common ways for referencing
847 information to be signed such as URIs, IDs, and [XPath](#), but some token formats may not allow
848 tokens to be referenced using URIs or IDs and [XPath](#)s may be undesirable in some situations.

849 This specification allows different tokens to have their own unique reference mechanisms which
850 are specified in their profile as extensions to the `<SecurityTokenReference>` element. This
851 element provides a uniform referencing mechanism that is guaranteed to work with all token

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852 formats. Consequently, this specification defines a new reference option for XML Signature: the
853 STR Dereference Transform.

854 This transform is specified by the URI <http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/2002/06/STR-Transform> and
855 when applied to a <SecurityTokenReference> element it means that the output is the token
856 referenced by the <SecurityTokenReference> element not the element itself.

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857 The processing model is to echo the input to the transform except when a
858 <SecurityTokenReference> element is encountered. When one is found, the element is not
859 echoed, but instead, it is used to locate a token(s) matching the criteria and rules defines by the
860 <SecurityTokenReference> element and echo it (them) to the output. Consequently, the
861 output of the transformation is the resultant sequence representing the input with any
862 <SecurityTokenReference> elements replaced by the referenced security token(s) matched

863 The following illustrates an example of this transformation which references a token contained
864 within the message envelope:

```
865 ...  
866 <wsse:SecurityTokenReference wsu:Id="Str1">  
867 ...  
868 </wsse:SecurityTokenReference>  
869 ...  
870 <Signature xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">  
871   <SignedInfo>  
872     ...  
873     <Reference URI="#Str1">  
874       <Transforms>  
875         <ds:Transform  
876           Algorithm=  
877             "http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/2002/06/STR-Transform" />  
878         </Transforms>  
879         <DigestMethod Algorithm=  
880           "http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1" />  
881         <DigestValue>...</DigestValue>  
882       </Reference>  
883     </SignedInfo>  
884     <SignatureValue></SignatureValue>  
885 </Signature>  
886 ...
```

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887 8.4 Signature Validation

888 The validation of a <ds:Signature> element inside an <wsse:Security> header block
889 SHALL fail if

- 890 • the syntax of the content of the element does not conform to this specification, or
- 891 • the validation of the [signature](#) contained in the element fails according to the core
892 validation of the [XML Signature](#) specification, or
- 893 • the application applying its own validation policy rejects the message for some reason
894 (e.g., the [signature](#) is created by an untrusted key – verifying the previous two steps only
895 performs cryptographic validation of the [signature](#)).

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896 If the validation of the signature element fails, applications MAY report the failure to the sender
897 using the fault codes defined in [Section 12](#) Error Handling.

898 8.5 Example

899 The following sample message illustrates the use of integrity and security tokens. For this
900 example, only the message body is signed.

```
901 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
902 <S:Envelope xmlns:S="http://www.w3.org/2001/12/soap-envelope"
903           xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"
904           xmlns:wsse="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2002/06/secext"
905           xmlns:xenc="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#">
906   <S:Header>
907     <wsse:Security>
908       <wsse:BinarySecurityToken
909         ValueType="wsse:X509v3"
910         EncodingType="wsse:Base64Binary"
911         wsu:Id="X509Token">
912         MIEZzCCA9CgAwIBAgIQEmtJZc0rqrKh5i...
913       </wsse:BinarySecurityToken>
914       <ds:Signature>
915         <ds:SignedInfo>
916           <ds:CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm=
917             "http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#" />
918           <ds:SignatureMethod Algorithm=
919             "http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#rsa-sha1" />
920           <ds:Reference URI="#myBody">
921             <ds:Transforms>
922               <ds:Transform Algorithm=
923                 "http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#" />
924             </ds:Transforms>
925             <ds:DigestMethod Algorithm=
926               "http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1" />
927             <ds:DigestValue>EULddytSol...</ds:DigestValue>
928           </ds:Reference>
929         </ds:SignedInfo>
930         <ds:SignatureValue>
931         BL8jdfToEbl1/vXcMZNNjPOV...
932       </ds:SignatureValue>
933       <ds:KeyInfo>
934         <wsse:SecurityTokenReference>
935           <wsse:Reference URI="#X509Token" />
936         </wsse:SecurityTokenReference>
937       </ds:KeyInfo>
938     </ds:Signature>
939   </wsse:Security>
940 </S:Header>
941 <S:Body wsu:Id="myBody" >
942   <tru:StockSymbol xmlns:tru="http://www.fabrikaml23.com/payloads">
943     QQQ
944   </tru:StockSymbol>
945 </S:Body>
946 </S:Envelope>
```

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9 Encryption

947

948 This specification allows encryption of any combination of body blocks, header blocks, any of
949 these sub-structures, and attachments by either a common symmetric key shared by the sender
950 and the recipient or a symmetric key carried in the message in an encrypted form.

951 In order to allow this flexibility, this specification leverages the [XML Encryption](#) standard.
952 Specifically what this specification describes is how three elements (listed below and defined in
953 [XML Encryption](#)) can be used within the `<wsse:Security>` header block. When a sender or
954 an intermediary encrypts portion(s) of a [SOAP](#) message using [XML Encryption](#) they MUST
955 prepend a sub-element to the `<wsse:Security>` header block. Furthermore, the encrypting
956 party MUST prepend the sub-element into the `<wsse:Security>` header block for the targeted
957 recipient that is expected to decrypt these encrypted portions. The combined process of
958 encrypting portion(s) of a message and adding one of these a sub-elements referring to the
959 encrypted portion(s) is called an encryption step hereafter. The sub-element should contain
960 enough information for the recipient to identify which portions of the message are to be decrypted
961 by the recipient.

962 All compliant implementations MUST be able to support the [XML Encryption](#) standard.

9.1 xenc:ReferenceList

963

964 When encrypting elements or element contents within a [SOAP](#) envelope, the
965 `<xenc:ReferenceList>` element from [XML Encryption](#) MAY be used to create a manifest of
966 encrypted portion(s), which are expressed as `<xenc:EncryptedData>` elements within the
967 envelope. An element or element content to be encrypted by this encryption step MUST be
968 replaced by a corresponding `<xenc:EncryptedData>` according to [XML Encryption](#). All the
969 `<xenc:EncryptedData>` elements created by this encryption step SHOULD be listed in
970 `<xenc:DataReference>` elements inside an `<xenc:ReferenceList>` element.

971 Although in [XML Encryption](#), `<xenc:ReferenceList>` is originally designed to be used within
972 an `<xenc:EncryptedKey>` element (which implies that all the referenced
973 `<xenc:EncryptedData>` elements are encrypted by the same key), this specification allows
974 that `<xenc:EncryptedData>` elements referenced by the same `<xenc:ReferenceList>`
975 MAY be encrypted by different keys. Each encryption key can be specified in `<ds:KeyInfo>`
976 within individual `<xenc:EncryptedData>`.

977 A typical situation where the `<xenc:ReferenceList>` sub-element is useful is that the sender
978 and the recipient use a shared secret key. The following illustrates the use of this sub-element:

979

```
<S:Envelope
  xmlns:S="http://www.w3.org/2001/12/soap-envelope"
  xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"
  xmlns:wsse="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2002/06/secext"
  xmlns:xenc="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#">
  <S:Header>
    <wsse:Security>
      <xenc:ReferenceList>
        <xenc:DataReference URI="#bodyID"/>
      </xenc:ReferenceList>
```

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```

989     </wsse:Security>
990 </S:Header>
991 <S:Body>
992     <xenc:EncryptedData Id="bodyID">
993         <ds:KeyInfo>
994             <ds:KeyName>CN=Hiroshi Maruyama, C=JP</ds:KeyName>
995         </ds:KeyInfo>
996         <xenc:CipherData>
997             <xenc:CipherValue>...</xenc:CipherValue>
998         </xenc:CipherData>
999     </xenc:EncryptedData>
1000 </S:Body>
1001 </S:Envelope>

```

1002 9.2 xenc:EncryptedKey

1003 When the encryption step involves encrypting elements or element contents within a SOAP
1004 envelope with a symmetric key, which is in turn to be encrypted by the recipient's key and
1005 embedded in the message, <xenc:EncryptedKey> MAY be used for carrying such an
1006 encrypted key. This sub-element SHOULD have a manifest, that is, an
1007 <xenc:ReferenceList> element, in order for the recipient to know the portions to be
1008 decrypted with this key. An element or element content to be encrypted by this encryption step
1009 MUST be replaced by a corresponding <xenc:EncryptedData> according to XML Encryption.
1010 All the <xenc:EncryptedData> elements created by this encryption step SHOULD be listed in
1011 the <xenc:ReferenceList> element inside this sub-element.

1012 This construct is useful when encryption is done by a randomly generated symmetric key that is
1013 in turn encrypted by the recipient's public key. The following illustrates the use of this element:

```

1014 <S:Envelope
1015     xmlns:S="http://www.w3.org/2001/12/soap-envelope"
1016     xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"
1017     xmlns:wsse="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2002/06/secext"
1018     xmlns:xenc="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#">
1019     <S:Header>
1020         <wsse:Security>
1021             <xenc:EncryptedKey>
1022                 <xenc:EncryptionMethod Algorithm="..."/>
1023                 <ds:KeyInfo>
1024                     <wsse:SecurityTokenReference>
1025                         <wsse:KeyIdentifier EncodingType="wsse:Base64Binary"
1026                             ValueType="wsse:X509v3">MIGfMa0GCSq...
1027                         </wsse:KeyIdentifier>
1028                     </wsse:SecurityTokenReference>
1029                 </ds:KeyInfo>
1030                 <xenc:CipherData>
1031                     <xenc:CipherValue>...</xenc:CipherValue>
1032                 </xenc:CipherData>
1033                 <xenc:ReferenceList>
1034                     <xenc:DataReference URI="#bodyID"/>
1035                 </xenc:ReferenceList>
1036             </xenc:EncryptedKey>
1037         </wsse:Security>
1038     </S:Header>
1039     <S:Body>

```

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```

1040     <xenc:EncryptedData Id="bodyID">
1041         <xenc:CipherData>
1042             <xenc:CipherValue>...</xenc:CipherValue>
1043         </xenc:CipherData>
1044     </xenc:EncryptedData>
1045 </S:Body>
1046 </S:Envelope>

```

1047 While XML Encryption specifies that <xenc:EncryptedKey> elements MAY be specified in
1048 <xenc:EncryptedData> elements, this specification strongly RECOMMENDS that
1049 <xenc:EncryptedKey> elements be placed in the <wsse:Security> header.

1050 9.3 xenc:EncryptedData

1051 In some cases security-related information is provided in a purely encrypted form or non-XML
1052 attachments MAY be encrypted. The <xenc:EncryptedData> element from [XML Encryption](#)
1053 SHALL be used for these scenarios. For each part of the encrypted attachment, one encryption
1054 step is needed; that is, for each attachment to be encrypted, one <xenc:EncryptedData> sub-
1055 element MUST be added with the following rules (note that steps 2-4 applies only if MIME types
1056 are being used for attachments).

1057 The contents of the attachment MUST be replaced by the encrypted octet string.

1058 The replaced MIME part MUST have the media type application/octet-stream.

1059 The original media type of the attachment MUST be declared in the mimeType attribute of the
1060 <xenc:EncryptedData> element.

1061 The encrypted MIME part MUST be referenced by an <xenc:CipherReference> element with
1062 a URI that points to the MIME part with cid: as the scheme component of the URI.

1063 The following illustrates the use of this element to indicate an encrypted attachment:

```

1064 <S:Envelope
1065     xmlns:S="http://www.w3.org/2001/12/soap-envelope"
1066     xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"
1067     xmlns:wsse="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2002/06/secext"
1068     xmlns:xenc="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmenc#">
1069     <S:Header>
1070         <wsse:Security>
1071             <xenc:EncryptedData mimeType="image/png">
1072                 <ds:KeyInfo>
1073                     <wsse:SecurityTokenReference>
1074                         <xenc:EncryptionMethod Algorithm="..."/>
1075                         <wsse:KeyIdentifier EncodingType="wsse:Base64Binary"
1076                             ValueType="wsse:X509v3">MIGfMa0GCSq...
1077                     </wsse:KeyIdentifier>
1078                 </wsse:SecurityTokenReference>
1079             </ds:KeyInfo>
1080             <xenc:CipherData>
1081                 <xenc:CipherReference URI="cid:image"/>
1082             </xenc:CipherData>
1083         </xenc:EncryptedData>
1084     </wsse:Security>
1085     </S:Header>
1086     <S:Body> </S:Body>
1087 </S:Envelope>

```

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1088 **9.4 Processing Rules**

1089 Encrypted parts or attachments to the SOAP message using one of the sub-elements defined
1090 above MUST be in compliance with the XML Encryption specification. An encrypted SOAP
1091 envelope MUST still be a valid SOAP envelope. The message creator MUST NOT encrypt the
1092 <S:Envelope>, <S:Header>, or <S:Body> elements but MAY encrypt child elements of
1093 either the <S:Header> and <S:Body> elements. Multiple steps of encryption MAY be added
1094 into a single <Security> header block if they are targeted for the same recipient.

1095 When an element or element content inside a SOAP envelope (e.g. of the contents of <S:Body>)
1096 is to be encrypted, it MUST be replaced by an <xenc:EncryptedData>, according to XML
1097 Encryption and it SHOULD be referenced from the <xenc:ReferenceList> element created
1098 by this encryption step. This specification allows placing the encrypted octet stream in an
1099 attachment. For example, for an <xenc:EncryptedData> element in an <S:Body> element has
1100 <xenc:CipherReference> that refers to an attachment, then the decrypted octet stream
1101 SHALL replace the <xenc:EncryptedData>. However, if the <xenc:EncryptedData>
1102 element is located in the <Security> header block and it refers to an attachment, then the
1103 decrypted octet stream MUST replace the encrypted octet stream in the attachment.

1104 **9.4.1 Encryption**

1105 The general steps (non-normative) for creating an encrypted SOAP message in compliance with
1106 this specification are listed below (note that use of <xenc:ReferenceList> is
1107 RECOMMENDED).

1108 Create a new SOAP envelope.
1109 Create a <Security> header

1110 Create an <xenc:ReferenceList> sub-element, an <xenc:EncryptedKey> sub-element, or
1111 an <xenc:EncryptedData> sub-element in the <Security> header block (note that if the
1112 SOAP "role" and "mustUnderstand" attributes are different, then a new header block may be
1113 necessary), depending on the type of encryption.

1114 Locate data items to be encrypted, i.e., XML elements, element contents within the target SOAP
1115 envelope, and attachments.

1116 Encrypt the data items as follows: For each XML element or element content within the target
1117 SOAP envelope, encrypt it according to the processing rules of the XML Encryption specification.
1118 Each selected original element or element content MUST be removed and replaced by the
1119 resulting <xenc:EncryptedData> element. For an attachment, the contents MUST be replaced
1120 by encrypted cipher data as described in section 9.3 Signature Validation.

1121 The optional <ds:KeyInfo> element in the <xenc:EncryptedData> element MAY reference
1122 another <ds:KeyInfo> element. Note that if the encryption is based on an attached security
1123 token, then a <SecurityTokenReference> element SHOULD be added to the
1124 <ds:KeyInfo> element to facilitate locating it.

1125 Create an <xenc:DataReference> element referencing the generated
1126 <xenc:EncryptedData> elements. Add the created <xenc:DataReference> element to the
1127 <xenc:ReferenceList>.

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1128 **9.4.2 Decryption**

1129 On receiving a SOAP envelope containing encryption header elements, for each encryption
1130 header element the following general steps should be processed (non-normative):

1131 Locate the <xenc:EncryptedData> items to be decrypted (possibly using the
1132 <xenc:ReferenceList>).

1133 Decrypt them as follows: For each element in the target SOAP envelope, decrypt it according to
1134 the processing rules of the XML Encryption specification and the processing rules listed above.

1135 If the decrypted data is part of an attachment and MIME types were used, then revise the MIME
1136 type of the attachment to the original MIME type (if one exists).

1137 If the decryption fails for some reason, applications MAY report the failure to the sender using the
1138 fault code defined in Section 12 Error Handling.

1139 **9.5 Decryption Transformation**

1140 The ordering semantics of the <wsse:Security> header are sufficient to determine if
1141 signatures are over encrypted or unencrypted data. However, when a signature is included in
1142 one <wsse:Security> header and the encryption data is in another <wsse:Security>
1143 header, the proper processing order may not be apparent.

1144 If the sender wishes to sign a message that MAY subsequently be encrypted by an intermediary
1145 then the sender MAY use the Decryption Transform for XML Signature to explicitly specify the
1146 order of decryption.

1147



1148

10 Message Timestamps

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It is often important for the recipient to be able to determine the *freshness* of a message. In some cases, a message may be so *stale* that the recipient may decide to ignore it.

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This specification does not provide a mechanism for synchronizing time. The assumption is either that the recipient is using a mechanism to synchronize time (e.g. NTP) or, more likely for federated applications, that they are making assessments about time based on three factors: creation time of the message, transmission checkpoints, and transmission delays and their local time.

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To assist a recipient in making an assessment of staleness, a requestor may wish to indicate a suggested expiration time after which the recipient should ignore the message. The specification provides XML elements by which the requestor may express the expiration time of a message, the requestor's clock time at the moment the message was created, checkpoint timestamps (when an **SOAP** role received the message) along the communication path, and the delays introduced by transmission and other factors subsequent to creation. The quality of the delays is a function of how well they reflect the actual delays (e.g., how well they reflect transmission delays).

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It should be noted that this is not a protocol for making assertions or determining when, or how fast, a service produced or processed a message.

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This specification defines and illustrates time references in terms of the *dateTimeType* defined in XML Schema. It is RECOMMENDED that all time references use this type. It is further RECOMMENDED that all references be in UTC time. If, however, other time types are used, then the *ValueType* attribute (described below) MUST be specified to indicate the data type of the time format. Requestors and receivers SHOULD NOT rely on other applications supporting time resolution finer than milliseconds. Implementations MUST NOT generate time instants that specify leap seconds.

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10.1 Model

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This specification provides several tools for recipient s to process the expiration time presented by the requestor. The first is the **creation time**. Recipient s can use this value to assess possible clock skew . However, to make some assessments, the time required to go from the requestor to the recipient may also be useful in making this assessment. Two mechanisms are provided for this. The first is that **intermediaries** may add timestamp elements indicating when they received the message. This knowledge can be useful to get a holistic view of clocks along the message path. The second is that intermediaries can specify any delays they imposed on message delivery. It should be noted that not all **delays** can be accounted for, such as wire time and parties that don't report. Recipients need to take this into account when evaluating clock skew .

1183

10.2 Timestamp Elements

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This specification defines the following message timestamp elements. These elements are defined for use with the `<wsu:Timestamp>` header for SOAP messages, but they can be used anywhere within the header or body that creation, expiration, and delay times are needed.

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1188 **10.2.1 Creation**

1189 The <wsu:Created> element specifies a creation timestamp. The exact meaning and
1190 semantics are dependent on the context in which the element is used. The syntax for this
1191 element is as follows:

```
1192 <wsu:Created ValueType="..." wsu:Id="...">...</wsu:Created>
```

1193 The following describes the attributes and elements listed in the schema above:

1194 */wsu:Created*

1195 This element's value is a creation timestamp. Its type is specified by the ValueType
1196 attribute.

1197 */wsu:Created/@ValueType*

1198 This optional attribute specifies the type of the time data. This is specified as the XML
1199 Schema type. The default value is `xsd:dateTime`.

1200 */wsu:Created/@wsu:Id*

1201 This optional attribute specifies an XML Schema ID that can be used to reference this
1202 element.

1203 **10.2.2 Expiration**

1204 The <wsu:Expires> element specifies the expiration time. The exact meaning and processing
1205 rules for expiration depend on the context in which the element is used. The syntax for this
1206 element is as follows:

```
1207 <wsu:Expires ValueType="..." wsu:Id="...">...</wsu:Expires>
```

1208 The following describes the attributes and elements listed in the schema above:

1209 */wsu:Expires*

1210 This element's value represents an expiration time. Its type is specified by the ValueType
1211 attribute

1212 */wsu:Expires/@ValueType*


1213 This optional attribute specifies the type of the time data. This is specified as the XML
1214 Schema type. The default value is `xsd:dateTime`.

1215 */wsu:Expires/@wsu:Id*

1216 This optional attribute specifies an XML Schema ID that can be used to reference this
1217 element.

1218 The expiration is relative to the requestor's clock. In order to evaluate the expiration time,
1219 recipients need to recognize that the requestor's clock may not be synchronized to the recipient's
1220 clock. The recipient, therefore, MUST make an assessment of the level of trust to be placed in
1221 the requestor's clock, since the recipient is called upon to evaluate whether the expiration time is
1222 in the past relative to the requestor's, not the recipient's, clock. The recipient may make a
1223 judgment of the requestor's ~~likely current clock time by means not described in this specification,~~
1224 for example an out-of-band clock synchronization protocol. The recipient may also use the
1225 creation time and the delays introduced by intermediate SOAP roles to estimate the degree of
1226 clock skew .

1227 One suggested formula for estimating clock skew is



1228 skew = recipient's arrival time - creation time - transmission time
1229 Transmission time may be estimated by summing the values of delay elements, if present. It
1230 should be noted that wire-time is only part of this if delays include it in estimates. Otherwise the
1231 transmission time will not reflect the on-wire time. If no delays are present, there are no special
1232 assumptions that need to be made about processing time

1233 10.3 Timestamp Header

1234 A <wsu:Timestamp> header provides a mechanism for expressing the creation and expiration
1235 times of a message introduced throughout the message path. Specifically, it uses the previously
1236 defined elements in the context of message creation, receipt, and processing.

1237 All times SHOULD be in UTC format as specified by the XML Schema type (dateTime). It should
1238 be noted that times support time precision as defined in the XML Schema specification.

1239 Multiple <wsu:Timestamp> headers can be specified if they are targeted at different SOAP
1240 roles. The ordering within the header is as illustrated below.

1241 The ordering of elements in this header is fixed and MUST be preserved by intermediaries.

1242 To preserve overall integrity of each <wsu:Timestamp> header, it is strongly RECOMMENDED
1243 that each SOAP role create or update the appropriate <wsu:Timestamp> header destined to
1244 itself.

1245 The schema outline for the <wsu:Timestamp> header is as follows:

```
1246 <wsu:Timestamp wsu:Id="...">  
1247   <wsu:Created>...</wsu:Created>  
1248   <wsu:Expires>...</wsu:Expires>  
1249   ...  
1250 </wsu:Timestamp>
```

1251 The following describes the attributes and elements listed in the schema above:

1252 /wsu:Timestamp

1253 This is the header for indicating message timestamps.

1254 /wsu:Timestamp/Created

1255 This represents the creation time of the message. This element is optional, but can only
1256 be specified once in a Timestamp header. Within the SOAP processing model, creation
1257 is the instant that the infoset is serialized for transmission. The creation time of the
1258 message SHOULD NOT differ substantially from its transmission time. The difference in
1259 time should be minimized.

1260 /wsu:Timestamp/Expires

1261 This represents the expiration of the message. This is optional, but can appear at most
1262 once in a Timestamp header. Upon expiration, the requestor asserts that the message
1263 is no longer valid. It is strongly RECOMMENDED that recipients (anyone who processes
1264 this message) discard (ignore) any message that has passed its expiration. A Fault code
1265 (wsu:MessageExpired) is provided if the recipient wants to inform the requestor that its
1266 message was expired. A service MAY issue a Fault indicating the message has expired.

1267 /wsu:Timestamp/{any}

1268 This is an extensibility mechanism to allow additional elements to be added to the
1269 header.

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1270 */wsu:Timestamp/@wsu:Id*
 1271 This optional attribute specifies an XML Schema ID that can be used to reference this
 1272 element.
 1273 */wsu:Timestamp/@{any}*
 1274 This is an extensibility mechanism to allow additional attributes to be added to the
 1275 header.

1276 The following example illustrates the use of the `<wsu:Timestamp>` element and its content.

```
1277 <S:Envelope xmlns:S="http://www.w3.org/2001/12/soap-envelope"
1278           xmlns:wsu="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2002/06/utility">
1279   <S:Header>
1280     <wsu:Timestamp>
1281       <wsu:Created>2001-09-13T08:42:00Z</wsu:Created>
1282       <wsu:Expires>2001-10-13T09:00:00Z</wsu:Expires>
1283     </wsu:Timestamp>
1284     ...
1285   </S:Header>
1286   <S:Body>
1287     ...
1288   </S:Body>
1289 </S:Envelope>
```

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1290 10.4 TimestampTrace Header

1291 A `<wsu:TimestampTrace>` header provides a mechanism for expressing the delays introduced
 1292 throughout the message path. Specifically, it uses the previously defined elements in the context
 1293 of message creation, receipt, and processing.

1294 All times SHOULD be in UTC format as specified by the [XML Schema](#) type (`dateTime`). It should
 1295 be noted that times support time precision as defined in the [XML Schema](#) specification.

1296 Multiple `<wsu:TimestampTrace>` headers can be specified if they reference a different [SOAP](#)
 1297 role.

1298 The `<wsu:Received>` element specifies a receipt timestamp with an optional processing delay.
 1299 The exact meaning and semantics are dependent on the context in which the element is used.

1300 It is also strongly RECOMMENDED that each [SOAP](#) role sign its elements by referencing their
 1301 ID, NOT by signing the `TimestampTrace` header as the header is mutable.

1302 The syntax for this element is as follows:

```
1303 <wsu:TimestampTrace>
1304   <wsu:Received Role="..." Delay="..." ValueType="..."
1305     wsu:Id="..." >...</wsu:Received>
1306 </wsu:TimestampTrace>
```

1307 The following describes the attributes and elements listed in the schema above:

1308 */wsu:Received*

1309 This element's value is a receipt timestamp. The time specified SHOULD be a UTC
 1310 format as specified by the `ValueType` attribute (default is [XML Schema](#) type `dateTime`).

1311 */wsu:Received/@Role*

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1312 A required attribute, `Role`, indicates which **SOAP** role is indicating receipt. Roles MUST
1313 include this attribute, with a value matching the role value as specified as a SOAP
1314 intermediary.

1315 `/wsu:Received/@Delay`

1316 The value of this optional attribute is the delay associated with the **SOAP** role expressed
1317 in milliseconds. The delay represents processing time by the Role after it received the
1318 message, but before it forwarded to the next recipient.

1319 `/wsu:Received/@ValueType`

1320 This optional attribute specifies the type of the time data (the element value). This is
1321 specified as the XML Schema type. If this attribute isn't specified, the default value is
1322 `xsd:dateTime`.

1323 `/wsu:Received/@wsu:Id`

1324 This optional attribute specifies an XML Schema ID that can be used to reference this
1325 element.

1326 The delay attribute indicates the time delay attributable to an **SOAP** role (intermediate
1327 processor). In some cases this isn't known; for others it can be computed as *role's send time –*
1328 *role's receipt time*.

1329 Each delay amount is indicated in units of milliseconds, without fractions. If a delay amount
1330 would exceed the maximum value expressible in the datatype, the value should be set to the
1331 maximum value of the datatype.

1332 The following example illustrates the use of the `<wsu:Timestamp>` header and a
1333 `<wsu:TimestampTrace>` header indicating a processing delay of one minute subsequent to the
1334 receipt which was two minutes after creation.

```
1335 <S:Envelope xmlns:S="http://www.w3.org/2001/12/soap-envelope"  
1336   xmlns:wsu="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2002/06/utility">  
1337   <S:Header>  
1338     <wsu:Timestamp>  
1339       <wsu:Created>2001-09-13T08:42:00Z</wsu:Created>  
1340       <wsu:Expires>2001-10-13T09:00:00Z</wsu:Expires>  
1341     </wsu:Timestamp>  
1342     <wsu:TimestampTrace>  
1343       <wsu:Received Role="http://x.com/" Delay="60000">  
1344         2001-09-13T08:44:00Z</wsu:Received>  
1345     </wsu:TimestampTrace>  
1346     ...  
1347   </S:Header>  
1348   <S:Body>  
1349     ...  
1350   </S:Body>  
1351 </S:Envelope>  
1352
```

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1353

11 Extended Example

1354

The following sample message illustrates the use of security tokens, signatures, and encryption.

1355

For this example, the timestamp and the message body are signed prior to encryption. The

1356

decryption transformation is not needed as the signing/encryption order is specified within the

1357

<wsse:Security> header.

1358

```
(001) <?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
```

1359

```
(002) <S:Envelope xmlns:S="http://www.w3.org/2001/12/soap-envelope"
```

1360

```
  xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"
```

1361

```
  xmlns:wsse="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2002/06/secext"
```

1362

```
  xmlns:wsu="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2002/06/utility"
```

1363

```
  xmlns:xenc="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#">
```

1364

```
(003) <S:Header>
```

1365

```
(004) <wsu:Timestamp>
```

1366

```
(005) <wsu:Created wsu:Id="T0">
```

1367

```
(006) 2001-09-13T08:42:00Z
```

1368

```
(007) </wsu:Created>
```

1369

```
(008) </wsu:Timestamp>
```

1370

```
(009) <wsse:Security>
```

1371

```
(010) <wsse:BinarySecurityToken
```

1372

```
  ValueType="wsse:X509v3"
```

1373

```
  wsu:Id="X509Token"
```

1374

```
  EncodingType="wsse:Base64Binary">
```

1375

```
(011) MIEZzCCA9CgAwIBAgIQEmtJZc0rqrKh5i...
```

1376

```
(012) </wsse:BinarySecurityToken>
```

1377

```
(013) <xenc:EncryptedKey>
```

1378

```
(014) <xenc:EncryptionMethod Algorithm=
```

1379

```
  "http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#rsa-1_5"/>
```

1380

```
(015) <wsse:KeyIdentifier EncodingType="wsse:Base64Binary"
```

1381

```
(016)  ValueType="wsse:X509v3">MIGfMa0GCSq...
```

1382

```
(017) </wsse:KeyIdentifier>
```

1383

```
(018) <xenc:CipherData>
```

1384

```
(019) <xenc:CipherValue>d2FpbmdvbGRfE0lm4byV0...
```

1385

```
(020) </xenc:CipherValue>
```

1386

```
(021) </xenc:CipherData>
```

1387

```
(022) <xenc:ReferenceList>
```

1388

```
(023) <xenc:DataReference URI="#enc1"/>
```

1389

```
(024) </xenc:ReferenceList>
```

1390

```
(025) </xenc:EncryptedKey>
```

1391

```
(026) <ds:Signature>
```

1392

```
(027) <ds:SignedInfo>
```

1393

```
(028) <ds:CanonicalizationMethod
```

1394

```
  Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"/>
```

1395

```
(029) <ds:SignatureMethod
```

1396

```
  Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#rsa-sha1"/>
```

1397

```
(030) <ds:Reference URI="#T0">
```

1398

```
(031) <ds:Transforms>
```

1399

```
(032) <ds:Transform
```

1400

```
  Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"/>
```

1401

```
(033) </ds:Transforms>
```

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```

1402 (034) <ds:DigestMethod
1403 Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/>
1404 (035) <ds:DigestValue>LyLsF094hPi4wPU...
1405 (036) </ds:DigestValue>
1406 (037) </ds:Reference>
1407 (038) <ds:Reference URI="#body">
1408 <ds:Transforms>
1409 (040) <ds:Transform
1410 Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"/>
1411 </ds:Transforms>
1412 (042) <ds:DigestMethod
1413 Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/>
1414 (043) <ds:DigestValue>LyLsF094hPi4wPU...
1415 (044) </ds:DigestValue>
1416 (045) </ds:Reference>
1417 (046) </ds:SignedInfo>
1418 (047) <ds:SignatureValue>
1419 (048) HplZkmFZ/2kQLXDjBchm5gK...
1420 (049) </ds:SignatureValue>
1421 (050) <ds:KeyInfo>
1422 (051) <wsse:SecurityTokenReference>
1423 (052) <wsse:Reference URI="#X509Token"/>
1424 (053) </wsse:SecurityTokenReference>
1425 (054) </ds:KeyInfo>
1426 (055) </ds:Signature>
1427 (056) </wsse:Security>
1428 (057) </S:Header>
1429 (058) <S:Body wsu:Id="body">
1430 (059) <xenc:EncryptedData
1431 Type="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#Element"
1432 wsu:Id="enc1">
1433 (060) <xenc:EncryptionMethod
1434 Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#3des-cbc"/>
1435 (061) <xenc:CipherData>
1436 (062) <xenc:CipherValue>d2FpbmdvbGRfE0lm4byV0...
1437 (063) </xenc:CipherValue>
1438 (064) </xenc:CipherData>
1439 (065) </xenc:EncryptedData>
1440 (066) </S:Body>
1441 (067) </S:Envelope>

```

1442 Let's review some of the key sections of this example:

1443 Lines (003)-(057) contain the SOAP message headers.

1444 Lines (004)-(008) specify the timestamp information. In this case it indicates the creation time of
1445 the message.

1446 Lines (009)-(056) represent the <wsse:Security> header block. This contains the security-
1447 related information for the message.

1448 Lines (010)-(012) specify a [security token](#) that is associated with the message. In this case, it
1449 specifies an [X.509](#) certificate that is encoded as Base64. Line (011) specifies the actual Base64
1450 encoding of the certificate.

1451 Lines (013)-(025) specify the key that is used to encrypt the body of the message. Since this is a
1452 symmetric key, it is passed in an encrypted form. Line (014) defines the algorithm used to
1453 encrypt the key. Lines (015)-(017) specify the name of the key that was used to encrypt the

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1454 symmetric key. Lines (018)-(021) specify the actual encrypted form of the symmetric key. Lines
1455 (022)-(024) identify the encryption block in the message that uses this symmetric key. In this
1456 case it is only used to encrypt the body (Id="enc1").

1457 Lines (026)-(055) specify the digital signature. In this example, the signature is based on the
1458 [X.509](#) certificate. Lines (027)-(046) indicate what is being signed. Specifically, Line (039)
1459 references the creation timestamp and line (038) references the message body.

1460 Lines (047)-(049) indicate the actual signature value – specified in Line (042).

1461 Lines (051)-(053) indicate the key that was used for the signature. In this case, it is the [X.509](#)
1462 certificate included in the message. Line (052) provides a URI link to the Lines (010)-(012).

1463 The body of the message is represented by Lines (056)-(066).

1464 Lines (059)-(065) represent the encrypted metadata and form of the body using [XML Encryption](#).
1465 Line (059) indicates that the "element value" is being replaced and identifies this encryption. Line
1466 (060) specifies the encryption algorithm – Triple-DES in this case. Lines (062)-(063) contain the
1467 actual cipher text (i.e., the result of the encryption). Note that we don't include a reference to the
1468 key as the key references this encryption – Line (023).



1469

12 Error Handling

1470

There are many circumstances where an *error* can occur while processing security information.

1471

For example:

1472

Invalid or unsupported type of security token, signing, or encryption

1473

Invalid or unauthenticated or unauthenticatable security token

1474

Invalid signature

1475

Decryption failure

1476

Referenced security token is unavailable

1477

Unsupported namespace

1478

If a service does not perform its normal operation because of the contents of the Security header,

1479

then that MUST be reported using SOAP's Fault Mechanism. However, this specification does

1480

not preclude action being taken by a site to suppress processing of messages that appear to be

1481

part of a denial of service or cryptographic attack. We combine signature and encryption failures

1482

to mitigate certain types of attacks.

1483

If a failure is returned to a sender then the failure MUST be reported using SOAP's Fault

1484

mechanism. The following tables outline the predefined security fault codes. The "unsupported"

1485

class of errors are:

Error that occurred	faultcode
An unsupported token was provided	wsse:UnsupportedSecurityToken
An unsupported signature or encryption algorithm was used	wsse:UnsupportedAlgorithm

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Deleted: These can be grouped into two classes of errors: unsupported and failure. For the case of unsupported errors, the recipient MAY provide a response that informs the sender of supported formats, etc. For failure errors, the recipient MAY choose not to respond, as this may be a form of Denial of Service (DOS) or cryptographic attack.

1486

The "failure" class of errors are:

Error that occurred	faultcode
An error was discovered processing the <wsse:Security> header.	wsse:InvalidSecurity
An invalid security token was provided	wsse:InvalidSecurityToken
The security token could not be authenticated or authorized	wsse:FailedAuthentication

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The signature or decryption was invalid	wsse:FailedCheck
Referenced security token could not be retrieved	wsse:SecurityTokenUnavailable



1487

13 Security Considerations

1488 It is strongly RECOMMENDED that messages include digitally signed elements to allow message
1489 recipient s to detect replays of the message when the messages are exchanged via an open
1490 network. These can be part of the message or of the headers defined from other SOAP
1491 extensions. Four typical approaches are:

1492 Timestamp

1493 Sequence Number

1494 Expirations

1495 Message Correlation

1496 This specification defines the use of XML Signature and XML Encryption in SOAP headers. As
1497 one of the building blocks for securing SOAP messages, it is intended to be used in conjunction
1498 with other security techniques. Digital signatures need to be understood in the context of other
1499 security mechanisms and possible threats to an entity.

1500 Digital signatures alone do not provide message authentication. One can record a signed
1501 message and resend it (a replay attack). To prevent this type of attack, digital signatures must be
1502 combined with an appropriate means to ensure the uniqueness of the message, such as
1503 timestamps or sequence numbers (see earlier section for additional details). The proper usage of
1504 nonce guards against replay attacks.

1505 When digital signatures are used for verifying the claims pertaining to the sending entity, the
1506 sender must demonstrate knowledge of the confirmation key. One way to achieve this is to use a
1507 challenge-response type of protocol. Such a protocol is outside the scope of this document.

1508 To this end, the developers can attach timestamps, expirations, and sequences to messages.

1509 Implementers should also be aware of all the security implications resulting from the use of digital
1510 signatures in general and XML Signature in particular. When building trust into an application
1511 based on a digital signature there are other technologies, such as certificate evaluation, that must
1512 be incorporated, but these are outside the scope of this document.

1513 Requestors should use digital signatures to sign security tokens that do not include signatures (or
1514 other protection mechanisms) to ensure that they have not been altered in transit. It is strongly
1515 RECOMMENDED that all relevant and immutable message content be signed by the sender.
1516 Receivers SHOULD only consider those portions of the document that are covered by the
1517 sender's signature as being subject to the security tokens in the message. Security tokens
1518 appearing in <wsse:Security> header elements SHOULD be signed by their issuing authority
1519 so that message receivers can have confidence that the security tokens have not been forged or
1520 altered since their issuance. It is strongly RECOMMENDED that a message sender sign any
1521 <SecurityToken> elements that it is confirming and that are not signed by their issuing
1522 authority.

1523 Also, as described in XML Encryption, we note that the combination of signing and encryption
1524 over a common data item may introduce some cryptographic vulnerability. For example,
1525 encrypting digitally signed data, while leaving the digital signature in the clear, may allow plain
1526 text guessing attacks. The proper usage of nonce guards against replay attacks.

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1527 In order to *trust* IDs and timestamps, they SHOULD be signed using the mechanisms outlined in
1528 this specification. This allows readers of the IDs and timestamps information to be certain that
1529 the IDs and timestamps haven't been forged or altered in any way. It is strongly
1530 RECOMMENDED that IDs and timestamp elements be signed.

1531 Timestamps can also be used to mitigate replay attacks. Signed timestamps MAY be used to
1532 keep track of messages (possibly by caching the most recent timestamp from a specific service)
1533 and detect replays of previous messages. It is RECOMMENDED that timestamps and **nonce** be
1534 cached for a given period of time, as a guideline a value of five minutes can be used as a
1535 minimum to detect replays, and that timestamps older than that given period of time set be
1536 rejected in interactive scenarios.

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1537 When a password (or password equivalent) in a <UsernameToken> is used for authentication,
1538 the password needs to be properly protected. If the underlying transport does not provide enough
1539 protection against eavesdropping, the password SHOULD be digested as described in [the Web](#)
1540 [Services Security: Username Token Profile Document](#). Even so, the password must be strong
1541 enough so that simple password guessing attacks will not reveal the secret from a captured
1542 message.

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1543 In one-way message authentication, it is RECOMMENDED that the sender and the recipient re-
1544 use the elements and structure defined in this specification for proving and validating freshness of
1545 a message. It is RECOMMEND that the nonce value be unique per message (never been used
1546 as a nonce before by the sender and recipient) and use the <wsse:Nonce> element within the
1547 <wsse:Security> header. Further, the <wsu:Timestamp> header SHOULD be used with a
1548 <wsu:Created> element. It is strongly RECOMMENDED that the <wsu:Created> ,
1549 <wsse:Nonce> elements be included in the signature.

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14 Privacy Considerations

1551 TBD



1552

15 Acknowledgements

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1554

This specification was developed as a result of joint work of many individuals from the WSS TC including: TBD

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1557
1558

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Appendix A: Utility Elements and Attributes

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This specification defines several elements, attributes, and attribute groups which can be re-used by other specifications. This appendix provides an overview of these *utility* components. It should be noted that the detailed descriptions are provided in the specification and this appendix will reference these sections as well as calling out other aspects not documented in the specification.

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A.1. Identification Attribute

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There are many situations where elements within SOAP messages need to be referenced. For example, when signing a SOAP message, selected elements are included in the signature. XML Schema Part 2 provides several built-in data types that may be used for identifying and referencing elements, but their use requires that consumers of the SOAP message either to have or be able to obtain the schemas where the identity or reference mechanisms are defined. In some circumstances, for example, intermediaries, this can be problematic and not desirable. Consequently a mechanism is required for identifying and referencing elements, based on the SOAP foundation, which does not rely upon complete schema knowledge of the context in which an element is used. This functionality can be integrated into SOAP processors so that elements can be identified and referred to without dynamic schema discovery and processing. This specification specifies a namespace-qualified global attribute for identifying an element which can be applied to any element that either allows arbitrary attributes or specifically allows this attribute. This is a general purpose mechanism which can be re-used as needed. A detailed description can be found in Section 4.0 ID References.

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A.2. Timestamp Elements

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The specification defines XML elements which may be used to express timestamp information such as creation, expiration, and receipt. While defined in the context of messages, these elements can be re-used wherever these sorts of time statements need to be made. The elements in this specification are defined and illustrated using time references in terms of the *dateTime* type defined in XML Schema. It is RECOMMENDED that all time references use this type for interoperability. It is further RECOMMENDED that all references be in UTC time for increased interoperability. If, however, other time types are used, then the *ValueType* attribute MUST be specified to indicate the data type of the time format. The following table provides an overview of these elements:

Element	Description
<wsu:Created>	This element is used to indicate the creation time associated with the enclosing context.
<wsu:Expires>	This element is used to indicate the expiration time associated with the enclosing context.
<wsu:Received>	This element is used to indicate the receipt time reference

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	associated with the enclosing context.
--	--

1642 A detailed description can be found in Section [10 Message Timestamp](#).

1643 **A.3. General Schema Types**

1644 The schema for the utility aspects of this specification also defines some general purpose
 1645 schema elements. While these elements are defined in this schema for use with this
 1646 specification, they are general purpose definitions that may be used by other specifications as
 1647 well.

1648 Specifically, the following schema elements are defined and can be re-used:

Schema Element	Description
<code>wsu:commonAttrs</code> attribute group	This attribute group defines the common attributes recommended for elements. This includes the <code>wsu:Id</code> attribute as well as extensibility for other namespace qualified attributes.
<code>wsu:AttributedDateTime</code> type	This type extends the XML Schema <code>dateTime</code> type to include the common attributes.
<code>wsu:AttributedURI</code> type	This type extends the XML Schema <code>dateTime</code> type to include the common attributes.

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1650

Appendix B: SecurityTokenReference Model

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This appendix provides a non-normative overview of the usage and processing models for the `<wsse:SecurityTokenReference>` element.

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There are several motivations for introducing the `<wsse:SecurityTokenReference>` element:

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1655

The XML Signature reference mechanisms are focused on "key" references rather than general token references.

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1657

The XML Signature reference mechanisms utilize a fairly closed schema which limits the extensibility that can be applied.

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There are additional types of general reference mechanisms that are needed, but are not covered by XML Signature.

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There are scenarios where a reference may occur outside of an XML Signature and the XML Signature schema is not appropriate or desired.

1662

1663

The XML Signature references may include aspects (e.g. transforms) that may not apply to all references.

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
The following use cases drive the above motivations:

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Local Reference – A security token, that is included in the message in the `<wsse:Security>` header, is associated with an XML Signature. The figure below illustrates this:

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
Remote Reference – A security token, that is not included in the message but may be available at a specific URI, is associated with an XML Signature. The figure below illustrates this:

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


1673 **Key Identifier** – A security token, which is associated with an XML Signature and identified using




1674 a known value that is the result of a well-known function of the security token (defined by the
1675 token format or profile). The figure below illustrates this where the token is located externally:
1676


1677 **Key Name** – A security token is associated with an XML Signature and identified using a known
1678 value that represents a "name" assertion within the security token (defined by the token format or
1679 profile). The figure below illustrates this where the token is located externally:



1680 **Format-Specific References** – A security token is associated with an XML Signature and
1681 identified using a mechanism specific to the token (rather than the general mechanisms
1682



1683 described above). The figure below illustrates this:
1684



1685

1686 **Non-Signature References** – A message may contain XML that does not represent an XML
 1687 signature, but may reference a security token (which may or may not be included in the
 1688 message). The figure below illustrates this:

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1690

1691 All conformant implementations **MUST** be able to process the
 1692 `<wsse:SecurityTokenReference>` element. However, they are not required to support all of
 1693 the different types of references.

1694 The reference **MAY** include a *ValueType* attribute which provides a "hint" for the type of desired
 1695 token.

1696 If multiple sub-elements are specified, together they describe the reference for the token.

1697 There are several challenges that implementations face when trying to interoperate:

1698 **ID References** – The underlying XML referencing mechanism using the XML base type of ID
 1699 provides a simple straightforward XML element reference. However, because this is an XML
 1700 type, it can be bound to *any* attribute. Consequently in order to process the IDs and references
 1701 requires the recipient to *understand* the schema. This may be an expensive task and in the
 1702 general case impossible as there is no way to know the "schema location" for a specific
 1703 namespace URI.

1704 **Ambiguity** – The primary goal of a reference is to uniquely identify the desired token. ID
 1705 references are, by definition, unique by XML. However, other mechanisms such as "principal
 1706 name" are not required to be unique and therefore such references may be unique.

1707 The XML Signature specification defines a `<ds:KeyInfo>` element which is used to provide
 1708 information about the "key" used in the signature. For token references within signatures, it is
 1709 RECOMMENDED that the `<wsse:SecurityTokenReference>` be placed within the
 1710 `<ds:KeyInfo>`. The XML Signature specification also defines mechanisms for referencing keys
 1711 by identifier or passing specific keys. As a rule, the specific mechanisms defined in WSS: SOAP
 1712 Message Security or its profiles are preferred over the mechanisms in XML Signature.

1713 The following provides additional details on the specific reference mechanisms defined in WSS:
 1714 SOAP Message Security:

1715 **Direct References** – The `<wsse:Reference>` element is used to provide a URI reference to
 1716 the security token. If only the fragment is specified, then it references the security token within
 1717 the document whose *wsu:Id* matches the fragment. For non-fragment URIs, the reference is to
 1718 a [potentially external] security token identified using a URI. There are no implied semantics
 1719 around the processing of the URI.

1720 **Key Identifiers** – The `<wsse:KeyIdentifier>` element is used to reference a security token
 1721 by specifying a known value (identifier) for the token, which is determined by applying a special

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1722 *function* to the security token (e.g. a hash of key fields). This approach is typically unique for the
1723 specific security token but requires a profile or token-specific function to be specified. The
1724 *ValueType* attribute provide a *hint* as to the desired token type. The *EncodingType* attribute
1725 specifies how the unique value (identifier) is encoded. For example, a hash value may be
1726 encoded using base 64 encoding (the default).

1727 **Key Names** – The `<ds:KeyName>` element is used to reference a security token by specifying a
1728 specific value that is used to *match* identity assertion within the security token. This is a subset
1729 match and may result in multiple security tokens that match the specified name. While XML
1730 Signature doesn't imply formatting semantics, WSS: SOAP Message Security RECOMMENDS
1731 that X.509 names be specified.

1732 It is expected that, where appropriate, profiles define if and how the reference mechanisms map
1733 to the specific token profile. Specifically, the profile should answer the following questions:

1734 What types of references can be used?

1735 How "Key Name" references map (if at all)?

1736 How "Key Identifier" references map (if at all)?

1737 Any additional profile or format-specific references?

1738

1739



Appendix C: Revision History

Rev	Date	What
01	20-Sep-02	Initial draft based on input documents and editorial review
02	24-Oct-02	Update with initial comments (technical and grammatical)
03	03-Nov-02	Feedback updates
04	17-Nov-02	Feedback updates
05	02-Dec-02	Feedback updates
06	08-Dec-02	Feedback updates
07	11-Dec-02	Updates from F2F
08	12-Dec-02	Updates from F2F



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