

Glossary for the OASIS Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML)

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01	9 Feb 2001	Jeff Hodges	Cleaned up refs, added refs, added definitions, enhanced or otherwise mangled others.
00	30 Mar 2001	Jeff Hodges	Aligned terms with draft-sstc-use-domain-02 and discussion thereof in the security-use subgoup's conference calls. Aligned terms with usage in X.8xx/ISO-10181 series of docs. Added commentary to various definitions where security-use needs to come to consensus and/or make decision(s) on refining said definitions. Deleted various referenceable terms such as HTTP, LDAP, etc. Renamed doc to draft-sstc-glossary-00.
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1. Introduction

- 38 This normative document defines terms used throughout the OASIS Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML)
- 39 specifications and related documents.
- 40 Some definitions are derived directly from external sources (referenced in an appendix), some definitions based
- 41 on external sources have been substantively modified to fit the SAML context, and some are newly developed for
- 42 SAML. Please refer to the external sources for definitions of terms not explicitly defined here.

2. Notation

- Some definitions are tentative or missing. They are denoted with a question mark (?).
- 45 Some definitions have multiple senses provided. They are denoted by (a), (b), and so on.
- Note: Tentative and missing definitions and multiple senses are currently non-normative and form part of the remaining work of the OASIS Security Services Technical Committee.
- Definitions that have been specifically agreed to by the Use Case and Requirements subcommittee are denoted by reference to "[33]".
- In this document, references to SAML defined terms in the text are italicized.

3. Glossary

Following are the defined terms used in the SAML specifications and related documents.

Access	To interact with a <i>system entity</i> in order to manipulate, use, gain knowledge of, and/or obtain a representation of some or all of a system entity's <i>resources</i> . [4]
Access Control	Protection of <i>resources</i> against unauthorized access; a process by which use of resources is regulated according to a security policy and is permitted by only authorized system entities according to that policy. [4]
Access Control Information	Any information used for access control purposes, including contextual information [10]. Contextual information might include source IP address, encryption strength, the type of operation being requested, time of day, etc. Portions of access control information may be specific to the request itself, some may be associated with the connection via which the request is transmitted, and others (for example, time of day) may be "environmental". [25]
Access Rights	A description of the type of authorized interactions a <i>subject</i> can have with a <i>resource</i> . Examples include read, write, execute, add, modify, and delete. [8]
Active Role	A role that a <i>system entity</i> has donned when performing some operation, for example accessing a <i>resource</i> .

Administrative Domain	An environment or context that is defined by some combination of one or more administrative policies, Internet Domain Name registrations, civil legal entities (for example, individuals, corporations, or other formally organized entities), plus a collection of hosts, network devices and the interconnecting networks (and possibly other traits), plus (often various) network services and applications running upon them. An administrative domain may contain or define one or more security domains. An administrative domain may encompass a single site or multiple sites. The traits defining an administrative domain may, and in many cases will, evolve over time. Administrative domains may interact and enter into agreements for providing and/or consuming services across administrative domain boundaries.
Administrator	A person who installs or maintains a system (for example, a SAML-based security system) or who uses it to manage <i>system entities</i> , users, and/or content (as opposed to application purposes; see also <i>End User</i>). An administrator is typically affiliated with a particular <i>administrative domain</i> and may be affiliated with more than one administrative domain.
Anonymity	The quality or state of being anonymous, which is the condition of having a name or identity that is unknown or concealed. [4]
Assertion	A piece of data produced by a <i>SAML authority</i> regarding either an act of authentication performed on a <i>subject</i> , attribute information about the subject, or authorization permissions applying to the subject with respect to a specified <i>resource</i> .
Asserting Party	Formally, the administrative domain that hosts one or more SAML authorities. Informally, an instance of a SAML authority.
Attribute	A distinct characteristic of an object (in SAML, a <i>subject</i>). An object's attributes are said to describe it. Attributes are often specified in terms of physical traits, such as size, shape, weight, and color, etc., for real-world objects. Objects in cyberspace might have attributes describing size, type of encoding, network address, and so on. Which attributes of an object are salient is decided by the beholder. See also <i>XML attribute</i> .
Attribute Authority	A system entity that produces attribute assertions. [33]
Attribute Assertion	An assertion that conveys information about attributes of a subject.
Authentication	To confirm a system entity's asserted principal identity with a specified, or understood, level of confidence. [7] [33]
Authentication Assertion	An assertion that conveys information about a successful act of authentication that took place for a subject.
Authentication Authority	A system entity that produces authentication assertions. [33]
Authorization	The process of determining, by evaluating applicable access control information, whether a subject is allowed to have the specified types of access to a particular resource. Usually, authorization is in the context of authentication. Once a subject is authenticated, it may be authorized to perform different types of access. [8]
Authorization Decision	The result of an act of authorization. The result may be negative, that is, it may indicate that the <i>subject</i> is not allowed any access to the <i>resource</i> .
Authorization Decision Assertion	An assertion that conveys information about an authorization decision.
Binding, Protocol Binding	An instance of mapping SAML request-response message exchanges into a specific protocol. Each binding is given a name in the pattern "SAML xxx binding".

Credentials	Data that is transferred to establish a claimed principal identity. [9] [33]
End User	A natural person who makes use of resources for application purposes (as opposed to system management purposes; see Administrator, User).
Identifier	A representation (for example, a string) mapped to a <i>system entity</i> that uniquely refers to it.
Login, Logon, Sign-On	The process whereby a <i>user</i> presents <i>credentials</i> to an <i>authentication authority</i> , establishes a <i>simple session</i> , and optionally establishes a <i>rich session</i> .
Logout, Logoff, Sign-Off	The process whereby a <i>user</i> signifies desire to terminate a <i>simple session</i> or <i>rich session</i> .
Keep-alive	?
Markup Language	A set of XML elements and XML attributes to be applied to the structure of an XML document for a specific purpose. A markup language is typically defined by means of a set of XML schemas and accompanying documentation. For example, the Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) is defined by two schemas and the set of normative SAML specification text.
Party	Informally, one or more <i>principals</i> participating in some process or communication, such as receiving an <i>assertion</i> or accessing a <i>resource</i> .
Policy Decision Point (PDP)	A system entity that makes authorization decisions for itself or for other system entities that request such decisions. [31] For example, a SAML PDP consumes authorization decision requests, and produces authorization decision assertions in response. A PDP is an "authorization decision authority".
Policy Enforcement Point (PEP)	A system entity that requests and subsequently enforces authorization decisions. [31] For example, a SAML PEP sends authorization decision requests to a PDP, and consumes the authorization decision assertions sent in response.
Principal	A system entity whose identity can be authenticated. [34]
Principal Identity	A representation of a principal's identity, typically an identifier.
Profile	A set of rules describing how to embed assertions into and extract them from a framework or protocol. Each profile is given a name in the pattern "xxx profile for SAML".
Proxy	a) An entity authorized to act for another.
	b) Authority or power to act for another.
	c) A document giving such authority. [28]
Proxy Server	A computer process that relays a protocol between client and server computer systems, by appearing to the client to be the server and appearing to the server to be the client. [4]
Pull	To actively request information from a system entity.
Push	To provide information to a system entity that did not actively request it.
Relying Party	A system entity that decides to take an action based on information from another system entity. For example, a SAML relying party depends on receiving assertions from an asserting party (a SAML authority) about a subject.
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Requester	A system entity that utilizes a protocol to request services from another system entity. The term "client" for this notion is not used because many system entities simultaneously or serially act as both clients and servers.
Resource	 a) Data contained in an information system (for example, in the form of files, information in memory, etc).
	b) A service provided by a system.
	 c) An item of system equipment (in other words, a system component such as hardware, firmware, software, or documentation).
	d) A facility that houses system operations and equipment. [4]
	? Should this definition mention the relationship to URI references? We probably only want the (a) and (b) senses.
Rich session	?
Role	? Dictionaries define a role as "a character or part played by a performer" or "a function or position." Principals don various types of roles serially and/or simultaneously, for example, active roles and passive roles. The notion of an Administrator is often an example of a role.
SAML Authority	An abstract system entity in the SAML domain model that issues assertions. See also attribute authority, authentication authority, and policy decision point (PDP).
Security	A collection of safeguards that ensure the confidentiality of information, protect the systems or networks used to process it, and control access to them. Security typically encompasses the concepts of secrecy, confidentiality, integrity, and availability. It is intended to ensure that a system resists potentially correlated attacks. [7]
Security Architecture	A plan and set of principles for an <i>administrative domain</i> and its <i>security domains</i> that describe the security services that a system is required to provide to meet the needs of its users, the system elements required to implement the services, and the performance levels required in the elements to deal with the threat environment. A complete security architecture for a system addresses administrative security, communication security, computer security, emanations security, personnel security, and physical security, and prescribes security policies for each. A complete security architecture needs to deal with both intentional, intelligent threats and accidental threats. A security architecture should explicitly evolve over time as an integral part of its administrative domain's evolution. [4]
Security Assertion	An assertion that is scrutinized in the context of a security architecture.
Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML)	The set of specifications describing <i>security assertions</i> that are encoded in <i>XML</i> , <i>profiles</i> for attaching the assertions to various protocols and frameworks, the request/response protocol used to obtain the assertions, and <i>bindings</i> of this protocol to various transfer protocols (for example, SOAP and HTTP).
Security Domain	An environment or context that is defined by security models and a security architecture, including a set of resources and set of system entities that are authorized to access the resources. One or more security domains may reside in a single administrative domain. The traits defining a given security domain typically evolve over time. [8]

Security Policy A set of rules and practices that specify or regulate how a sy organization provides security services to protect resources. policies are components of security architectures. Significant security policies are implemented via security services, usin expressions. [4] [8]	. Security nt portions of
Security Policy Expression A mapping of <i>principal identities</i> and/or <i>attributes</i> thereof wit actions. [8] Security policy expressions are often essentially lists. [8]	
Security Service A processing or communication service that is provided by a a specific kind of protection to resources, where said resour with said system or reside with other systems, for example, authentication service or a PKI-based document attribution a authentication service. A security service is a superset of AA Security services typically implement portions of security polimplemented via security mechanisms. [4] [8]	rces may reside an and AA services.
Session A lasting interaction between system entities, often involving by the maintenance of some state of the interaction for the context interaction.	
Site An informal term for an <i>administrative domain</i> in geographic sense. It may refer to a particular geographical or topological administrative domain, or it may encompass multiple adminition domains, as may be the case at an ASP site.	al portion of an
Subject A <i>principal</i> in the context of a <i>security domain</i> . SAML assert declarations about subjects.	ions make
System Entity An active element of a computer/network system. For exam automated process or set of processes, a subsystem, a perspersons that incorporates a distinct set of functionality. [4] [3]	son or group of
Time-In ?	
Time-Out A period of time after which some condition becomes true if not occurred. For example, a session that is terminated because has been inactive for a specified period of time is said to "time".	ause its state
User A natural person who makes use of a system and its resource purpose [33]	ces for any
Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) A compact string of characters for identifying an abstract or resource. [37] [21] URIs are the universal addressing mecharesources on the World Wide Web. Uniform Resource Loca a subset of URIs that use an addressing scheme tied to the primary access mechanism, for example, their network "local"	anism for ators (URLs) are resource's
URI Reference A URI that is allowed to have an appended number sign (#) identifier. [37] [21] Fragment identifiers address particular loveregions within the identified resource.	
XML Extensible Markup Language, abbreviated XML, describes a objects called XML documents and partially describes the becomputer programs which process them. [36]	
XML Attribute An XML data structure that is embedded in the start-tag of a and that has a name and a value. For example, the italicized	
is an instance of an XML attribute:	

XML Element	An XML data structure that is hierarchically arranged among other such structures in an XML document and is indicated by either a start-tag and end-tag or an empty tag. For example:
	<pre><address addressid="A12345"></address></pre>
XML Namespace	A collection of names, identified by a <i>URI reference</i> , which are used in XML documents as element types and attribute names. An XML namespace is often associated with an <i>XML schema</i> . For example, SAML defines two schemas, and each has a unique XML namespace.
XML Schema	The format developed by the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) for describing rules for a <i>markup language</i> to be used a set of XML documents. In the lowercase, a "schema" or "XML schema" is an individual instance of this format. For example, SAML defines two schemas, one containing the rules for XML documents that encode security assertions and one containing the rules for XML documents that encode request/response protocol messages. Schemas define not only XML elements and XML attributes, but also datatypes that apply to these constructs.

54 Appendix A. Notices

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81 Appendix B. References

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³³ **OASIS Security Services TC Use Case and Requirements Conference Call Consensus**. Consensus on the wording for this item occurred during one or more conference calls of the SSTC Use Case and Requirments subgroup. See minutes of the conference calls in the security-use email distribution list archives for details.

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