OASIS SECURITY SERVICES TECHNICAL COMMITTEE
SECURITY ASSERTIONS MARKUP LANGUAGE
ISSUES LIST
VERSION 6
AUGUST 22, 2001
Hal Lockhart, Editor

PURPOSE	
INTRODUCTION	
Use Case Issues	
Group 0: Document Format & Strategy	
CLOSED ISSUE: [UC-0-01:MergeUseCases]	
CLOSED ISSUE:[UC-0-02:Terminology]	
CLOSED ISSUE:[UC-0-03:Arrows]	
Group 1: Single Sign-on Push and Pull Variations	
CLOSED ISSUE:[UC-1-01:Shibboleth]	
CLOSED ISSUE:[UC-1-02:ThirdParty]	
CLOSED ISSUE: [UC-1-03: ThirdPartyDoable]	
CLOSED ISSUE: [UC-1-04: ARundgrenPush]	
ISSUE:[UC-1-05:FirstContact]	
CLOSED ISSUE:[UC-1-06:Anonymity]	
CLOSED ISSUE:[UC-1-07:Pseudonymity]	
CLOSED ISSUE:[UC-1-08:AuthZAttrs]	1
CLOSED ISSUE: [UC-1-09: AuthZDecisions]	1
CLOSED ISSUE: [UC-1-10: UnknownParty]	1
CLOSED ISSUE: [UC-1-11: AuthNEvents]	1
CLOSED ISSUE:[UC-1-12:SignOnService]	
CLOSED ISSUE:[UC-1-13:ProxyModel]	1
CLOSED ISSUE:[UC-1-14: NoPassThruAuthnImpactsPEP2PDP]	
Group 2: B2B Scenario Variations	
CLOSED ISSUE: [UC-2-01: AddPolicyAssertions]	
CLOSED ISSUE:[UC-2-02:OutsourcedManagement]	
CLOSED ISSUE: [UC-2-03:ASP]	
ISSUE:[UC-2-05:EMarketplace]	
CLOSED ISSUE: [UC-2-06:EMarketplaceDifferentProtocol]	
CLOSED ISSUE:[UC-2-07:MultipleEMarketplace]	
CLOSED ISSUE:[UC-2-08:ebXML]	
Group 3: Sessions	
CLOSED ISSUE: [UC-3-01:UserSession]	
CLOSED ISSUE: [UC-3-02: Conversation]	
CLOSED ISSUE:[UC-3-03:Logout]	
CLOSED ISSUE: [UC-3-05:SessionTermination]	
CLOSED ISSUE: [UC-3-06:DestinationLogout]	
CLOSED ISSUE: [UC-3-07:Logout Extent]	
CLOSED ISSUE: [UC-3-08:DestinationSessionTermination]	
CLOSED ISSUE: [UC-3-09: Destination-Time-In]	
Group 4: Security Services	
CLOSED ISSUE:[UC-4-01:SecurityService]	
CLOSED ISSUE: [UC-4-02: AttributeAuthority]	
CLOSED ISSUE: [UC-4-03: PrivateKeyHost]	
CLOSED ISSUE: [UC-4-04:SecurityDiscover]	
Group 5: AuthN Protocols	
CLOSED ISSUE: [UC-5-01:AuthNProtocol]	
CLOSED ISSUE:[UC-5-02:SASL]	
CLOSED ISSUE:[UC-5-03:AuthNThrough]	
Group 6: Protocol Bindings	
CLOSED ISSUE: [UC-6-01:XMLProtocol]	

65	Group 7: Enveloping vs. Enveloped	32
66	ISSUE:[UC-7-01:Enveloping]	
67	ISSUE:[UC-7-02:Enveloped]	
68	Group 8: Intermediaries	
69	CLOSED ISSUE: [UC-8-01:Intermediaries]	
70	ISSUE:[UC-8-02:IntermediaryAdd]	
71	ISSUE:[UC-8-03:IntermediaryDelete]	
72	ISSUE:[UC-8-04:IntermediaryEdit]	
73^{72}	ISSUE: [UC-8-05: AtomicAssertion]	
73	Group 9: Privacy	
74	ISSUE:[UC-9-01:RuntimePrivacy]	
76		
77	ISSUE:[UC-9-02:PrivacyStatement]	
78	Group 10: Framework	
	CLOSED ISSUE:[UC-10-01:Framework]	
79	ISSUE:[UC-10-02:ExtendAssertionData]	
80	CLOSED ISSUE: [UC-10-03:ExtendMessageData]	
81	CLOSED ISSUE: [UC-10-04:ExtendMessageTypes]	
82	CLOSED ISSUE: [UC-10-05: ExtendAssertionTypes]	
83	CLOSED ISSUE: [UC-10-06:BackwardCompatibleExtensions]	
84	CLOSED ISSUE:[UC-10-07:ExtensionNegotiation]	
85	Group 11: AuthZ Use Case	
86	CLOSED ISSUE:[UC-11-01:AuthzUseCase]	
87	Group 12: Encryption	
88	CLOSED ISSUE:[UC-12-01:Confidentiality]	
89	CLOSED ISSUE:[UC-12-02:AssertionConfidentiality]	
90	CLOSED ISSUE: [UC-12-03:BindingConfidentiality]	
91	CLOSED ISSUE:[UC-12-04:EncryptionMethod]	
92	Group 13: Business Requirements	
93	CLOSED ISSUE: [UC-13-01:Scalability]	
94	CLOSED ISSUE: [UC-13-02:EfficientMessages]	
95	CLOSED ISSUE: [UC-13-03: Optional Authentication]	
96	CLOSED ISSUE: [UC-13-04: OptionalSignatures]	
97	CLOSED ISSUE: [UC-13-05:SecurityPolicy]	
98	CLOSED ISSUE: [UC-13-06:ReferenceReqt]	
99	ISSUE [UC-13-07: Hailstorm Interoperability]	
100	Group 14: Domain Model	
101	ISSUE:[UC-14-01:UMLCardinalities]	
102	Design Issues	
103	Group 1: Naming Subjects	
104	ISSUE:[DS-1-01]: Referring to Subject]	
105	ISSUE:[DS-1-02: Anonymity Technique]	
106	ISSUE:[DS-1-03: SubjectComposition]	
107	ISSUE:[DS-1-04: AssnSpecifiesSubject]	
108	ISSUE:[DS-1-05: SubjectofAttrAssn]	
109	Group 2: Naming Objects	
110	CLOSED ISSUE: [DS-2-01: Wildcard Resources]	
111	ISSUE: [DS-2-02: Permissions]	
112	Group 3: Assertion Validity	
113	ISSUE:[DS-3-01: DoNotCache]	
114	ISSUE:[DS-3-02: ClockSkew]	
115	ISSUE:[DS-3-03: ValidityDependsUpon]	
115	Group 4: Assertion Style	
110	Group т. 11550 июн Буус	

117	ISSUE:[DS-4-01: Top or Bottom Typing]	64
118	ISSUE:[DS-4-02: XML Terminology]	64
119	ISSUE: [DS-4-03: Assertion Request Template]	
120	ISSUE: [DS-4-04: URIs for Assertion IDs]	
121	ISSUE: [DS-4-05: SingleSchema]	
122	ISSUE: [DS-4-06: Final Types]	
123	ISSUE:[DS-4-07: ExtensionSchema]	
124	Group 5: Reference Other Assertions	
125	ISSUE:[DS-5-01: Dependency Audit]	
126	ISSUE: [DS-5-02: Authenticator Reference]	
120	ISSUE:[DS-5-03: Role Reference]	
128	ISSUE:[DS-5-04: Request Reference]	
120	Group 6: Attributes	
130	ISSUE:[DS-6-01: Nested Attributes]	
131	ISSUE: [DS-6-02: Roles vs. Attributes]	
131		
132	ISSUE:[DS-6-03: Attribute Values]	
	ISSUE:[DS-6-04: Negative Roles]	
134	Group 7: Authentication Assertions	
135	ISSUE:[DS-7-01: AuthN Datetime]	
136	ISSUE:[DS-7-02: AuthN Method]	
137	ISSUE:[DS-7-03: AuthN Method Strength]	
138	ISSUE:[DS-7-04: AuthN IP Address]	
139	ISSUE:[DS-7-05: AuthN DNS Name]	
140	ISSUE:[DS-7-06: DiscoverAuthNProtocols]	
141	Group 8: Authorities and Domains	
142	ISSUE:[DS-8-01: Domain Separate]	
143	ISSUE:[DS-8-02: AuthorityDomain]	82
144	ISSUE:[DS-8-03: DomainSyntax]	83
145	ISSUE:[DS-8-04: Issuer]	83
146	Group 9: Request Handling	84
147	ISSUE:[DS-9-01: AssertionID Specified]	84
148	ISSUE:[DS-9-02: MultipleRequest]	
149	ISSUE:[DS-9-03: IDandAttribQuery]	
150	Group 10: Assertion Binding	
151	ISSUE:[DS-10-01: AttachPayload]	
152	Group 11: Authorization Decision Assertions	
153	ISSUE: [DS-11-01: MultipleSubjectAssertions]	
154	ISSUE: [DS-11-02: ActionNamespacesRegistry]	
155	ISSUE: [DS-11-03: AuthzNDecAssnAdvice]	
156	ISSUE: [DS-11-04: DecisionTypeValues]	
157	ISSUE:[DS-11-05: MultipleActions]	
158	Group 12: Attribute Assertions.	
159	ISSUE:[DS-12-01: AnyAllAttrReq]	
160	ISSUE:[DS-12-02: CombineAttrAssnReqs]	
161	ISSUE:[DS-12-03: AttrSchemaReqs]	
162	ISSUE:[DS-12-03: AttrSchemakeqs] ISSUE:[DS-12-04: AttrNameReqs]	
162	ISSUE:[DS-12-04: AttrNameKeqs] ISSUE:[DS-12-05: AttrNameValueSyntax]	
164	ISSUE: [DS-12-05: All Name valuesyntax] ISSUE: [DS-12-06: RequestALLAttrbs]	
165	Group 13: Dynamic Sessions	
165	ISSUE: [DS-13-01: SessionsinEffect]	
160		
167	Group 14:General – Multiple Message Types	
100	ISSUE:[DS-14-01: Conditions]	

169	ISSUE:[DS-14-02: AuthenticatorRequired]	
170	ISSUE:[DS-14-03: AuthenticatorName]	
171	ISSUE:[DS-14-04: Aggregation]	
172	ISSUE: [DS-14-05: Version]	
173	ISSUE:[DS-14-06: ProtocolIDs]	
174	ISSUE:[DS-14-07: BearerIndication]	
175	ISSUE:[DS-14-08: ReturnExpired]	
176	ISSUE:[DS-14-09: OtherID]	
177	ISSUE:[DS-14-10: StatusCodes]	
178	ISSUE:[DS-14-11: CompareElements]	
179	MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES	
180	Group 1: Terminology	
181	ISSUE: [MS-1-01: MeaningofProfile]	
182	Group 2: Administrative	
183	ISSUE:[MS-2-01: RegistrationService]	
184	Group 3: Conformance	
185	ISSUE: [MS-3-01: BindingConformance]	
186	ISSUE: [MS-3-02: Browser Partition]	
187	Group 4: XMLDSIG	
188	ISSUE:[MS-4-01: XMLDsigProfile]	
189	DOCUMENT HISTORY	
190		

191 **Purpose**

- 192 This document catalogs issues for the Security Assertions Markup Language (SAML) developed
- 193 the Oasis Security Services Technical Committee.

194 Introduction

- 195 The issues list presented here documents issues brought up in response to draft documents as
- 196 well as other issues mentioned on the security-use and security mailing lists, in conference calls,
- 197 and in other venues.

212

213

- 198 Each issue is formatted according to the proposal of David Orchard to the general committee:
- 199 ISSUE:[Document/Section Abbreviation-Issue Number: Short name] Issue long description.
- 200 Possible resolutions, with optional editor resolution Decision
- The issues are informally grouped according to general areas of concern. For this document, the "Issue Number" is given as "#-##", where the first number is the number of the issue group.
- Issues on this list were initially captured from meetings of the Use Cases subcommittee or from the security-use mailing list. They were refined to a voteable form by issue champions within the subcommittee, reviewed for clarity, and then voted on by the subcommittee. To achieve a higher level of consensus, each issue required a 75% super-majority of votes to be resolved. Here, the 75% number is of votes counted; abstentions or failure to vote by a subcommittee member did not affect the percentage.
- 209 At the second face-to-face meeting it was agreed to close all open issues relating to Use Cases
- and requirements accepting the findings of the sub committee, with the exception of issues that were specifically selected to remain open. This has been interpreted to mean that:
 - Issues that received a consensus vote by the committee were settled as indicated.
 - Issues that did not achieve consensus were settled by selecting the "do not add" option.
- To make reading this document easier, the following convention has been adopted for shading sections in various colors.
- 216 Gray is used to indicate issues that were previously closed.
- 217 Blue is used to indicate issues that have just been closed in the most recent revision
- 218 Yellow is used to indicated issues which have recently been created or modified or are actively 219 being debated.
- 220 Other open issues are not marked, i.e. left white.

- 221 Beginning with version 5 of this document, issues with lengthy write-ups, that have been closed
- 222 "for some time" will be removed from this document, in order to reduce its overall size. The
- 223 headings, a short description and resolution will be retained. All vote summaries from closed
- issues have also been removed.

225 Use Case Issues

Group 0: Document Format & Strategy

227 CLOSED ISSUE:[UC-0-01:MergeUseCases]

228 There are several use case scenarios in the Straw Man 1 that overlap in purpose. For example,

there are several single sign-on scenarios. Should these be merged into a single use case, or

should the multiplicity of scenarios be preserved?

231 Possible Resolutions:

- Merge similar use case scenarios into a few high-level use cases, illustrated with UML
 use case diagrams. Preserve the detailed use case scenarios, illustrated with UML
 interaction diagrams. This allows casual readers to grasp quickly the scope of SAML,
 while keeping details of expected use of SAML in the document for other subcommittees
 to use.
- 237 2. Merge similar use case scenarios, leave out detailed scenarios.
- 238 Status: Closed, resolution 2 carries.

239 CLOSED ISSUE:[UC-0-02:Terminology]

240 Several subcommittee members have found the current document, and particularly the use case

scenario diagrams, confusing in that they use either domain-specific terminology (e.g., "Web

242 User", "Buyer") or vague, undefined terms (e.g., "Security Service.").

One proposal is to replace all such terms with a standard actor naming scheme, suggested by Hal
Lockhart and adapted by Bob Morgan, as follows:

- 245 1. User
- 246 2. Authn Authority
- 247 3. Authz Authority
- 248 4. Policy Decision Point (PDP)
- 249 5. Policy Enforcement Point (PEP)
- 250 A counter-argument is that abstraction at this level is the point of design and not of requirements
- analysis. In particular, the real-world naming of actors in use cases makes for a more concrete

252 goal for other subcommittees to measure against.

- Another proposal is, for each use case scenario, to add a section that maps the players in the
- scenario to one or more of the actors called out above.
- 255 Possible Resolutions:
- 1. Replace domain-specific or vague terms with standard vocabulary above.
- 2572. Map domain-specific or vague terms to standard vocabulary above for each use-case and scenario.
- 259 3. Don't make global changes based on this issue.
- 260 Status: Closed, resolution 3 carries
- 261 CLOSED ISSUE:[UC-0-03:Arrows]

Another problem brought up is that the use case scenarios have messages (arrow) between actors, but not much detail about the actual payload of the arrows. Although this document is intended for a high level of analysis, it has been suggested that more definite data flow in the interaction diagrams would make them clearer.

- UC-1-08:AuthZAttrs, UC-1-09:AuthZDecisions, and UC-1-11:AuthNEvents all address this
 question to some degree, but this issue is added to state for a general editorial principle for the
 document.
- 269 Possible Resolutions:
- Edit interaction diagrams to give more fine-grained detail and exact payloads of each message between players.
- 272 2. Don't make global changes based on this issue.
- 273 Status: Closed, resolution 2 carries.
- 274

274 Group 1: Single Sign-on Push and Pull Variations

275 CLOSED ISSUE:[UC-1-01:Shibboleth]

- 276 The Shibboleth security system for Internet 2
- 277 (http://middleware.internet2.edu/shibboleth/index.shtml) is closely related to the SAML effort.

278 [Text Removed to Archive]

- 279 If these issues, along with the straw man 2 document, have addressed the requirements of
- Shibboleth, then the subcommittee can address each issue on its own, rather than Shibboleth as amonolithic problem.

282 Possible Resolutions:

- The above list of issues, combined with the straw man 2 document, address the
 requirements of Shibboleth, and no further investigation of Shibboleth is necessary.
- 285 2. Additional investigation of Shibboleth requirements are needed.
- 286 Status: Closed per F2F #2, Resolution 1 Carries

287 CLOSED ISSUE:[UC-1-02:ThirdParty]

Use case scenario 3 (single sign-on, third party) describes a scenario in which a Web user logs in
to a particular 3rd-party security provider which returns an authentication reference that can be
used to access multiple destination Web sites. Is this different than Use case scenario 1 (single

sign-on, pull model)? If not, should it be removed from the use case and requirements document?

292 [Text Removed to Archive]

293 Possible Resolutions:

- 294
 1. Edit the current third-party use case scenario to feature passing a third-party
 295
 authentication assertion from one destination site to another.
- 296 2. Remove the third-party use case scenario entirely.
- 297 Status: Closed per F2F #2, Resolution 1 Carries

298 CLOSED ISSUE:[UC-1-03:ThirdPartyDoable]

- 299 Questions have arisen whether use case scenario 3 is doable with current Web browser
- 300 technology. An alternative is using a Microsoft Passport-like architecture or scenario.

301 [Text Removed to Archive]

302 Possible Resolutions:

- 303 1. The use case scenario should be removed because it is unimplementable.
- 3043052. The use case scenario is implementable, and whether it should stay in the document or not should be decided based on other factors.
- 306 Status: Closed per F2F #2, Resolution 2 Carries
- 307 CLOSED ISSUE:[UC-1-04:ARundgrenPush]

Anders Rundgren has proposed on security-use an alternative to use case scenario 2 (single sign on, push model). The particular variation is that the source Web site requests an authorization
 profile for a resource (e.g., the credentials necessary to access the resource) before requesting
 access.

312 [Text Removed to Archive]

313 Possible Resolutions:

- 1. Use this variation to replace scenario 2 in the use case document.
- 315 2. Add this variation as an additional scenario in the use case document.
- 316 3. Do not add this use case scenario to the use case document.
- 317 Status: Closed per F2F #2 3 carries

318 ISSUE:[UC-1-05:FirstContact]

319 A variation on the single sign on use case that has been proposed is one where the Web user goes

- 320 directly to the destination Web site without authenticating with a definitive authority first.
- 321 A single sign-on use case scenario would be added as follows:
- 322 In this single sign-on scenario, the user does not first authenticate with their home security
- 323 domain. Instead, they go directly to the destination Web site, first. The destination site must then
- 324 redirect the user to a site they can authenticate at. The situation then continues as if in a single
- 325 sign-on, push model scenario.
- 326 {PRIVATE "TYPE=PICT;ALT=Single Sign-on, Alternative Push
- 327 Model"}

	2	
328		
329	Single	Sign-on, Alternative Push Model
330	Steps:	
331	1.	Web user requests resource from destination Web site.
332 333 334	2.	Destination Web site determines that the Web user is unauthenticated. It chooses the appropriate home domain for that user (deployment dependent), and redirects the Web user to that source Web site.
335	3.	Web user authenticates with source Web site.
336 337	4.	Source Web site provides user with authentication reference (AKA "name assertion reference"), and redirects user to destination Web site.
338	5.	Web user requests destination Web site resource, providing authentication reference.
339 340	6.	Destination Web site requests authentication document ("name assertion") from source Web site, passing authentication reference.
341	7.	Source Web site returns authentication document.
342	8.	Destination Web site provides resource to Web user.
343	Possib	le Resolutions:

- 344 1. Add this use case scenario to the use case document.
- 345 2. Do not add this use case scenario to the use case document.
- 346 Status: Voted, No conclusion
- 347 Voting Results

{PRIVATE}Date	23 Feb 2001
Eligible	18
Resolution 1	6
Resolution 2	3
Abstain	0

- Bob Blakley said, " I agree that servers will have to do this, but it can easily be done by writing
- 349 HTML with no requirement for us to provide anything in our specification."

350 CLOSED ISSUE:[UC-1-06:Anonymity]

351 What part does anonymity play in SAML conversations? Can assertions be for anonymous

352 parties? Here, "anonymous" means that an assertion about a principal does not include an

- attribute uniquely identifying the principal (ex: user name, distinguished name, etc.).
- 354 A requirement for anonymity would state:
- 355 [CR-1-06-Anonymity] SAML will allow assertions to be made about anonymous
- principals, where "anonymous" means that an assertion about a principal does not include an attribute uniquely identifying the principal (ex: user name, distinguished name, etc.).

358 Possible Resolutions:

- 1. Add this requirement to the use case and requirement document.
- 360 2. Do not add this requirement.
- 361 Status: Closed per F2F #2, Resolution 1 Carries
- 362 CLOSED ISSUE:[UC-1-07:Pseudonymity]
- 363 What part do pseudonyms play in SAML conversations? Can assertions be made about
- 364 principals using pseudonyms? Here, a pseudonym is an attribute in an assertion that identifies the
- 365 principal, but is not the identifier used in the principal's home domain.

366	A requirement for pseudonymity would state:
367 368	[CR-1-07-Pseudonymity] SAML will allow assertions to be made about principals using pseudonyms for identifiers.
369	Possible Resolutions:
370	1. Add this requirement to the use case and requirement document.
371	2. Do not add this requirement.
372	Status: Closed per F2F #2, Resolution 1 Carries
373	CLOSED ISSUE:[UC-1-08:AuthZAttrs]
374 375 376 377	It's been pointed out that the concept of an "authentication document" used in the use case and requirements document does not clearly specify the inclusion of authz attributes. Here, authz attributes are attributes of a principal that are used to make authz decisions, e.g. an identifier, or group or role membership.
378 379	Since authz attributes are important and are required by [R-AuthZ], it has been suggested that the single sign-on use case scenarios specify when authz assertions are passed between actors.
380	Possible Resolutions:
381 382	1. Edit the use case scenarios to specify passing authz attributes with authentication documents.
383	2. Do not specify the passing of authz attributes in the use case scenarios.
384	Status: Closed per F2F #2, Resolution 1 Carries
385	CLOSED ISSUE:[UC-1-09:AuthZDecisions]
386 387 388	The current use case and requirements document mentions "Access Authorization" and "Access Authorization References." In particular, this data is a record of a authorization decision made about a particular principal performing a particular action on a particular resource.
389 390 391	It would be more clear to label this data as "AuthZ Decision Documents" to differentiate from other AuthZ data, such as AuthZ attributes or AuthZ policy. To this point, the mentions of "access authorization" would be changed, and a new requirement would be added as follows:
392 393	[CR-1-09-AuthZDecision] SAML should define a data format for recording authorization decisions.
394	Possible Resolutions:

- 395
 1. Edit the use case scenarios to use the term "authz decision" and add the [CR-1-09 396 AuthZDecision] requirement.
- 397 2. Do not make these changes.
- 398 Status: Closed per F2F #2, Resolution 1 Carries
- 399 CLOSED ISSUE:[UC-1-10:UnknownParty]

400 The current straw man 2 document does not have a use case scenario for exchanging data 401 between security services that are previously unknown to each other. For example, a relying 402 party may choose to trust assertions made by an asserting party based on the signatures on the 403 AP's digital certificate, or through other means.

- 404 [Text Removed to Archive]
- 405 Possible Resolutions:
- 406 1. Add this use case scenario to the use case document.
- 407 2. Do not add this use case scenario to the use case document.
- 408 Status: Closed per F2F #2, Resolution 2 Carries
- 409 CLOSED ISSUE:[UC-1-11:AuthNEvents]

410 It is not specified in straw man 2 what authentication information is passed between parties. In

411 particular, specific information about authn events, such as time of authn and authn protocol are
 412 alluded to but not specifically called out.

The use case scenarios would be edited to show when information about authn events would be transferred, and the requirement for authn data would be edited to say:

- 415 [CR-1-11-AuthN] SAML should define a data format for authentication assertions,
 416 including descriptions of authentication events.
- 417 Possible Resolutions:
- 418
 418 1. Edit the use case scenarios to specifically define when authn event descriptions are 419 transferred, and edit the R-AuthN requirement.
- 420 2. Do not change the use case scenarios or R-AuthN requirement.
- 421 Status: Closed per F2F #2, Resolution 1 Carries

- 422 CLOSED ISSUE:[UC-1-12:SignOnService]
- 423 Bob Morgan suggests changing the title of use case 1, "Single Sign-on," to "Sign-on Service."
- 424 Possible Resolutions:
- 425 1. Make this change to the document.
- 426 2. Don't make this change.
- 427 Status: Closed per F2F #2, 2 carries
- 428 CLOSED ISSUE:[UC-1-13:ProxyModel]
- 429 Irving Reid suggests an additional use case scenario for single sign-on, based on proxies.

430 [Text Removed to Archive]

- 431 Possible Resolutions:
- 432 1. Add this use case scenario to the document.
- 433 2. Don't make this change.
- 434 Status: Closed by explicit vote at F2F #2, 2 carries, however see UC-1-14
- 435 CLOSED ISSUE:[UC-1-14: NoPassThruAuthnImpactsPEP2PDP]

436 Stephen Farrell has argued that dropping PassThruAuthN prevents standardization of important437 functionality in a commonly used configuration.

- The counter argument is the technical difficulty of implementing this capability, especially whenboth username/password and PKI AuthN must be supported.
- 440 Possible Resolutions:
- 441 1. Add this requirement to SAML 1.0
- authorize a subgroup/task force to evaluate a suitable pass-through authN solution for
 eventual inclusion in V.next of SAML. If the TC likes the design once it is presented, it
 may choose to open up its scope to once again include pass-through authN in V1.0.
 Stephen is willing to champion this."
- 446 3. Do not add this requirement.
- 447 Status: Closed on May 15 telcon, 2 carries
- 448

448 Group 2: B2B Scenario Variations

449 CLOSED ISSUE:[UC-2-01:AddPolicyAssertions]

450 Some use cases proposed on the security-use list (but not in the straw man 1 document) use a

451 concept of a "policy document." In concept a policy document is a statement of policy about a

452 particular resource, such as that user "evanp" is granted "execute" privileges on file

453 "/usr/bin/emacs." Another example may be that all users in domain "Acme.com" with role

454 "backup administrator" may perform the "shutdown" method on resource "mail server," during 455 non-business hours.

456 Use cases where policy documents are exchanged, and especially activities like security

discovery as in UC-4-04:SecurityDiscovery, would require this type of assertion. If these use

458 cases and/or services were adapted, the term "policy document" should be used. In addition, the

- 459 following requirement would be added:
- 460 [CR-2-01-Policy] SAML should define a data format for security policy about resources.
- 461 In addition, the explicit non-goal for authorization policy would be removed.

462 Another thing to consider is that the intended XACML group within Oasis is planning on

- working on defining a policy markup language in XML, and any work we do here could verywell be redundant.
- 465 Possible Resolutions:
- 466467467467467467
- 468 2. Maintain the non-goal, leave out the requirement.
- 469 Status: Closed per F2F #2, Resolution 1 Carries
- 470 CLOSED ISSUE:[UC-2-02:OutsourcedManagement]
- 471 A use case scenario provided by Hewlett Packard illustrates using SAML enveloped in a472 CIM/XML request. Should this scenario be included in the use case document?
- 473 [Text Removed to Archive]
- 474 Potential Resolutions:
- 475 1. Add this use-case scenario to the document.
- 476 2. Do not add this use-case scenario.

- 477 Status: Closed per F2F #2, 2 carries
- 478 CLOSED ISSUE:[UC-2-03:ASP]
- 479 A use case scenario provided by Hewlett Packard illustrates using SAML for a secure interaction
- 480 between an application service provider (ASP) and a client. Should this scenario be included in 481 the use case document?
- 482 [Text Removed to Archive]
- 483 Potential Resolutions:
- 484 1. Add this use-case scenario to the document.
- 485 2. Do not add this use-case scenario.
- 486 Status: Closed per F2F #2, 2 carries
- 487 ISSUE:[UC-2-05:EMarketplace]
- 488
- 489 Zahid Ahmed proposes the following additional use case scenario for inclusion in the use case
- 490 and requirements document.
- 491 Scenario X: E-Marketplace
- 492 {PRIVATE
- 493 "TYPE=PICT;ALT=EMarketplace"}

	2	
494		Fig X.
495	EMarketplace.	
496	Figure X: E-Marketplace Transaction.	
497 498 499 500	A B2B Transaction involving buyers and suppliers that conduct trade via an e-marketplace provides trading party authentication and authorization services, and other business servic support of secure transaction and routing of business document exchanges between trading parties.	es, in
501	Steps:	
502 503	1. A trading party (TP, e.g., buyer) creates a business document for subsequent transa with another trading party (e.g., supplier) accessible via its e-marketplace.	action
504 505	2. The sending, i.e., transaction-initiating trading party (TP) application creates crede data to be authenticated by the authentication and security service operated by an e	
	Colors: Gray Blue Yellow 19	

- 506 marketplace.
- The trading party application transaction client packages the XML-based credential data along with the other XML-based business document over a specific transport, messaging, and application protocol. Note: Credential data for login is not in SAML scope at the present time.
- 511 Some examples of such (layered) protocols are following (but not limited to):
- Secure transports: SSL and/or HTTPS
- Messaging protocol: S/MIME and JMS.
- Message Enveloping Formats: SOAP, etc.
- B2B Application Protocol: ebXML, BizTalk, etc.
- 516
 4. E-marketplace Authentication Service validates the TP Credential and creates a SAML
 517
 authn assertion along with attribute assertions for the transaction-initiating TP.
- 518NOTE: The authentication protocol and service and message processing service that519process SAML document instances are beyond the scope of the OASIS SAML520Specification. However, it is included here mainly to highlight the transaction flow and is521not defined as part of any SAML spec.
- 5. The E-marketplace Messaging Service then packages the AuthN Assertion and attribute
 assertions along with the original message payload into a tamper-proof envelope (i.e.,
 S/MIME multi-part signed)
- 5256. The resulting message envelope is transmitted to the target trading party (service provider).
- 5275277. The receiving trading party application extracts and processes the TP identity and authorization information available in the received envelope.
- 529 8. Receiving TP application then processes the business document of the sending TP.
- 530 9. Receiving TP sends back a response to sending TP via its e-marketplace by repeating531 Steps 1 through 5.
- 532 Possible Resolutions:
- 533 1. The above scenario should be added to the use cases document.
- 534 2. The above scenario should not be added to the document.
- 535 Status: Voted, No conclusion

Colors:	Gray	Blue	Yellow	20

536 Voting Results

{PRIVATE}Date	6 Apr 2001
Eligible	12
Resolution 1	7
Resolution 2	4

537 CLOSED ISSUE:[UC-2-06:EMarketplaceDifferentProtocol]

- 538 Zahid Ahmed has proposed that the following use case scenario be added to the use case and
- 539 requirements document.

540 [Text Removed to Archive]

541 Possible Resolutions:

- 542 1. Add this scenario to the document.
- 543 2. This use case scenario should not be added to the document.
- 544 Status: Closed per F2F #2, 2 carries
- 545 CLOSED ISSUE:[UC-2-07:MultipleEMarketplace]
- 546 Zahid Ahmed proposes the following use case scenario for inclusion in the document. This use547 case/issue is a variant of ISSUE# [UC-2-05].
- 548 [Text Removed to Archive]

549 Possible Resolutions:

- 550 1. Add this scenario to the document.
- 551 2. The above scenario should not be added to the document.
- 552 Status: Closed per F2F #2, 2 carries
- 553 CLOSED ISSUE:[UC-2-08:ebXML]
- 554 Maryann Hondo proposed this use case scenario for inclusion in the use case document
- 555 [Text Removed to Archive].
- 556 Potential Resolutions:

		draft-sstc-saml-issues-06.doc
557	1.	Add this use case scenario to the use case and requirements document.
558	2.	Do not add this scenario.
559	Status:	Closed per F2F #2, 2 carries
560		
561		

561 Group 3: Sessions

562 [At F2F #2, it was agreed to charter a sub group to "do the prep work to ensure that

563 logout, timein, and timeout will not be precluded from working with SAML later; commit 564 to doing these other pieces "next" after 1.0." Therefore all the items in this section have 565 hear closed with the netation "meformed to sub-group "l

565 been closed with the notation "referred to sub group."]

566 The purpose of the issues/resolutions in this group is to provide guidance to the rest of the TC as 567 to the functionality required related to sessions. Some of the scenarios contain some detail about 568 the messages which are transferred between parties, but the intention is not to require a particular 569 protocol. Instead, these details are offered as a way of describing the functionality required. It

- 570 would be perfectly acceptable if the resulting specification used different messages to
- 571 accomplish the same functionality.
- 572 CLOSED ISSUE:[UC-3-01:UserSession]
- 573 Should the use cases of log-off and timeout be supported
- 574 [Text Removed to Archive].
- 575 Possible Resolutions:
- 576 1. Add this requirement and/or use cases to SAML.
- 577 2. Do not add this requirement and/or use cases.
- 578 Status: Closed, referred to sub group
- 579 CLOSED ISSUE:[UC-3-02:ConversationSession]
- 580 Is the concept of a session between security authorities separate from the concept of a user
- 581 session? If so, should use case scenarios or requirements supporting security system sessions be 582 supported? [DavidO: I don't understand this issue, but I have left in for backwards
- 583 compatibility]. [DarrenP: I think this issue arose out of a misunderstanding/miscommunication
- on the mailing list and has been resolved. This is more of a formality to vote this one to a closed
- 585 status.]
- 586 Possible Resolutions:
- 587 1. Do not pursue this requirement as it is not in scope.
- 588 2. Do further analysis on this requirement to determine what it is specifically.
- 589 Status: Closed, referred to sub group

- 590 CLOSED ISSUE:[UC-3-03:Logout]
- 591 Should SAML support transfer of information about application-level logouts (e.g., a principal 592 intentionally ending a session) from the application to the Session Authority ?
- 593 Candidate Requirement:
- 594 [CR-3-3-Logout] SAML shall support a message format to indicate the end of an 595 application-level session due to logout by the principal.
- 596 Note that this requirement is implied by Scenario 1-3 (the second scenario 1-3 in straw man 3 -597 oops). This issue seeks to clarify the document by making the requirement explicit.
- 598 Possible Resolutions:
- 599 1. Add this requirement to SAML.
- 600 2. Do not add this requirement to SAML.
- 601 Status: Closed, referred to sub group
- 602 CLOSED ISSUE:[UC-3-05:SessionTermination]

For managing a SAML User Sessions, it may be useful to have a way to indicate that the SAMLlevel session is no longer valid. The logout requirement would invalidate a session based on user

605 input. This requirement, for termination, would invalidate the SAML-level session based on

- other factors, such as when the user has not used any of the SAML-level sessions constituent
- application- level sessions for more than a set amount of time. Timeout would be an example of
- a session termination.
- 609 Candidate requirement:
- 610 [CR-3-5-SessionTermination] SAML shall support a message format for timeout of a
- 611 SAML-level session. Here, "termination" is defined as the ending of a SAML-level
- session by a security system not based on user input. For example, if the user has not
- 613 used any of the application-level sub-sessions for a set amount of time, the session may
- 614 be considered "timed out."
- 615 Note that this requirement is implied by Scenario 1-3, figure 6, specifically the last message
- 616 labeled 'optionally delete/revoke session'. This issue seeks to clarify the document by making the
- 617 requirement explicit.
- 618 Possible Resolutions:
- 619 1. Add this requirement to SAML.
- 620 2. Do not add this requirement and/or use cases.

- 621 Status: Closed, referred to sub group
- 622 CLOSED ISSUE:[UC-3-06:DestinationLogout]

623 Should logging out of an individual application-level session be supported? Advantage: allows

application Web sites control over their local domain consistent with the model most widely

625 implemented on the web. Disadvantage: potentially more interactions between the application626 and the Session Authority.

627 [Text Removed to Archive]

628 Possible Resolutions:

- 629 1. Add this scenario and requirement to SAML.
- 630 2. Do not add this scenario or requirement.
- 631 Status: Closed, referred to sub group
- 632 CLOSED ISSUE:[UC-3-07:Logout Extent]
- 633 What is the impact of logging out at a destination web site?
- 634 Possible Resolution:
- 1. Logout from destination web site is local to destination [DavidO recommendation]
- 636 2. Logout from destination web site is global, that is destination + source web sites.
- 637 Status: Closed, referred to sub group
- 638 CLOSED ISSUE:[UC-3-08:DestinationSessionTermination]
- Having the Session Authority determine the timeout of a session is covered under [UC-3-5]. This
- 640 issue covers the manner and extent to which systems participating in that session can initiate and
- 641 control the timeout of their own sessions.
- 642 [Text Removed to Archive].
- 643 Possible Resolutions:
- 644 1. Add this scenario and requirement to SAML.
- 645 2. Do not add this scenario or requirement.
- 646 Status: Closed, referred to sub group

647 CLOSED ISSUE:[UC-3-09:Destination-Time-In]

648 In this scenario, a user has traveled from the source site (site of initial login) to some destination

649 site. The source site has set a maximum idle-time limit for the user session, based on user

activity at the source or destination site. The user stays at the destination site for a period longer

651 than the source site idle-time limit; and at that point the user returns to the source site. We do not 652 wish to have the user time-out at the source site and be re-challenged for authentication; instead,

the user should continue to enjoy the original session which would somehow be cognizant of

654 user activity at the destination site.

655 Candidate Requirement:

656 [CR-3-9:Destination-TimeIn] SAML shall support destination system time-in.

657 Possible Resolutions:

- 1. Add this scenario and requirement to SAML.
- 659 2. Do not add this scenario or requirement to SAML.
- 660 Status: Closed, referred to sub group

661 Group 4: Security Services

662 CLOSED ISSUE:[UC-4-01:SecurityService]

- 663 Should part of the use case document be a definition of a security service? What is a security
- service and how is it defined?

665 Potential Resolutions:

- This issue is now obsolete and can be closed as several securityservices (shared sessioning, PDP--PEP relationship) have been identified within SAML.
- 668 2. This issue should be kept open.
- 669 Status: Closed per F2F #2, 1 carries

670 CLOSED ISSUE:[UC-4-02:AttributeAuthority]

671 Should a concept of an attribute authority be introduced into the [SAML] use case document?

What part does it play? Should it be added in to an existing use case scenario, or be developed into its own scenario?

- The "attribute authority" terminology has already been introduced in the Hal/David diagrams and discussed by the use-case group. So this issue can be viewed as requiring more detail concerning
- the flows derived from the diagram to be introduced into the use-case document.
- 677 The following use-case scenario is offered as an instance:

678 (a) User authenticates and obtains an AuthN assertion. (b) User or server submits the AuthN

- 679 assertion to an attribute authority and in response obtains an AuthZ assertion containing 680 authorization attributes.
- 681 Potential Resolutions:
- 682683683684683684685685685685686686686687687688<l
- 6846852. This issue is adequately addressed by existing use cases and does not require further elaboration within SAML.
- 686 Status: Closed per F2F #2, Resolution 2 Carries

687 CLOSED ISSUE:[UC-4-03:PrivateKeyHost]

A concept taken from S2ML. A user may allow a server to host a private key. A credentials field
 within an AuthN assertion identifies the server that holds the key. Should this concept be

- 690 introduced into the [SAML] use case document? As a requirement? As part of an existing use 691 case scenario, or as its own scenario?
- 692 The S2ML use-case scenario had the following steps:
- User Jane (without public/private key pair) authenticates utilizing a trusted server X and
 receives an AuthN assertion. The trusted server holds a private/public key pair. The
 AuthN assertion received by Jane includes a field for the server X's public key.
- 696
 697
 698
 2. User submits a business payload and said AuthN assertion to trusted server X. The trusted server "binds" the assertion to the payload using some form of digital signing and sends the composite package onto the next stage in the business flow.

699 Potential Resolutions:

7001. A use-case or use-case scenario comprising steps 1 and 2 above should be added to the
use-case document.

A requirement for supporting "binding" between AuthN assertions and business payloads thru digital signature be added to the use-case document.

- This issue has been adequately addressed elsewhere; there is no need for any additions to the use-case document.
- 706 Status: Closed per F2F #2, Resolution 2 Carries
- 707 CLOSED ISSUE:[UC-4-04:SecurityDiscover]
- 708 UC-1-04:ARundgrenPush describes a single sign-on scenario that would require transfer of
- authorization data about a resource between security zones. Should a service for security
- 710 discovery be part of the [SAML] standard?
- 711 Possible Resolutions:
- Yes, a service could be provided to send authorization dataabout a service between security zones. This would require some sort of policy assertions (UC-2-01:AddPolicyAssertions).
- 715
 2. No, this extends the scope of [SAML] too far. AuthZ in [SAML]should be concerned with AuthZ attributes of a principal, not of resources.
- 717 Status: Closed per F2F #2, Resolution 2 Carries

718 Group 5: AuthN Protocols

719 CLOSED ISSUE:[UC-5-01:AuthNProtocol]

720 Straw Man 1 explicitly makes challenge-response authentication a non-goal. Is specifying which

- types of authn are allowed and what protocols they can use necessary for this document? If so,
- 722 what types and which protocols?

723 [Text Removed to Archive]

724 Possible Resolutions (not mutually exclusive):

725	1. The Non-Goal		
726 727	"Challenge-response authentication protocols are outside the scope of the SAML"		
728	should be removed from the Strawman 3 document.		
729	2. The following requirements should be added to the Strawman 3 document:		
730 731 732	[CR-5-01-1-StandardCreds] SAML should provide a data format for credentials including those based on name-password, X509v3 certificates, public keys, X509 Distinguished name, and empty credentials.		
733 734	[CR-5-01-2-ExtensibleCreds] SAML The credentials data format must support extensibility in a structured fashion.		
735	Status: Closed per F2F #2, 1 is not removed, 2 is not added, but see UC-1-14		
736	CLOSED ISSUE:[UC-5-02:SASL]		
737	Is there a need to develop materials within SAML that explore its relationship to SASL [SASL]?		
738	Possible Resolutions:		
739	1. Yes		
740	2. No		
741	Status: Closed per F2F #2, 2 carries		
742	CLOSED ISSUE:[UC-5-03:AuthNThrough]		
743 744	All the scenarios in Straw Man 1 presume that the user provides authentication credentials (password, certificate, biometric, etc) to the authentication system out-of-band.		

745	Possible Resolutions (not mutually exclusive):
746 747	1. Should SAML be used directly for authentication? In other words should the SAML model or express one or more authentication methods or a framework for authentication?
748	2. Should this be explicitly stated as a non-goal?
749	3. Should the following statement be added to the non-goals section?
750 751	[NO-Authn] Authentication methods or frameworks are outside the scope of SAML.
752	Status: Closed per F2F #2, Resolution 1 Fails, Resolution 2 Passes, Resolution 3 Fails
753	

753 Group 6: Protocol Bindings

754 CLOSED ISSUE:[UC-6-01:XMLProtocol]

Should mention of a SOAP binding in the use case and requirements document be changed to asay "an XML protocol" (lower case, implying generic XML-based protocols)? Or "XML

757 Protocol", the specific W3 RPC-like protocol using XML (http://www.w3.org/2000/xp/)?

Although SOAP is being reworked in favor of XP, the current state of XML Protocol is unknown. Requiring a binding to that protocol by June may not be feasible.

760 Per David Orchard, "There is no such deliverable as XML Protocol specification. We don't know

when an XMLP 1.0 spec will ship. We can NEVER have forward references in specifications.

When XMLP ships, we can easily change the requirements. [...] I definitely think we should

763 mandate a SOAP 1.1 binding."

764 Possible Resolutions:

- 1. Change requirement for binding to SOAP to binding to XML Protocol.
- 766 2. Leave current binding to SOAP.
- 767 3. Remove mention of binding to either of these protocols.
- 768 Status: Closed per F2F #2, Resolution 2 Carries

769 Group 7: Enveloping vs. Enveloped

770 ISSUE:[UC-7-01:Enveloping]

SAML data will be transferred with other types of XML data not specific to authn and authz,such as financial transaction data. What should the relationship of the documents be?

One possibility is requiring that SAML allow for enveloping business-specific data within
 SAML. Such a requirement might state:

- [CR-7-01:Enveloping] SAML messages and assertions should be able to envelopconversation-specific XML data.
- Note that this requirement is not in conflict with [CR-7-02:Enveloped]. They are mutuallycompatible.
- 779 Possible Resolutions:
- 780 1. Add this proposed requirement.
- 781 2. Do not add this proposed requirement.
- 782 Status: Voted, No Conclusion
- 783 Voting Results

{PRIVATE}Date	27 Mar 2001
Eligible	15
Resolution 1	9
Resolution 2	4
Abstain	1

- 784 ISSUE:[UC-7-02:Enveloped]
- 785 SAML data will be transferred with other types of XML data not specific to authn and authz, 786 such as financial transaction data. What should the relationship of the documents be?
- One possibility is requiring that SAML should be fit for being enveloped in other XMLdocuments.
- 789 [CR-7-02:Enveloped] SAML messages and assertions should be fit to be enveloped in

- 790 conversation-specific XML documents.
- Note that this requirement is not in conflict with [CR-7-01:Enveloping]. They are mutually
- compatible.
- 793 Possible Resolutions:
- 1. Add this proposed requirement.
- 795 2. Do not add this proposed requirement.
- 796 Status: Voted, Resolution 1 Carries
- 797 Voting Results


{PRIVATE}Date	27 Mar 2001
Eligible	15
Resolution 1	12
Resolution 2	2


798

799 Group 8: Intermediaries

800 CLOSED ISSUE:[UC-8-01:Intermediaries]

- 801 The use case scenarios in the S2ML 0.8a specification include one where an intermediary passes
- an S2ML message from a source party to a destination party. What is the part of intermediaries
 in an SAML conversation?
- 804 A requirement to enable passing SAML data through intermediaries could be phrased as follows:
- 805 [CR-8-01:Intermediaries] SAML data structures (assertions and messages) will be
- structured in a way that they can be passed from an asserting party through one or more
- 807 intermediaries to a relying party. The validity of a message or assertion can be
- 808 established without requiring a direct connection between asserting and relying party.
- 809 Possible Resolutions:
- 810 1. Add this requirement to the document.
- 811 2. Do not add this requirement to the document.
- 812 Status: Closed per F2F #2, Resolution 1 Carries
- 813 ISSUE:[UC-8-02:IntermediaryAdd]
- 814 One question that has been raised is whether intermediaries can make additions to SAML
- 815 documents. It is possible that intermediaries could add data to assertions, or add new assertions 816 that are bound to the original assertions.
- 817 If we wanted to support allowing intermediaries to add data to SAML documents, the following 818 use-case scenario could be added to the use case and requirements document:
- 819 In this use case scenario, two parties -- a buyer and a seller -- perform a transaction using a B2B
- 820 exchange as an intermediary. The intermediary adds AuthN and AuthZ data to orders as they go
- 821 through the system, giving additional points for decisions made by the parties.
- 822 {PRIVATE "TYPE=PICT;ALT=Intermediary





- 826 1. Buyer authenticates to Buyer Security System.
- 827 2. Buyer Security System provides a SAML AuthN assertion to Buyer, containing data

Colors: Gray Blue Yellow

823

824

828		about the authentication event and authorization attributes about the Buyer.
829	3.	Seller authenticates to Seller Security System.
830 831	4.	Seller Security System provides a SAML AuthN assertion to Seller, containing data about the authentication event and authorization attributes about the Seller.
832	5.	Buyer requests authorization from Buyer Security System to submit a given order.
833 834	6.	Buyer Security System provides a SAML AuthZ Decision assertion to Buyer, stating that Buyer is allowed to submit the order.
835 836	7.	Buyer submits order to B2B Exchange, providing AuthN assertion and AuthZ decision assertion.
837 838	8.	B2B exchange adds AuthN assertion data, specifying that the exchange authenticated the buyer (using the assertion).
839 840	9.	B2B exchange adds AuthZ decision assertion data, stating that the Buyer is permitted to use the exchange to make this order.
841	10	. B2B exchange submits order to Seller.
842	11	. Seller validates the order, using the assertions.
843	12	2. Seller requests authorization from Seller Security System to fulfill a given order.
844 845	13	Seller Security System provides a SAML AuthZ Decision assertion to Seller, stating that Seller is allowed to fulfill the order.
846 847	14	. Seller submits intention to fulfill the order to the B2B exchange, including AuthN assertions and AuthZ decision assertions.
848 849	15	. B2B exchange adds AuthN data, specifying that it used the original SAML AuthN assertion to authenticate the Seller.
850 851	16	B2B exchange add AuthZ decision data, specifying that the seller is authorized to fulfill this order through the exchange.
852	17	. B2B exchange sends the order fulfillment to the Buyer.
853 854	18	8. Buyer validates the order fulfillment based on AuthN assertion(s) and AuthZ decision assertion(s).
855	Possil	ble Resolutions:
856	1.	Add this use-case scenario to the document.

- 857 2. Don't add this use-case scenario.
- 858 Status: Voted, Resolution 1 Carries
- 859 Voting Results

{PRIVATE}Date	27 Mar 2001
Eligible	15
Resolution 1	11
Resolution 2	3

- 860 ISSUE:[UC-8-03:IntermediaryDelete]
- Another issue with intermediaries is whether SAML must support allowing intermediaries to delete data from SAML documents.
- 863 If so, the following use-case scenario could be added to the use case document to illustrate.
- 864 Use Case Scenario X: Intermediary Delete
- 865 In this scenario, a buyer and a seller are using a B2B exchange to perform a transaction. The
- 866 B2B exchange acts as an intermediary between the two parties. The exchange has an interest in
- 867 not being disintermediated by the parties, so it modifies submitted SAML data to anonymize the
- 868 buyer. This would prevent the seller from directly contacting the buyer without using the
- 869 exchange.
- 870 {PRIVATE "TYPE=PICT;ALT=Intermediary
- 871 Delete"}

	2	
872 873	Interm	Fig. X.
874	Steps:	
875	1.	Buyer authenticates to Buyer Security System.
876 877	2.	Buyer Security System provides a SAML AuthN assertion to Buyer, containing data about the authentication event and authorization attributes about the Buyer.
878	3.	Buyer requests authorization from Buyer Security System to submit a given order.
879 880	4.	Buyer Security System provides a SAML AuthZ Decision assertion to Buyer, stating that Buyer is allowed to submit the order.
881 882	5.	Buyer submits order to B2B Exchange, providing AuthN assertion and AuthZ decision assertion.
883 884	6.	B2B exchange anonymizes the order by removing identifying attributes from the SAML submitted by Buyer.
885	7.	B2B exchange submits order to Seller.
	Colors	: Gray Blue Yellow 38

- 886 Possible Resolutions:
- 1. Add this use-case scenario to the document.
- 888 2. Don't add this use-case scenario.
- 889 Status: Voted, No Conclusion
- 890 Voting Results

{PRIVATE}Date	27 Mar 2001
Eligible	15
Resolution 1	6
Resolution 2	8

- 891 ISSUE:[UC-8-04:IntermediaryEdit]
- 892 Similar to [UC-8-03:IntermediaryDelete] is the issue of whether SAML must support allowing
- 893 intermediaries to edit or change SAML data as they pass it between parties.
- 894 If so, the following use-case scenario could be added to the use case document to illustrate.
- 895 Use Case Scenario X: Intermediary Edit
- In this scenario, a buyer and a seller are using a B2B exchange to perform a transaction. The
- 897 B2B exchange acts as an intermediary between the two parties. In this case, the buyer and seller
- use different vocabularies for expressing security concepts and also different vocabularies for
- domain concepts. The B2B exchange provides a translation before passing on SAML documents.
- 900 {PRIVATE "TYPE=PICT;ALT=Intermediary

draft-sstc-saml-issues-06.doc 2 Edit"} Fig. X. Intermediary Edit Steps: 1. Buyer authenticates to Buyer Security System. 2. Buyer Security System provides a SAML AuthN assertion to Buyer, containing data about the authentication event and authorization attributes about the Buyer. One AuthZ attribute is that the Buyer has a "role" of "purchase agent". 3. Buyer requests authorization from Buyer Security System to submit a given order. 4. Buyer Security System provides a SAML AuthZ Decision assertion to Buyer, stating that Buyer is allowed to submit the order. Specifically, it states that Buyer has the "purchase" privilege for the given order. 5. Buyer submits order to B2B Exchange, providing AuthN assertion and AuthZ decision assertion. 6. Based on registered settings of the Seller, the B2B exchange knows that Seller uses a different vocabulary than Buyer. For example, Seller has only group-based AuthZ, not

Colors: Gray Blue Yellow

901

902

903

904

905

906

907

908

909

910

911

912

913

914

- 916 role-based. So it changes the "role" attribute to "group". Additionally, it knows that the
 917 Seller uses the term "buy" and not "purchase" for the privilege of making an order, so it
 918 translates that AuthZ information, too.
- 919 7. B2B exchange submits order to Seller.
- 920 Possible Resolutions:
- 921 1. Add this use-case scenario to the document.
- 922 2. Don't add this use-case scenario.
- 923 Status: Voted, No Conclusion
- 924 Voting Results

{PRIVATE}Date	27 Mar 2001
Eligible	15
Resolution 1	4
Resolution 2	10

- 925 ISSUE:[UC-8-05:AtomicAssertion]
- 926 One implicit assumption about SAML is that assertions will be represented as XML elements
- 927 with associated digital signatures. Any additions, deletions or changes would make the signature
- 928 on the assertion invalid. This would make it difficult for relying parties to determine the validity
- 929 of the assertion itself, especially if it is received through an intermediary.
- 930 Thus, the implementation of assertions as element + signature would make [UC-8-
- 931 02:IntermediaryAdd], [UC-8-03:IntermediaryDelete], and [UC-8-04:IntermediaryEdit] difficult
- to specify, if the idea is to actually modify the original assertions themselves. One possible
- solution is that some kind of diff or change structure could be added. Another possibility is that
- signatures on each individual sub-element of the assertion could be required, so that if the
- intermediary changes one sub-element the others remain valid. Neither of these is a clean
- 936 solution.
- However, if there's no goal of changing the sub-elements of the assertion, then it's possible to
- 938 implement modifications. For example, [UC-8-02:IntermediaryAdd] can be implemented
- 939 without breaking apart assertions. The B2B exchange could simply add its own assertions to the
- order, as well as the assertions provided by the buyer.
- 941 Deletion and edition could be implemented by simply replacing the assertions made by the buyer
 942 -- passing new AuthZ and AuthC assertions made and signed by the B2B exchange. These would

- 943 incorporate elements from the assertions made by the Buyer Security System, but be signed by944 the B2B exchange.
- There is semantic value to who makes an assertion, though. If the B2B exchange makes the assertion rather than the Buyer Security System, there is a different level of validity for the
- 947 Seller.
- 948 Since assertion as element + signature is a very natural implementation, it may be good to 949 express the indivisibility of the assertion as part of a non-goal. One such non-goal could be:
- 950 [CR-8-05:AtomicAssertion] SAML does not need to specify a mechanism for additions, 951 deletions or modifications to be made to assertions.
- 952 In addition, the use case scenarios should be edited to specifically point out that additions,
- 953 deletions or modifications make changes to whole assertions, and not to parts of assertions.
- 954 Possible Resolutions:
- Add this non-goal to the document, and change use case scenarios to specify that intermediaries must treat assertions as atomic.
- 957 2. Don't add this non-goal.
- 958 Status: Voted, Resolution 1 Carries
- 959 Voting Results

{PRIVATE}Date	27 Mar 2001
Eligible	15
Resolution 1	12
Resolution 2	2

960

961 Group 9: Privacy

962 ISSUE:[UC-9-01:RuntimePrivacy]

Should protecting the privacy of the user be part of the SAML conversation? In other words,
should user consent to exchange of data be given at run time, or at the time the user establishes a
relationship with a security system?

An example of runtime privacy configuration would be use case scenario described in [UC-1-04:ARundgrenPush]. Because this scenario has been rejected by the use cases and requirement group, it makes sense to phrase this as a non-goal of SAML, rather than as a requirement.

- 969 [CR-9-01:RuntimePrivacy] SAML does not provide for subject control of data flow
- 970 (privacy) at run-time. The determination of privacy policy is between the subject and
- 971 security authorities and should be determined out-of-band, for example, in a privacy
- 972 agreement.
- 973 Possible Resolutions
- 974 1. Add this proposed non-goal.
- 975 2. Do not add this proposed non-goal.
- 976 Status: Voted, No Conclusion
- 977 Voting Results

{PRIVATE}Date	27 Mar 2001
Eligible	15
Resolution 1	9
Resolution 2	4

- 978 ISSUE:[UC-9-02:PrivacyStatement]
- 979 Important private data of end users should be shared as needed between peers in an SAML
- 980 conversation. In addition, the user should have control over what data is exchanged. How should
- 981 the requirement be expressed in the use case and requirements document?
- 982 One difficulty is that, if run-time privacy is out of scope per UC-9-01:RuntimePrivacy, it's
- 983 difficult to impose a privacy requirement on eventual implementers. Especially considering that
- our requirements doc is for the specification itself, and not for implementers. In addition,
- 985 specifications rarely proscribe guiding principles that cannot be expressed in the specified

- 986 technology itself.
- 987 One statement suggested by Bob Morgan is as follows:
- 988 [CR-9-02-3-DisclosureMorgan] SAML should support policy-based disclosure of subject 989 security attributes, based on the identities of parties involved in an authentication or
- authorization exchange.
- 991 Another, by Bob Blakley:

992 [CR-9-02-2-DisclosureBlakley] SAM should support *restriction of* disclosure of
 993 subject security attributes, *based on a policy stated by the subject*. *This policy might
 994 be* based on the identities of parties involved in an authentication or authorization
 995 exchange.

996 A final one, by Prateek Mishra:

997 [CR-9-02-4-DisclosureMishra] An AP should only release credentials for a subject to an
 998 RP if the subject has been informed about this possibility and has assented. The exact
 999 mechanism and format for interaction between an AP and a subject concerning such
 1000 privacy issues is outside the scope of the specification.

1001 Comment by David Orchard:

"My concerns about all of the disclosure requirements, is that I cannot see how any piece of
software could be tested for conformance. In the case of Blakely style, "SAM should support
restriction of disclosure of subject security attributes, *based on a policy stated by the
subject*", how do I write a conformance test that verifes:

44

- what are allowable and non-allowable restrictions?
- How do I test that an non-allowable restriction hasn't been made?
- How do I verify that a subject has stated a policy?
- How can a subject state a policy?"
- 1010 Possible Resolutions
- 1011 1. Add [CR-9-02-3-DisclosureMorgan] as a requirement.
- 1012 2. Add [CR-9-02-2-DisclosureBlakley] as a requirement.
- 1013 3. Add [CR-9-02-4-DisclosureMishra] as a requirement.
- 1014 4. Add none of these as requirements.
- 1015 Status: Voted, No Conclusion

1016 Voting Results

{PRIVATE}Date	27 Mar 2001
Eligible	15
Resolution 1	4
Resolution 2	0
Resolution 3	4
Resolution 4	7

1017

1018 Group 10: Framework

1019 CLOSED ISSUE:[UC-10-01:Framework]

1020 Should SAML provide a framework that allows delivery of security content negotiated out-of-

band? A typical use case is authorization extensions to the core SAML constructs. The contra-position is to rigidly define the constructs without allowing extension.

A requirement already exists in the SAML document for extensibility: [R-Extensible] SAML should be easily extensible. Therefore, the change that voting on this issue would make would be to remove rather than add a requirement.

- 1026 Possible Resolutions:
- 1027 1. Remove the extensibility requirement.
- 1028 2. Leave the extensibility requirement.
- 1029 Status: Closed per F2F #2, Resolution 2 Carries
- 1030 ISSUE:[UC-10-02:ExtendAssertionData]
- 1031 Assertions are the "nouns" of SAML. One way to extend SAML is to allow additional elements
- 1032 in an assertion besides the ones specified by SAML. This could be used to add additional
- 1033 attributes about a subject, or data structured under another namespace.
- 1034 A requirement that captures this functionality would be:
- 1035 [CR-10-02:ExtendAssertionData] The format of SAML assertions should allow the 1036 addition of arbitrary XML data as extensions.
- 1037 Possible Resolutions:
- 1038 1. Add requirement [CR-10-02:ExtendAssertionData].
- 1039 2. Do not add this requirement.
- 1040 Status: Closed per F2F #2, 2 carries
- 1041 CLOSED ISSUE:[UC-10-03:ExtendMessageData]
- 1042 Similarly to [UC-10-02], it would be useful to allow additional data to SAML messages. Either
- 1043 defined SAML assertions, or arbitrary XML, could be attached.
- 1044 A potential requirement to add this functionality would be:

1045 [CR-	10-03:ExtendMessageData] The format of SAML	messages should allow the
-----------	-------------------------	----------------------	---------------------------

addition of arbitrary XML data, or SAML assertions not specified for that message type, as extensions.

- 1048 Possible Resolutions:
- 1049 1. Add requirement [CR-10-03:ExtendMessageData].
- 1050 2. Do not add this requirement.
- 1051 Status: Closed per F2F #2, 2 carries
- 1052 CLOSED ISSUE:[UC-10-04:ExtendMessageTypes]

1053 It's common in protocol definitions that real-world implementations require additional message

1054 types. For example, a system handling a request for authorization that is taking a long time might

send a <KeepWaiting> or <AskAgainLater> message to the requester.

1056 Many protocols explicitly allow for a mechanism for adding extended message types in their

specification. We may want to require that SAML also allow for extended message types in the
 specification. One requirement may be:

1059 [CR-10-04:ExtendMessageTypes] The SAML protocol will explicitly allow for 1060 additional message types to be defined by implementers.

1061 Note that this is different from [UC-10-03:ExtendMessageData]. That issue is about adding
1062 extended data to existing message types in the protocol. This issue is about adding new message
1063 types entirely.

- 1064Also note that adding this requirement would strongly favor [CR-10-07-1], to allow1065interoperability.
- 1066 Possible Resolutions:
- 1067 1. Add requirement [CR-10-04:ExtendMessageTypes].
- 1068 2. Do not add this requirement.
- 1069 Status: Closed per F2F #2, 2 carries
- 1070 CLOSED ISSUE:[UC-10-05:ExtendAssertionTypes]
- 1071 As with [UC-10-04], it may be useful to add extended assertions to a SAML conversation. As an
- admittedly stretched example, an implementer may choose to add auditing to the SAML
- specification, and therefore define one or more <AuditAssertion> types.
- 1074 [Text Removed to Archive]

1. Add requirement [CR-10-05:ExtendAssertionTypes].

1075

1076

Possible Resolutions:

1077	2. Do not add this requirement.
1078	Status: Closed per F2F #2, 2 carries
1079	CLOSED ISSUE:[UC-10-06:BackwardCompatibleExtensions]
1080 1081 1082 1083	Because SAML is an interoperability standard, it's important that custom extensions for SAML messages and/or assertions be compatible with standard SAML implementations. For this reasons, extensions should be clearly recognizable as such, marked with flags to indicate whether processing should continue if the receiving party does not support the extension.
1084	One possible requirement for this functionality is the following:
1085 1086 1087	[CR-10-06-BackwardCompatibleExtensions] Extension data in SAML will be clearly identified for all SAML processors, and will indicate whether the processor should continue if it does not support the extension.
1088	Possible Resolutions:
1089	1. Add requirement [CR-10-06-BackwardCompatibleExtensions].
1090	2. Do not add this requirement.
1091	Status: Closed per F2F #2, Resolution 1 Carries
1091 1092	Status: Closed per F2F #2, Resolution 1 Carries CLOSED ISSUE:[UC-10-07:ExtensionNegotiation]
1092 1093 1094	CLOSED ISSUE:[UC-10-07:ExtensionNegotiation] Many protocols allow a negotiation phase between parties in a message exchange to determine which extensions and options the other party supports. For example, HTTP 1.1 has the
1092 1093 1094 1095 1096	CLOSED ISSUE:[UC-10-07:ExtensionNegotiation] Many protocols allow a negotiation phase between parties in a message exchange to determine which extensions and options the other party supports. For example, HTTP 1.1 has the OPTIONS method, and ESMTP has the EHLO command. Since this is a fairly common design model, it may be useful to add such a feature to SAML. One
1092 1093 1094 1095 1096 1097 1098	CLOSED ISSUE:[UC-10-07:ExtensionNegotiation] Many protocols allow a negotiation phase between parties in a message exchange to determine which extensions and options the other party supports. For example, HTTP 1.1 has the OPTIONS method, and ESMTP has the EHLO command. Since this is a fairly common design model, it may be useful to add such a feature to SAML. One option is to add a requirement for extension negotiation: [CR-10-07-1:ExtensionNegotiation] SAML protocol will define a message format for
1092 1093 1094 1095 1096 1097 1098 1099 1100 1101	CLOSED ISSUE:[UC-10-07:ExtensionNegotiation] Many protocols allow a negotiation phase between parties in a message exchange to determine which extensions and options the other party supports. For example, HTTP 1.1 has the OPTIONS method, and ESMTP has the EHLO command. Since this is a fairly common design model, it may be useful to add such a feature to SAML. One option is to add a requirement for extension negotiation: [CR-10-07-1:ExtensionNegotiation] SAML protocol will define a message format for negotiation of supported extensions. However, this may unnecessarily complicate the SAML protocol. Because negotiation is a common design, it may be a good idea to have a clarifying non-goal in the requirements

1105	Possible Resolutions:
1106	1. Add requirement [CR-10-07-1:ExtensionNegotiation].
1107	2. Add non-goal [CR-10-07-2:NoExtensionNegotiation].
1108	3. Add neither the requirement nor the non-goal.
1109	Status: Closed per F2F #2, 3 carries
1110	

1110 Group 11: AuthZ Use Case

1111 CLOSED ISSUE:[UC-11-01:AuthzUseCase]

1112 Use Case 2 in Strawman 3 (http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/security/docs/draft-sstc-use-

strawman- 03.html) describes the use of SAML for the conversation between a Policy

1114 Enforcement Point (PEP) and a Policy Decision Point (PDP), in which the PEP sends a request

describing a particular action (such as 'A client presenting the attached SAML data wishes to

1116 read http://foo.bar/index.html'), and the PDP replies with an Authorization Decision Assertion

1117 instructing the PEP to allow or deny that request.

1118 Possible Resolutions:

- 1119 1. Continue to include this use case.
- 1120 2. Remove this use case.
- 1121 Status: Closed per F2F #2, Resolution 1 Carries

1122 Group 12: Encryption

- 1123 [Text Removed to Archive]
- 1124 CLOSED ISSUE:[UC-12-01:Confidentiality]
- 1125 Add the following requirement:
- 1126 [R-Confidentiality] SAML data should be protected from observation by third parties or 1127 untrusted intermediaries.

1128 Possible Resolutions:

- 1129 1. Add [R-Confidentiality]
- 1130 2. Do not add [R-Confidentiality]
- 1131 Status: Closed per F2F #2, Resolution 1 Carries
- 1132 CLOSED ISSUE:[UC-12-02:AssertionConfidentiality]
- 11331. Add the requirement: [R-AssertionConfidentiality] SAML should define a format so that1134individual SAML assertions may be encrypted, independent of protocol bindings.
- 11352. Add the requirement: [R-AssertionConfidentiality] SAML assertions must be encrypted, independent of protocol bindings.
- Add a non-goal: SAML will not define a format for protecting confidentiality of individual assertions; confidentiality protection will be left to the protocol bindings.
- 1139 4. Do not add either requirement or the non-goal.
- 1140 Status: Closed per F2F #2, No Conclusion
- 1141 CLOSED ISSUE:[UC-12-03:BindingConfidentiality]
- 1142 The first option is intended to make the protection optional (both in the binding definition, and 1143 by the user at runtime).
- [R-BindingConfidentiality] Bindings SHOULD (in the RFC sense) provide a means to protect SAML data from observation by third parties. Each protocol binding must include a description of how applications can make use of this protection. Examples: S/MIME for MIME, HTTP/S for HTTP.
- 11482. [R-BindingConfidentiality] Each protocol binding must always protect SAML data from observation by third parties.

1150	
1150	3. Do not add either requirement.
1151	Status: Closed per F2F #2, Resolution 1 Carries
1152	CLOSED ISSUE:[UC-12-04:EncryptionMethod]
1153 1154	If confidentiality protection is included in the SAML assertion format (that is, you chose option 1 or 2 for [UC-12-02:AssertionConfidentiality]), how should the protection be provided?
1155 1156	Note that if option 2 (assertion confidentiality is required) was chosen for UC-12-02, resolution 1 of this issue implies that SAML will not be published until after XML Encryption is published.
1157	Proposed resolutions; choose one of:
1150	
1158	1. Add the requirement: [R-EncryptionMethod] SAML should use XML Encryption.
1159 1160 1161	2. Add the requirement: [R-EncryptionMethod] Because there is no currently published standard for encrypting XML, SAML should define its own encryption format. Edit the existing non-goal of not creating new cryptographic techniques to allow this.
1162 1163	3. Add no requirement now, but include a note that this issue must be revisited in a future version of the SAML spec after XML Encryption is published.
1164	4. Do not add any of these requirements or notes.
1165	Status: Classed per E2E #2 Desclution 2 Corriga
1165	Status: Closed per F2F #2, Resolution 3 Carries
1166	

1166 Group 13: Business Requirements

- 1167 CLOSED ISSUE:[UC-13-01:Scalability]
- Bob Morgan brought up several "business requirements" on security-use. One was scalability.
- 1169 This issue is a placeholder for further elaboration on the subject.

1170 A candidate requirement might be:

1171 [CR-13-01-Scalability] SAML should be appropriate for high volume of messages, and 1172 for messages between parties made up of several physical machines.

1173 Potential Resolutions:

- 1174 1. Add requirement [CR-13-01-Scalability].
- 1175 2. Do not add this requirement.
- 1176 Status: Closed per F2F #2, 2 carries
- 1177 CLOSED ISSUE:[UC-13-02:EfficientMessages]
- 1178 Philip Hallam-Baker's core assertions requirement document included several requirements that
- were efficiency-oriented. When that requirement document was merged into Straw Man 2, the efficiency requirements were excluded.
- 1181 One such requirement was:
- 1182 [CR-13-02-EfficientMessages] SAML should support efficient message exchange.
- 1183 Potential Resolutions:
- 1. Add this requirement to the use case and requirements document.
- 1185 2. Leave this requirement out of use case and requirements document.
- 1186 Status: Closed per F2F #2, 2 carries
- 1187 CLOSED ISSUE:[UC-13-03:OptionalAuthentication]
- 1188 Philip Hallam-Baker's core assertions requirement document included several requirements that
- 1189 were efficiency-oriented. When that requirement document was merged into Straw Man 2, the
- 1190 efficiency requirements were excluded.
- 1191 One such requirement was:
- 1192 [CR-13-03-OptionalAuthentication] Authentication between asserting party and relying

	draft-sstc-saml-issues-06.doc
1193	party should be optional. Messages may omit authentication altogether.
1194 1195	In this case, "authentication" means authentication between the parties in the conversation (for example, by means of a digital signature) and not authentication by the subject.
1196	Potential Resolutions:
1197	1. Add this requirement to the use case and requirements document.
1198	2. Leave this requirement out of use case and requirements document.
1199	Status: Closed per F2F #2, 2 carries
1200	CLOSED ISSUE:[UC-13-04:OptionalSignatures]
1201 1202 1203	Philip Hallam-Baker's core assertions requirement document included several requirements tha were efficiency-oriented. When that requirement document was merged into Straw Man 2, the efficiency requirements were excluded.
1204	One such requirement was:
1205	[CR-13-04-OptionalSignatures] Signatures should be optional.
1206	Potential Resolutions:
1207	1. Add this requirement to the use case and requirements document.
1208	2. Leave this requirement out of use case and requirements document.
1209	Status: Closed, Voted on May 15 telcon for resolution 1
1210	CLOSED ISSUE:[UC-13-05:SecurityPolicy]
1211	Bob Morgan proposed a business-level requirement as follows:
1212 1213 1214	[CR-13-05-SecurityPolicy] Security measures in SAML should support common institutional security policies regarding assurance of identity, confidentiality, and integrity.
1215	Potential Resolutions:
1216	1. Add this requirement to the use case and requirements document.
1217	2. Leave this requirement out of use case and requirements document.

54

1218 Status: Closed per F2F #2, Resolution 2 Carries

1219 CLOSED ISSUE:[UC-13-06:ReferenceReqt]

Bob Morgan has questioned requirement [R-Reference] in that it is not specific enough. In

1221 particular, he said: "Goal [R-Reference] either needs more elaboration or (likely) needs to be

- dropped. What is a 'reference'? It doesn't have a standard well-understood security meaning nor
- 1223 is it defined in the glossary. This Goal seems to me to be making an assumption about a low-
- 1224 level mechanism for optimizing some of the transfers."
- 1225 One possible, more specific elaboration might be:
- 1226 [CR-13-06-1-Reference] SAML should define a data format for providing references to 1227 authentication and authorization assertions. Here, a "reference" means a token that may 1228 not be a full assertion, but can be presented to an asserting party to request a particular 1229 assertion.
- [CR-13-06-2-Reference-Message] SAML should define a message format for requesting
 authentication and authorization assertions using references.
- [CR-13-06-2-Reference-Size] SAML references should be small. In particular, they
 should be small enough to be transferred by Web browsers, either as cookies or as CGI
 parameters.
- 1235 Potential Resolutions:
- 1236 1. Replace [R-Reference] with these requirements.
- 1237 2. Leave [R-Reference] as it is.
- 1238 3. Remove mention of references entirely.
- 1239 Status: Closed per F2F #2, Resolution 2 Carries
- 1240 ISSUE [UC-13-07: Hailstorm Interoperability]
- 1241 Should SAML provide interoperability with the Microsoft Hailstorm architecture, including the
- 1242 Passport login system?
- 1243 Status: Open
- 1244

1244 Group 14: Domain Model

1245 **ISSUE:[UC-14-01:UMLCardinalities]**

1246 The cardinalities in the UML diagrams in the Domain Model are backwards.

1247 Frank Seliger comments: The Domain model claims to use the UML notation, but has the

1248 multiplicities according to the Coad method. If it were UML, the diagram would state that one

1249 Credential could belong to many Principals. I assume that we would rather want to state that one 1250 Principal can have many Credentials, similarly for System Entity, the generalization of User.

1251 One Principal would belong to several System Entities or Users according to the diagram. I

1252 would rather think we want one System Entity or User to have several Principals.

1253 My theory how these wrong multiplicities happened is the following: As I can see from the

1254 change history, the tool Together has been used to create the initial version of this diagram.

1255 Together in its first version used only the Peter Coad notation. Later versions still offered the

1256 Coad notation as default. Peter Coad had the cardinalities (UML calls this multiplicities) just

1257 swapped compared to the rest of the world. This always caused grief, and it did again here.

- 1258 Dave Orchard agrees this should be fixed.
- 1259 Status: Open

1260 **Design Issues**

1261 Group 1: Naming Subjects

- 1262 ISSUE:[DS-1-01: Referring to Subject]
- 1263 By what means should Assertions identify the subject they refer to?
- 1264 Bob Blakely points out that references can be:
- 1265 1. Nominative (by name, i.e. some identifier)
- 1266 2. Descriptive (by attributes)
- 1267 3. Indexical (by "pointing")

1268 SAML may need to use all types, but Indexical ones in particular can be dangerous from a

- security perspective.
- 1270 Potential Resolutions:
- 1271 ??
- 1272 Status: Open
- 1273 ISSUE:[DS-1-02: Anonymity Technique]
- 1274 How should the requirement of Anonymity of SAML assertions be met?
- 1275 **Potential Resolutions:**
- 1276 1. Generate a new, random identified to refer to an individual for the lifetime of a session.
- 1277 **2.** ???
- 1278 Status: Open
- 1279 ISSUE:[DS-1-03: SubjectComposition]
- 1280 What is the composition of a subject or "subject specifier" within:
- 1281 An AuthnAssn?
- An AuthnAssnReq?
- 1283 Note that we have consensus on the overall composition as noted in [sec. 2, 3, & 4 of

1284 WhiteboardTranscription-01.pdf].

- 1285 This was identified as F2F#3-9.
- 1286 This is a more specific variant of DS-1-01.
- 1287 Status: Open
- 1288 ISSUE:[DS-1-04: AssnSpecifiesSubject]

1289 Should it be possible to specify a subject in an Assertion or Assertion Request by reference to

- another Assertion containing the subject in question? The referenced Assertion might beindicated by its AssertionID or including it in its entirety.
- 1292 For example, a PDP might request an Attribute Assertion from an Attribute Authority by 1293 providing an Authentication Assertion (or its ID) as the way of identifying the subject.
- 1294 There are two cases: AssertionID and complete Assertion.

1295 AssertionID

When requesting an Assertion, it will be useful to specify an AssertionID in a situation where the requestor does not have a copy of the Assertion, but was had received the AssertionID from some source, for example in a Web cookie. Of course, it would be necessary that the Asserting Party be able to obtain the Assertion in question. This scenario would be particularly convenient if the Asserting Party already possessed the referenced Assertion, either because it had used it previously for some other purpose or because it was co-located with the Authority that created it

1302 originally.

1303 Using an AssertionID to specify the subject of an Assertion seems less useful, because it would

1304 make it impossible to interpret the Assertion by itself. If at some later time, the referenced

1305 Assertion was no longer available; it would not be possible to determine the subject of the

1306 Assertion in question. Even it the Assertion was available, having two assertions rather than one

1307 would be much less convenient.

1308 **Complete Assertion**

- 1309 Whether requesting an Assertion or creating a new assertion, it would never be strictly necessary
- 1310 to include another Assertion in its entirety to specify the subject of the first Assertion, because
- 1311 the subject field could be copied instead. Hypothetically, the complete contents of the Assertion
- 1312 might have some value, as the basis of a policy decision, however the same need could be served
- as well by attaching the second Assertion, rather than including it within the subject field of the
- 1314 first.
- 1315 This was identified as F2F#3-19 and F2F#3-27, although the scope of the latter is limited to the
- 1316 specific case of an Authentication Assertion being referenced within an Attribute Assertion.
- 1317 **Potential Resolutions:**

- 1318 1. Allow a subject to be specified by an AssertionID or complete Assertion.
- 1319 2. Allow a subject to be specified by an AssertionID, but not a complete Assertion.
- 1320 3. Allow a subject to be specified only in an Assertion Request by an AssertionID.
- 1321 4. Do not allow a subject to be specified by either an AssertionID or complete Assertion.
- 1322 Status: Open
- 1323 ISSUE:[DS-1-05: SubjectofAttrAssn]
- 1324 This statement's exact meaning needs to be clarified: "the only Subjects of Attribute Assertions 1325 are Subjects as described by Authentication Assertions.
- 1326 This was identified as F2F#3-26.
- 1327 Status: Open
- 1328

1328 Group 2: Naming Objects

- 1329 CLOSED ISSUE:[DS-2-01: Wildcard Resources]
- 1330 Nigel Edwards has proposed that Authorization Decision Assertions be allowed to refer to
- 1331 multiple resources by means of some kind of wildcards.

1332 Potential Resolutions:

- 1333 1. Allow resources to be specified with fully general regular expressions.
- 1334
 1335
 2. Allow resources to be specified with simple * wildcard in the final path element: e.g. /foo/*, but not /foo/*/x or /foo/y*
- 1336 3. Don't allow wildcarded resources
- 1337 Status: Closed by vote during May 29 telecon

1338 ISSUE:[DS-2-02: Permissions]

- 1339 Should the qualifiers of objects be called permissions, actions or operations? Authorization
- decision assertions contain an object that identifies the target of the request. This is qualified
- 1341 with a field called permissions, containing values like "Read" and "Write". Normal English
- 1342 language usage suggests that this field represents an Action or Operation on the object.
- 1343 Possible Resolutions:
- 1344 1. Retain Permissions
- 1345 2. Change to Actions
- 1346 3. Change to Operations
- 1347 Status: Open
- 1348

1348 Group 3: Assertion Validity

1349 ISSUE:[DS-3-01: DoNotCache]

1350 It has been suggested that there should be a way in SAML to specify that an assertion is currently

- 1351 valid, but should not be cached for later use. This should not depend on the particular amount of 1352 variation between clocks in the network
- 1352 variation between clocks in the network.
- 1353 For example, a PDP may wish to indicate to a PEP that it should make a new request for every
- 1354 authorization decision. For example, its policy may be subject to change at frequent and
- 1355 unpredictable intervals. It would be desirable to have a SAML specified convention for doing
- this. This may interact with the position taken on clock skew. For example, if SAML takes no
- 1357 position on clock skew the PDP may have to set the NotAfter value to some time in the future to
- 1358 insure that it is not considered expired by the PEP.
- 1359 Potential Resolutions:
- 1360 1. SAML will specify some combination of settings of the IssueInstant and ValidityInterval to
- 1361 mean that the assertion should not be cached. For example, setting all three datetime fields to the 1362 same value could be deemed indicate this.
- 1363 2. SAML will add an additional element to either Assertions or Responses to indicate the1364 assertion should not be cached.
- 1365 3. SAML will provide no way to indicate that an Assertion should not be cached.
- 1366 Status: Open
- 1367 ISSUE:[DS-3-02: ClockSkew]
- 1368 SAML should consider the potential effects of clock skew in environments it is used.
- 1369 It is impossible for local system clocks in a distributed system to be exactly the same, the only
- 1370 question is: how much do they differ by? This becomes an issue in security systems when
- 1371 information is marked with a validity period. Different systems will interpret the validity period
- 1372 according to their local time. This implies:
- 1373 1. Relying parties may not make the same interpretation as asserting parties.
- 1374 2. Distinct relying parties may make different interpretations.
- 1375 Generally what matters is not the absolute difference, but the difference as compared to the total
- 1376 validity interval of the information. For example, the PKI world has tended to (rightly) ignore
- 1377 this issue because CA and EE certificates tend to have validity intervals of years. Even Attribute
- 1378 Certificates and SAML Attribute Assertions are likely to have validity intervals of days or hours.

- 1379 However, it seems likely that Authorization Decision Assertions may sometimes have validity
- 1380 intervals of minutes or seconds. Therefore, the issue must be raised.
- 1381 One common problem is what to set the NotBefore element to. If it is set to the AP's current
- time, it may not yet be valid for the RP. If set in the past, (a common practice) the questions arise
- 1383 1) how far in the past? and 2) should the NotAfter time also be adjusted? If NotBefore is omitted,
- 1384 this may not be satisfactory for nonrepudiation purposes.
- 1385 The NotAfter value can also be an issue if the assumed clock skew is large compared to the1386 Validity Interval.
- 1387 [These paragraphs contain personal observations by Hal Lockhart, others may disagree.
- 1388 In the early 1990's some popular computer systems had highly erratic system clocks which could
- 1389 drift from the correct time by as much as five minutes per day. Kerberos's requirement for rough
- 1390 time synchronization (usually 5 minutes) was criticized at that time because of this reality.
- 1391 Today most popular computer systems have clocks which keep time accurately to seconds per
- 1392 month. Therefore the most common current source of time differences is the manual process of
- setting time. Therefore, most systems tend to be accurate within a few minutes, generally lessthan 10
- 1394 than 10.
- 1395 By means of NTP or other time synchronization system, it is not hard to keep systems
- 1396 synchronized to less than a minute, typically within 10 seconds. It is common for production
- 1397 server systems to be maintained this way. The price of GPS hardware has fallen to the point
- where it is not unreasonably expensive to keep systems synchronized to the true time with sub-
- 1399 second accuracy. However, few organizations bother to do this.]
- 1400 Potential Resolutions:
- 1401 1. SAML will leave it up to every deployment how to deal with clock skew.
- 1402 2. SAML will explicitly state that deployments must insure that clocks differ by no more
 1403 that X amount of time (X to be specified in the specification)
- SAML will provide a parameter to be set during deployment that defines the maximum
 clock skew in that environment. This will be used by AP's to adjust datetime fields according to
 some algorithm.
- 4. SAML will provide a parameter in assertions that indicates the maximum skew in theenvironment. RPs should use this value in interpreting all datetime fields.
- 1409 Status: Open
- 1410 ISSUE:[DS-3-03: ValidityDependsUpon]
- 1411In a previous version of the draft spec, assertions contained a ValidityDependsUpon
Colors: Gray Blue Yellow62

- 1412 element, which allowed the asserting party to indicate that this assertion was valid only if
- another, specified assertion was valid. This was dropped because it was felt that the lack of a
- 1414 SAML mechanism to revoke previously issued assertions made it moot.
- 1415 A number of people feel that this element is useful nevertheless and should be restored.
- 1416 It is worth noting that even in the absence of this element (from the a particular assertion or
- 1417 SAML as a whole) a particular relying party can still have a policy that requires multiple
- assertions to be valid.
- 1419 Status: Open
- 1420
- 1421

1421 Group 4: Assertion Style

1422 ISSUE:[DS-4-01: Top or Bottom Typing]

1423 Should assertions be identified as Authentication, Attribute and Authorization Decision, each

- 1425 should assertions be identified as Autointeention, Autoin Decision, each
 1424 containing specified elements? (Top Typing) Or should only the elements be defined allowing
 1425 them to be freely mixed? (Bottom Typing)
- 1426 Two comprehensive proposals to address this issue have been made in draft-orchard-maler-1427 assertion-00 and draft-sstc-core-08.
- 1428 Status: Open
- 1429 ISSUE:[DS-4-02: XML Terminology]
- 1430 Which XML terms should we be using in SAML? Possibilities include: message, document,
- 1431 package.
- 1432 Status: Open
- 1433 ISSUE:[DS-4-03: Assertion Request Template]
- 1434 What is the best way to provide a template of values in an assertion request?
- 1435Two comprehensive proposals to address this issue have been made in draft-orchard-maler-1436assertion-00 and draft-sstc-core-08.
- 1437 **Potential Resolutions:**
- 1438 **1.** The requestor sends an assertion with the required field types, but missing values
- 1439 2. The requestor sends fields and values, in the form of a list, not an assertion
- 1440 **3.** XPATH expressions
- 1441 **4.** XML query statements
- 1442 Status: Open
- 1443 ISSUE:[DS-4-04: URIs for Assertion IDs]
- 1444 Should URIs be used as identifiers in assertions?
- 1445 This issue was identified as F2F#3-8: "We need to decide the syntax of AssertionID." Although
- this is a broader formulation, the discussion below is actually directed towards it rather than theoriginal form (above).

1448 1449	This was identified as CONS-02. Does the specification (core-12) need additional specification for the types of assertion, request, and response IDs? If so, what are these requirements?
1450	Background
1451	From the focus group minutes [1]:
1452	>>- URIsForAssertionIDs: What are the pros and cons? What other
1453	>> methods are there?
1454	>
1455	> DS-4-04: URIs for Assertion IDs: (still open after today)
1456	>
1457	> Eve, with help from Dave, gave a short tutorial on the problems with
1458	> URI identity in XML namespace names.
1459 1460 1461	There followed a brief discussion in which we touched upon various aspects of this problem space. We terminated the discussion upon issuing the above "new action". (the discussion as-documented in the aforementioned minutes is attached below for reference [1])
1462 1463	Further background, in the form of the specs for AssertionID and Issuer from draft-sstc-core-07 are excerpted at [2].
1464	Relevant, recent discussion on security-services@lists.oasis-open.org
1465	Hal said in
1466	http://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/security-services/200105/msg00146.html
1467	> 5. In 1.3.1 I don't understand the intended purpose of AssertionID.
1468	PHB replied in
1469	http://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/security-services/200105/msg00159.html
1470	> The AssertionID provides a unique reference for the assertion
1471	> Within SAML 1.0 the principle use of an AssertionID would be to allow
1472	> one assertion to reference another (see previous Tim discussion) thus
1473	> allowing statements of the form `this assertion was constructed from
1474	> that assertion'.
	Colors: Gray Blue Yellow 65

1475

- 1476 > The principle use of the AssertionID however would be in systems built
- 1477 > around SAML, they provide the basis for audit and accountability for
- 1478 > example. If a system is built that allows for second order logic
- 1479 > (assertions may be true or false and other assertions may make
- 1480 > statements about validity (c.f. TASS meta-assertions)), then an
- 1481 > assertionID is essential.
- 1482 Analysis...

1483 The stated purpose of the AssertionID element is as an "assertion unique identifier" [2]. The

- 1484 stated syntax of this identifier is a URI [3]. Implicit in this line of thinking is a notion that URIs
- 1485 may be created (aka "minted") in a globally decentralized, non-colliding fashion due to the 1486 properties of the URI "space" [4].
- 1487 The following is stated in [2] about AssertionID..
- 1488 > The URI is used as a name for the assertion and not as a locator. It
- 1489 > is only necessary to ensure that no two assertions share the same
- 1490 > identifier. Provision of a service to resolve an identifier into an
- 1491 > assertion is not a requirement.
- 1492 Also, as far as I can tell, [2] postulates (in section 1.3) that a requester need supply only an
- 1493 assertionID in a SAMLQuery in order to obtain an assertion. It does not make clear any
- 1494 distinction between newly minting an assertion and retrieving an already-existing one.
- 1495Thus it seems that there is a tacit assumption in [2] that an assertion may be uniquely identified1496and minted/retrieved using only an assertionID, regardless of the quote above.
- 1497 So it seems that an assertionID is being asked to both..
- 1498 A. identify, globally and uniquely, assertions;
- 1499 B. provide at least a hint about where to direct requests for minting
- 1500 or retrieving assertions.
- 1501 ...but again, this is to a fair degree inferred from a rough, incomplete, draft spec ([2]).
- 1502 Additionally, there are many subtleties to using URIs as identifiers rather than straight-ahead

66

1503 resoure locators. See the minutes of the "Future of URIs" Birds of the Feather session held at the 1504 50th IETF meeting [11].

1505 Thoughts...

1506 It is an arguably good design principle to separate functions between various data items such that 1507 their roles in life are unambiguous.

1508 [2] already has an "Issuer" assertion element. If identifying assertions is predicated on using the 1509 tuple "assertionID, Issuer", and some method for guaranteeing non-colliding Issuer names is 1510 used (e.g. DNS domain names, and things built upon them), then the assertionID can be quite simple, e.g. an integer (as is done in PKIX [10]). 1511

1512 In using the "assertionID, Issuer" tuple to identify assertions, and also provide guidance about 1513 where to go to make requests about or for them, the role of the Issuer element may arguably be

1514 (too) overloaded. E.g. if the overall SAML design calls for assertions to (perhaps optionally)

1515 specify within their structure where a receiver of an assertion may go to make queries about the

1516 assertion, then the requirements for persistence and location-independence for that particular

identifier may conflict with the requirements of simply globally and uniquely (and perhaps 1517

- 1518 persistently) identifying the Issuer security domain.
- 1519 So it may be the case that to...

1520 case 1) globally uniquely identify an assertion one needs the combination of "assertionID, 1521 Issuer",

1522 case 2) uniquely identify assertions in the context of a given security domain, one needs only 1523 "assertionID" (it doesn't need to be disambiguated from assertions from other security domains; 1524 in this case the assertionID starts to look a lot like a serial number),

1525 case 3) one needs to cover either of the prior cases, and also needs to specify where to go (and 1526 "how" to "go") to make requests to the security domain in question. I.e...

- 1527 <assertionID>123123123123</assertionID>
- 1528 <Issuer>some-issuer-identifier</Issuer> -- perhaps optional
- 1529 <Source>saml://example.org/send-yer-SAML-based-requests-here -- optional
- 1530 </Source>
- 1531 Tho there are good arguments for not making Issuer optional (case 2), thus the overall set of 1532 identifying information might be structured something like this...
- 1533 <assertionID>
- 1534 <serialNumber>123123123123</serialNumber>

- 1535 <a href="https://www.searchitescommercidentifierscommercident
- 1536 </assertionID>
- 1537 <<u>Source>saml://example.org/send-yer-SAML-based-requests-here</u> -- optional
- 1538 <<u> /Source</u>>
- 1539 **Further thoughts...**
- There's tons of subtle-but-important details in all of this that need to be considered in nailing
 down a design. Some of them are..
- 1542 D1. if one uses a URL or URL-like flavor of URI as an identifier, we need to specify how
- 1543 comparisons between said identifier and other blobs of data are made. [3] details some of these
- 1544 subtleties in sections 1.5 and 2.1. The lowest-common-denominator option of specifying that
- 1545 such comparisons are made by performing a byte-by-byte octet string comparison will only
- technically work if certain restrictions are specified for the URI-based values. The SAML specs
 may need to consider/specify/incorporate one or more or all of..
- 1548 * charset restrictions for all or some SAML elements,
- 1549 * charset specifications, and bounds on said specifications, for SAML
- 1550 elements whose value syntaxes are URI [3],
- 1551 * charset(s) specified/allowed by underlying protocols and interaction
- 1552 thereof with the prior items in this list,
- 1553 * [perhaps others/more]
- 1554 Of note is "Character Model for the World Wide Web 1.0" [14] which defines an algorithm
- 1555 called "String Identity matching" (in section 6), which has implications for the above. (it also has1556 implications for SAML in general, see D6).
- 1557 D1.1. See also [16] [17] for further musing about internationalization for URI and other
 1558 identifiers.
- 1559 D1.2. See also "Considerations for URI and FQDN Protocol Parameters" [18] for further 1560 musings about using DNS domain names and/or URI as identifiers in protocol elements.
- 1561 D1.3. If URI are used as identifiers in protocol elements, software modules that handle them (this
- 1562 includes people as a boundary condition ;) may wonder just what the heck their semantics are,
- 1563 because their semantics can be so varied. "URI Relationship Discovery via RESCAP" [19]
- 1564 touches upon and enumerates these questions, as well as sketch a protocol-based approach that
- 1565 specifies a service providing such info. Additionally, the more recent I-D, "URI Resolution using

1566	the Dynamic Delegation Discovery System" [20], also provides some relevant background info.
1567 1568	D1.4. Registration issues URI (nee URL) schemes should be registered, same with URN namespaces. See [9] for pointers to relevant RFCs on how to accomplish such registrations.
1569 1570	D2. some-issuer-identifier should this simply be a DNS fully-qualified-domain-name? Should it be a URN [6]? Should it be something else?
1571 1572 1573 1574 1575	D3. use of URNs URNs have semantics of persistence and location-independence. Their use may or may not be appropriate in the context of SAML assertions depending upon the semantics of the thing they're being called upon to identify [6] [7]. E.g. it is questionable to use a URN to identity a given non-persistent, indeed likely ephemeral, artifact such as an instantiation of a SAML assertion. However, it is
1576 1577	D4. if URNs are used, what namespace identifiers are appropriate? Any? Only a selected one(s)? Formal or informal? [7] [12]
1578 1579 1580 1581	D5. the DOI work [13] is likely not appropriate for SAML's purposes due to that effort's Intellectual Property emphasis and also because of the implied (required?) dependency upon the Handle System. The latter is an nascent, intended-to-be-scalable-to-the-Internet, naming and name resolution system [13] (I haven't yet read the internet-drafts in detail).
1582 1583	D6. The emergent "Character Model for the World Wide Web 1.0" MAY have various implications for SAML's specification, beyond that noted in D1.
1584 1585 1586	D7. IMHO, "tag:" URIs [15] are not appropriate for our problem space, given their present specification, but reading about them and the discussion thereof on the uri@w3.org list is educational.
1587 1588	D9. If an artifact is not persistent, then it's identifier may be reused under certain conditions. Something to keep in mind and think about.
1589	Notes and References
1590	[1] URIsForAssertionIDs discussion, from Focus subgroup concall, 22-May-2001:
1591	http://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/security-services/200105/msg00139.html
1592	>- URIsForAssertionIDs: What are the pros and cons? What other methods
1593	> are there?
1594	DS-4-04: URIs for Assertion IDs: (still open after today)
1595 1596	Eve, with help from Dave, gave a short tutorial on the problems with URI identity in XML namespace names.

- 1597 Thomas: The DOI people are working on this general problem. (http://www.doi.org,
- 1598 http://www.handle.net/)

1599 Eve: It would be acceptable to use URIs if we apply constraints. E.g., they should be absolute

- (or even should be absolute URNs) and we should define what equality means. Dave: Solving
 the "whole URI problem" is way bigger than SAML's scope.
- 1602 Jeff: There was recently an IETF BOF on the future of URIs, and W3C was investigating these 1603 issues, but nothing has really happened.
- 1604 Eve: See W3C's Character Model spec for recommendations on normalization and 1605 internationalized URIs. (http://www.w3.org/TR/charmod/)
- 1606 Dave: Cautioned that we have to be concerned with real-world websites and their behavior,
- 1607 which is not precisely the same as the standards. For example, http://www.jamcracker.com and
- 1608 http://www.jamcracker.com/index.html point to the same resource, but how can people know 1609 that?
- BobB: Aliases, symbolic links, etc. are a problem if you have policies on different aliases thatconflict.
- Hal: We can take a hard line on URIs for assertion IDs, but for resources, we may have to dealwith the vagaries of real-world URIs.
- 1614 Evan: URIs are opaque strings, and XML makes data's structure more transparent.
- 1615 Hal: There will probably be more cases than just AssertionID where identifiers will have

1616 properties of uniqueness (RequestID?) and are just "internal to SAML." We should pull out the

- 1617 description of these properties into a separate section and have it referred to from the various 1618 sections.
- 1619 Hal: We should register a new URI scheme, e.g. "saml:" Thomas: We could
- 1620 just use URNs and have the same effect. Jeff: It's pretty easy to register
- 1621 a new scheme with IANA. (http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2717.txt)
- 1622 Eve: It's surprisingly hard to register a new URN namespace (http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2611.txt)
- 1623 NEW ACTION: Jeff to send out email about possible URI constraints and identity definitions we 1624 should consider imposing in the case of SAML's unique identifiers.
- 1625 [2] from draft-sstc-core-07: http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/security/docs/draft-sstc-core-1626 07.pdf
- 1627 > 1.4.2 Element < AssertionID>

1628	>
1629	> Each assertion MUST specify exactly one unique assertion identifier.
1630	> All identifiers are encoded as a Uniform Resource Identifier (URI)
1631	> and are specified in full (use of relative identifiers is not
1632	> permitted).
1633	>
1634	> The URI is used as a name for the assertion and not as a locator. It
1635	> is only necessary to ensure that no two assertions share the same
1636	> identifier. Provision of a service to resolve an identifier into an
1637	> assertion is not a requirement.
1638	> The following schema defines the <assertionid> element:</assertionid>
1639	<pre>> <element name="AssertionID" type="string"></element></pre>
1640	> 1.4.3 Element <issuer></issuer>
1641	> The Issuer element specifies the issuer of the assertion by means of a
1642	> URI. It is defined by the following XML schema:
1643	> The following schema defines the <issuer> element:</issuer>
1644	<pre>> <element name="Issuer" type="string"></element></pre>
1645	[3] Uniform Resource Identifiers (URI): Generic Syntax http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2396.txt
1646 1647 1648 1649 1650	[4] URIs encompass both URLs and URNs. The former [5] often (but not always) depend upon the Domain Name System (DNS) namespace, which enables the capability to mint globally unique URLs in a decentalized fashion. The latter [6] define a hierarchical namespace that is DNS-independent but centrally mediated [7] in order to provide "location independent identification of a resource, as well as longevity of reference".
1651 1652 1653 1654 1655 1656 1657 1658	This picture is from [8]

	draft-sstc-saml-issues-06.doc
1659 1660 1661 1662 1663 1664 1665	URLS URNS URIS
1666 1667	URIs, URLs, and URNs are described by a plethora of documents. An attempt to tie them all together is given in [9].
1668	[5] Uniform Resource Locators (URL) http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1738.txt
1669	[6] URN Syntax http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2141.txt
1670	[7] URN Namespace Definition Mechanisms http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2611.txt
1671	[8] Naming and Addressing: URIs, URLs,http://www.w3.org/Addressing/
1672 1673	[9] Uniform Resource Identifiers: Comprehensive Standard http://www.ietf.org/internet- drafts/draft-daigle-uri-std-01.txt
1674	[10] PKIX Certificate and CRL Profile http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2459.txt
1675 1676	[11] Future of Uniform Resource Identifiers BOF (furi) [50th IETF, Minneapolis MN, Mar- 2001] http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/01mar/ietf50-39.htm#TopOfPage
1677 1678	[12] URI.NET a clearing house for information on URIs in general and on specific URI schemes and software http://www.uri.net/
1679	[13] Digital Object Identifiers, The Handle System http://www.doi.org, http://www.handle.net/
1680	[14] Character Model for the World Wide Web 1.0 http://www.w3.org/TR/charmod/
1681 1682 1683	[15] "Tag" URI Scheme <u>http://www.taguri.org/</u> see also the thread on uri list "Proposal: 'tag' URIs", from Tim Kindberg <timothy@hpl.hp.com>http://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/uri/2001Apr/0013.html</timothy@hpl.hp.com>
1684	http://www.taguri.org/2001-04-26/draft-kindberg-tag-uri-00.txt
1685 1686	[16] Internationalization: URIs and other identifiers http://www.w3.org/International/O-URL- and-ident.html
1687 1688	[17] Internationalized Resource Identifiers (IRI) http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft- masinter-url-i18n-07.txt
1689 1690	[18] Considerations for URI and FQDN Protocol Parameters http://www.ietf.org/internet- drafts/draft-eastlake-uri-fqdn-param-00.txt

- [19] URI Relationship Discovery via RESCAP http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft mealling-uri-rdf-00.txt
- 1693 [20] URI Resolution using the Dynamic Delegation Discovery System
- 1694 http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-urn-uri-res-ddds-03.txt
- 1695
- 1696 Status: Open
- 1697 **ISSUE:[DS-4-05: SingleSchema]**
- Should we design the schema for Assertions and their respective request/response messages in
 different XML namespaces?
- 1700 Request/response messages could reference the core assertions schema. There could be many
- 1701 applications that reference the core assertions without referencing the request/response stuff.
- 1702 Making them pull in the request/response namespace is just extra overhead.
- 1703 This has been identified as F2F#3-36.
- 1704 **Potential Resolutions**:
- 1705 **1**. Use a single schema for Assertions and Request/Response messages.
- 170617072. Have a schema for Assertions that is distinct from the schema for Request/Response messages.
- 1708 Status: Open
- 1709 ISSUE:[DS-4-06: Final Types]
- 1710 Does the TC plan to restrict certain types in the SAML schema to be final? If so, which types are 1711 to be so restricted?
- 1712 This was identified as CONS-03.
- 1713 Status: Open
- 1714 ISSUE:[DS-4-07: ExtensionSchema]
- 1715 One of the goals of the F2F #3 "whiteboard draft" was to use strong typing to differentiate
- 1716 between the three assertion types and between the three different query forms. This has been
- 1717 achieved (in core-12) through the use of ``abstract'' schema and schema inheritance. One
- 1718 implication is that any concrete assertion instance MUST utilize the xsi:type attribute to
- 1719 specifically describe its type even as all assertions will continue to use a single <Assertion>
- 1720 element as their container. XML processors can key off this attribute during assertion processing.

- 1721 Is this an acceptable approach? Other approaches, such as the use of substitution groups, are also
- available. Using substition groups, each concrete assertion type would receive its own
- 1723 distinguished top-level element (e.g., <AuthenticationAssertion>) and there would be no need
- 1724 for the use of xsi:type attribute in any assertion instance. At the same time the SAML schema
- 1725 would be made somewhat more complex through the use of substitution groups.
- 1726 Should the TC investigate these other approaches? Most important: what is the problem with the 1727 current approach?
- 1728 This was identified as CONS-04.
- 1729 Status: Open
- 1730

1730 Group 5: Reference Other Assertions

- A number of requirements have been identified to reference an assertion with in another
 assertion or within a request.
- 1733 Phillip Hallam-Baker observes: "there is more than one way to support this requirement,
- 1734 "[A] The first is to simply cut and paste the assertion into the <Subject> field so we have
- 1736 not seem to achieve much since it essentially comes down to 'you can unwrap this structure to
- 1737 find the information you want'. Why not just cut to the chase and specify <Subject>[XYZ]?
- 1738 "[B] The problem with cutting to the chase is that it means that the application is simply told the
- 1739 <subject> without any information to specify where that data came from. In many audit
- 1740 situations one would need this type of information so that if something bad happens it is possible
- 1741 to work out exactly where the bogus information was first introduced and how many inferences
- 1742 were derived from it. So we might have <Subject><AssertionRef>[XYZ]
- 1743 "[C] The above is my preferred representation since the assertion can be used immediately by the
- simplest SAML application without the need to dereferrence the assertion reference to discover
 the subject of the assertion. However one could argue that an application might want to specify
- 1746 simply <Subject><AssertionRef> and then specify the referenced assertion in the advice 1747 container.
- 1748 "I think that the choice is really between [B] and [C] since the first suggestion in [A] is unwieldy 1749 and the second is simply the status quo.
- 1750 "Of these [B] is more verbose, [C] requires applications to perform some pointer chasing and1751 could be seen as onerous."
- 1752 The following four scenarios have been identified where this is required:
- 1753 ISSUE:[DS-5-01: Dependency Audit]

1754 One issue with draft-sstc-core-07.doc is a lack of support for audit of assertion dependency

1755 between co-operating authorities. As one explicit goal of SAML was to support inter-domain

security (i.e., each authority may be administered by a separate business entity) this seems to bea serious "gap" in reaching that goal.

- 1758 Consider the following example:
- 1759 (1) User Ravi authenticates in his native security domain and receives
- 1760 Assertion A:
- 1761
- Colors: Gray Blue Yellow

draft-sstc-saml-issues-06.doc		
1762 1763 1764 1765 1766 1767 1768 1769 1770	<assertion> <assertionid>http://www.small-company.com/A</assertionid> <issuer>URN:small-company:DivisionB</issuer> <validityinterval> </validityinterval> <claims> <subject>"cn=ravi, ou=finance, id=325619"</subject> <attribute>manager</attribute> </claims> </assertion>	
1771 1772	(2) User Ravi authenticates to the Widget Marketplace using assertion A and based on the policy:	
1773 1774 1775	All entities with "ou=finance" authenticated thru small-company.com with attribute manager have purchase limit \$100,000 receives Assertion B from the Widget Marketplace: <assertion></assertion>	
1773 1776 1777 1778 1779 1780 1781 1782 1783	<assertion <br=""><assertionid>http://www.WidgetMarket.com/B<assertionid> <issuer>URN:WidgetMarket:PartsExchange</issuer> <validityinterval></validityinterval> <claims> <subject>"cn=ravi, ou=finance, id=325619"</subject> <attribute>max-purchase-limit-\$100,000</attribute> </claims> <assertion></assertion></assertionid></assertionid></assertion>	
1784 1785	(3) User Ravi purchases farm machinery from a parts provider hosted at the Widget Marketplace. The parts provider authorizes the transaction based on Assertion B.	
1786 1787 1788	Even though Assertion B has been issued by the Widget Marketplace in response to assertion A (I guess another way to look at this to view assertion A as the subject of B as in [1]) there is no way to represent this information within SAML.	
1789 1790 1791	If there is a problem with Ravi's purchases at the Widget Marketplace (Ravi wont pay his bills) there is nothing in the SAML flow that ties Assertion B to Assertion A. This appears to be a significant missing piece to me.	
1792	Status: Open	
1793	ISSUE:[DS-5-02: Authenticator Reference]	
1794 1795	The authenticator element of an assertion should be able to reference another assertion, used solely for authentication.	
1796	Status: Open	

- 1797 ISSUE:[DS-5-03: Role Reference]
- 1798 The role element should be able to reference another assertion that asserts the attributes of the
- 1799 role.
- 1800 Status: Open
- 1801 ISSUE:[DS-5-04: Request Reference]
- 1802 There should be a way to reference an assertion as the subject of a request. For example, a
- 1803 request might reference a Attribute Assertion and ask if the subject of that assertion could access
 1804 a specified object.
- 1805 Status: Open
- 1806

1806 Group 6: Attributes

- 1807 ISSUE:[DS-6-01: Nested Attributes]
- 1808 Should SAML support nested attributes? This means that for example, a role could be a member
- 1809 of another role. This is one standard way of distinguishing the semantics of roles from groups.
- 1810 There are many issues of semantics and pragmatics related to this. These include:
- 1811 1. Limit of levels if any
- 1812 2. Circular references
- 1813 3. Distributed definition
- 1814 4. Mixed attribute types.
- 1815 Status: Open
- 1816 ISSUE:[DS-6-02: Roles vs. Attributes]
- 1817 Should Attributes and Roles be identified as separate objects?
- 1818 Status: Open
- 1819 ISSUE:[DS-6-03: Attribute Values]
- 1820 Should Attributes have some 'attribute-value' type structure to them?
- 1821 Status: Open
- 1822 ISSUE:[DS-6-04: Negative Roles]
- 1823 Should there be a way to state that someone does not have a role?
- 1824 Status: Open
- 1825

1825 Group 7: Authentication Assertions

1826 ISSUE:[DS-7-01: AuthN Datetime]

1827 An Authentication Assertion should contain the date and time that the Authentication occurred.

- This could be done by explicitly assigning this meaning to the IssueInstant or NotBefore elements or create a new element containing a datetime.
- 1830 Possible Resolutions:
- 1831 1. Use IssueInstant in a AuthN Assertion to indicate datetime of AuthN.
- 1832 2. Use NotBefore in a AuthN Assertion to indicate datetime of AuthN.
- 1833 3. Create a new element to indicate datetime of AuthN.
- 1834 Status: Open

1835 ISSUE:[DS-7-02: AuthN Method]

1836 An element is required in AuthN Assertions to indicate the method of AuthN that was used. This

- 1837 could be a simple text field, but the values should be registered with some central authority.
- 1838 Otherwise different identifiers will be created for the same methods, harming interoperability.

1839 Core-12 addresses this issue with AuthenticationCode. CONS-12 asks: what restrictions, if any,

1840 should be placed on the format of the contents of the AuthenticationCode element? Should this

1841 be a closed list of possible values? Should the list be open, but with some "well-known" values?

- 1842 Should we refer to another list already in existence?
- 1843 Are the set of values supported for the <Protocol> element (DS-8-03) essentially the same as
- 1844 those required for the <<u>AuthenticationCode</u>> element?
- 1845 Status: Open
- 1846 ISSUE:[DS-7-03: AuthN Method Strength]
- 1847 SAML has identified a requirement to indicate that a negative AuthZ decision might be changed
- 1848 if a "stronger" means of AuthN was used. In support of this it is useful to introduce the concept
- 1849 of AuthN strength. AuthN strength is an element containing an integer representing strength of
- 1850 AuthN, where a larger number is considered stronger. Individual deployments could assign
- numbers to particular AuthN methods according to their policies. This would allow an AuthZ

79

- 1852 policy to state that the required AuthN must exceed some value.
- 1853 Possible Resolutions:
- 1854 1. Add an AuthN strength element.

- 1855 2. Do not add an AuthN strength element.
- 1856 Status: Open

1857 ISSUE:[DS-7-04: AuthN IP Address]

Should an AuthN Assertion contain the (optional) IP Address from which the Authentication was
done? This information might be used to require that other requests in the same session originate
from the same source. Alternatively it might be used as an input to an AuthZ decision or simply
recorded in an Audit Trail.

1862 One reason not to include this information is that it is not authenticated and can be spoofed. Also 1863 requiring that the IP address match future requests may cause spurious errors when firewalls or

- 1864 proxies are used. On the other hand, many systems today use this information.
- 1865 This was identified as F2F#3-12.
- 1866 **Possible Resolutions**:
- 1867 **1.** Add IP Address to the AuthN Assertion schema.
- 1868 2. Do not add IP Address to the AuthN Assertion schema.
- 1869 Status: Open
- 1870 ISSUE:[DS-7-05: AuthN DNS Name]

1871 Should the AuthN Assertion contain an (optional) DNS name, distinct from the DNS name
 1872 indicating the security domain of the Subject? If so, what are the semantics of this field?

1873 An obvious answer is that the DNS name is the result of doing a reverse lookup on the IP

- 1874 Address from which the Authentication was done. This suggests that there is a relationship
- 1875 between this issue and DS-7-04. Presumably if the IP Address is not included in the
- 1876 specification, this field will not be either. However if IP Address is included, DNS name might 1877 still not be.
- 1878 The DNS name in the subject represents the security domain that knows how to authenticate this
- 1879 subject. The DNS name of authentication would reflect the location from which the
- 1880 Authentication was done. These will often be different from each other.
- 1881 This value might be used for AuthZ decisions or Audit. Of course, a reverse lookup could be
- 1882 done on the IP Address at a later time, but the result might be different. Like the IP Address, the
- 1883 DNS name is not authenticated and could be spoofed, either by spoofing the IP Address or
- 1884 **impersonating a legitimate DNS server.**
- 1885 This was identified as F2F#3-13.

1886	Possible Resolutions:
1887	3. Add DNS Name to the AuthN Assertion schema.
1888	4. Do not add DNS Nameto the AuthN Assertion schema.
1889	Status: Open
1890	ISSUE:[DS-7-06: DiscoverAuthNProtocols]
1891	Should SAML provide a means to discover supported types of AuthN protocols?
1892 1893 1894	Simon Godik has suggested: One way to do it is to use AuthenticationQuery with empty Authenticator subject. Then SAMLRequest will carry AuthenticationAssertion with Authenticator subject listing acceptable protocols.
1895 1896	The problem is that Authenticator element does not allow for 0 occurances of Protocol. Should we specify minOccurs=0 on Protocol element for that purpose?
1897	Possible Resolutions:
1898	1. Declare AuthN Protocol discovery out of scope for SAML V1.0.
1899	2. Support it in the way suggested.
1900	3. Support it some other way.
1901	Status: Open
1902	

1902 Group 8: Authorities and Domains

- 1903 The following points are generally agreed.
- An Assertion is issued by an Authority.
- Assertions may be signed.
- The name of a subject must be qualified to some security domain.
- Attributes must be qualified by a security domain as well.
- Nigel Edwards has suggested that resources also need to be qualified by domain.
- 1909 ISSUE:[DS-8-01: Domain Separate]
- 1910 Stephen Farrell has pointed out that there may be a requirement to encrypt, for example, the user

1911 name but not the domain. Therefore they should be in separate elements. If domains are going to

appear all over the place, maybe we need a general way of having element pairs or domain and

- 1913 "thing in domain."
- 1914 Possible Resolutions:
- 1915 1. Domains will always appear in a distinct element from the item in the domain
- 1916 2. The domain and item may be combined in a single element.
- 1917 Status: Open

1918 ISSUE:[DS-8-02: AuthorityDomain]

Should SAML take any position on the relationship between the 1) Authority, 2) the entity that
signed the assertion, and 3) the various domains scattered throughout the assertion? For example,
the Authority and Domain could be defined to be the same thing. Alternatively, Authorities could
assert for several domains, but each domain would have only one authority. Another possibility
would be to require that the domain asserted for be the same as that found in the Subject field of

- 1924 the PKI certificate used to sign the assertion.
- 1925 The contrary view is that is a matter for private arrangement among asserting and relying parties.
- 1926 At F2F #3 this issue was raised in the form of:
- F2F#3-15: Can an Authentication Authority issue assertions "for" ("from") multiple domains?
- 1929 F2F#3-16: Can multiple Authentication Authorities issue assertions "for" a given single

82

1930 domain?

1931 The general consensus from F2F #3 was that an Authority (Asserting Party) of any type can issue

- Assertions about multiple domains and multiple Authorities can issue Assertions about the same domain. However, this issue has not bee officially closed.
- 1934 Status: Open
- 1935 ISSUE:[DS-8-03: DomainSyntax]

1936 What is the composition of a "security domain" specifier? What is their syntax? What do they

- designate? Are they arbitrary or are they structured? JeffH has suggested that they are essentially
 the same as Issuer identifiers.
- 1939 This was identified as F2F#3-11.
- 1940 Core-12 addresses this issue with SecurityDomain. CONS-08 asks: Should the type of the
- 1941 <a>SecurityDomain> element of a <NameIdentifier> have additional or different structure?
- 1942 Status: Open
- 1943 ISSUE:[DS-8-04: Issuer]
- 1944Does the specification (core-12) need to further specify the Issuer element? Is a string type1945adequate for its use in SAML? See also DS-4-04.
- 1946 This was identified as CONS-05.
- 1947 Status: Open
- 1948
- 1949

1949 Group 9: Request Handling

- 1950 ISSUE:[DS-9-01: AssertionID Specified]
- SAML should define the responses to requests that specify a particular AssertionID. Forexample,
- What if the assertion doesn't exist or has expired?
- What if the assertion contents do not match the request?
- Is it ever legal to send a different assertion?
- 1956 Status: Open
- 1957 ISSUE:[DS-9-02: MultipleRequest]

Should SAML provide a means of requesting multiple assertion types in a single request? This
has been referred to as "boxcaring." In simplest form this could consist of concatenating several
defined requests one message. However there are usecases in which it would convenient to have
the second request use data from the results of the first.

- For example, it would be useful to ask for an AuthN Assertion by ID and for and AttributeAssertion referring to the same subject.
- 1964 **Potential Resolutions**:
- 1965 **1.** Do not specify a way to make requests for multiple assertions types in SAML V1.0.
- 1966 **2.** Allow simple concatenation of requests in one message.
- 1967 **3.** Provide a more general scheme for multiple requests.
- 1968 Status: Open
- 1969 ISSUE:[DS-9-03: IDandAttribQuery]
- 1970 Should SAML allow queries containing both an Assertion ID and Attributes?
- 1971 Tim Moses comments: The need to convey an assertion id and attributes in the same query arises1972 in the following circumstances.
- A browser contacts a content site and is redirected to an authentication site. The content site has
 specific requirements for:

84

1975 **1**. The authentication scheme between the browser and the authentication site (I'll call this

1976 "primary" authentication);

1977 2. The authentication scheme between the browser and the content site upon its return to the

1978 content site (I'll call this "secondary" authentication, normally this would be a bearer token, but 1979 who knows?);

- 1980 **3.** The space in which the subject's name should appear; and
- 1981 4. User attributes.

1982 So, the content site needs to communicate its requirements in these four areas to the

- 1983 authentication site, preferably, before primary authentication takes place.
- 1984 There is currently no fully-specified way for the content site to communicate its needs to the 1985 authentication site. What are the possible solutions?
- 1986
 1. The authentication site "just knows" what authentication schemes, namespaces and attributes
 the content site needs.
- 1988
 2. Each authentication site URL corresponds to a single authentication scheme. Then the content
 1989 site specifies the authentication scheme by redirecting the browser to the appropriate URL.
- 1990 3. The authentication site returns assertions containing every authentication scheme, namespace
 1991 and additional attribute, and the content site searches through them for the ones that suit its
 1992 needs.
- 4. The authentication site returns its own choice of authentication assertion and the content site
 submits a further query for any additional, or alternative, assertions that it needs.
- 1995 Solution 1 works because we don't.
- 1996 Solution 2 addresses requirement 1, but not requirements 2, 3 and 4.
- 1997 Solution 3 is unsatisfactory from an identity-theft/privacy point of view.
- 1998 Solution 4 introduces more delay than is absolutely necessary.
- 1999 We have, in both the "fat object" and "artifact" browser profiles, opportunities to solve these 2000 questions in a more satisfactory manner.
- In the "fat object" profile, the "form" can contain the Assertion Queries. In the "artifact" profile, the initial redirection by the content site to the authentication site can contain an artifact, in the redirection URL, corresponding to the Assertion Queries, using either of the push or pull communication models. The thing that is new and surprising about this approach is that the artifact does not correspond to an "assertion", but to a "query". There would then have to be a communication directly between the content and authentication sites in which the content site would request assertions that directly meet its needs.

2008	This is what it looks like in both the "push" and "pull" models.
2009	Push model
2010	Browser Content site Authentication site
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017	1 < redirect(artifact1) 2 redirect(artifact1)> 3 query(artifact1)> 4 < authenticate> 5 < assertions(artifact2) 6 <redirect(artifact2)> 7redirect(artifact2)></redirect(artifact2)>
2018	
2019	Pull model
2020	Browser Content site Authentication site
2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031	<pre>1 < redirect(artifact1) 2 redirect(artifact1)> 3 < authenticate> 4</pre>
2032	Possible Resolutions:
2033 2034	 Allow queries to specify both an Assertion ID and Attributes Only allow queries to specify one or the other.
2035	Status: Open
2036	

2036 Group 10: Assertion Binding

- 2037 ISSUE:[DS-10-01: AttachPayload]
- 2038 There is a requirement for assertions to support some structure to support their "secure
- attachment" to payloads. This is a blocking factor to creating a SOAP profile or a MIME profile.
- 2040 If needed, the bindings group can make a design proposal in this space but we would like input
- 2041 from the broader group.
- 2042 Status: Open

2043 Group 11: Authorization Decision Assertions

2044 ISSUE:[DS-11-01: MultipleSubjectAssertions]

It has been proposed (WhiteboardTranscription-01.pdf section 4.0) that an Authorization
Decision Assertion Request (and presumably the Assertion sent in response) may contain
multiple subject Assertions (or their Ids). Must these assertions all refer to the same subject or
may they refer to multiple subjects.

One view is that the assertions all provide evidence about a single subject who has requested
 access to a resource. For example, the request might include a Authentication Assertion and one
 or more Attribute Assertions about the same person.

Another view is that for efficiency or other reasons it is desirable to ask about access to a resource by multiple individuals in a single request. This raises the question of how the PDP should respond if some subjects are allowed and others are not.

The PDP might have the freedom to return a single, all encompassing Assertion in response or reduce the request in order to give a positive response or return multiple Assertions with positive and negative indications.

- 2058 Identified as F2F#3-30 and F2F#3-31.
- 2059 **Possible Resolutions**:
- 2060 1. Require that all the assertions and assertion ids in a request refer to the same subject.
- 2061
 2062
 2062
 2062
 2063
 2064
 2064
 2065
 2065
 2065
 2066
 2067
 2067
 2068
 2068
 2068
 2069
 2069
 2069
 2069
 2069
 2069
 2069
 2061
 2061
 2061
 2061
 2062
 2062
 2062
 2062
 2062
 2062
 2062
 2062
 2062
 2062
 2062
 2062
 2062
 2062
 2062
 2062
 2062
 2062
 2062
 2062
 2062
 2062
 2062
 2062
 2062
 2062
 2062
 2062
 2062
 2062
 2062
 2062
 2062
 2062
 2062
 2062
 2062
 2062
 2062
 2062
 2062
 2062
 2062
 2062
 2062
 2062
 2062
 2062
 2062
 2062
 2062
 2062
 2062
 2062
 2062
 2062
 2062
 2062
 2062
 2062
 2062
 2062
 2062
 2062
 2062
 2062
 2062
 2062
 2062
 2062
 2062
 2062
 2062
 2062
 2062
 2062
 2062
 2062
 2062
 2062
 2062
 2062
 2062
 2062
 2062
 2062
 <li
- Treat assertions with different subjects and a question about the collective group, i.e. true only if access is allowed for all.
- 2065 4. Allow multiple subjects, but assign some other semantic to such a request.
- 2066 Status: Open

2067 ISSUE:[DS-11-02: ActionNamespacesRegistry]

Authorization Decision Assertions contain an object and an action to be performed on the object.
 Different types of actions will be appropriate in different situations, so an action will be qualified
 by an XML namespace. Should a public registry of namespaces be established somewhere? This

- 2071 would allow groups applying SAML to different fields of interest to define appropriate syntaxes.
- 2072 This was identified as F2F#3-32. It relates to MS-2-01 and DS-7-02.

- 2073 Identified as CONS-14.
- 2074 **Possible Resolutions**:
- 2075 **1.** Establish an action namespace registry.
- 2076 2. Do not establish an action namespace registry.
- 2077 Status: Open
- 2078 ISSUE:[DS-11-03: AuthzNDecAssnAdvice]

Should Authorization Decision Assertions contain an Advice field? If so, what are the semantics
of Advice? It has been proposed that Conditions and Advice be fields that allow additional
information relative to the Assertion to be included. The distinction being that a relying party

- 2082 could safely ignore items in Advice that it does not understand, but should discard an Assertion
 2083 if it does not understand all the Conditions.
- 2084 Such as scheme would allow for backward compatibility between SAML versions and/or the 2085 possibility of proprietary usages.
- 2086 This was identified as F2F#3-33 and F2F#3-34.
- 2087 Note this is closely related to DS-14-01.
- 2088 **Possible Resolutions:**
- 2089 **1.** Include Advice in AuthZDecAssns.
- 2090 **2.** Do not include Advice in AuthZDecAssns.
- 2091 Status: Open
- 2092 ISSUE:[DS-11-04: DecisionTypeValues]
- 2093 CONS-13 asks: does {Permit, Deny, Indeterminate} (as proposed in core12) cover the range of 2094 decision answers we need? See also discussion in [ISSUE:F2f#3-33]. (This is DS-11-03, not 2095 clear how this relates. ed.)
- 2096 Status: Open
- 2097 ISSUE:[DS-11-05: MultipleActions]
- 2098 The F2F #3 left it somewhat unclear if multiple actions are supported within an <Object>. There
- 2099 is clear advantage to this type of extension (as defined in core-12) as it provides a simple way to
- aggregate actions. Given that actions are strings (as opposed to pieces of XML) this does seem to
- 2101 provide additional flexibility within the SAML framework.

- 2102 Does the TC support this type of flexibility?
- 2103 This was identified as CONS-15.
- 2104 Status: Open
- 2105

2105 Group 12: Attribute Assertions

2106 ISSUE:[DS-12-01: AnyAllAttrReq]

Should an Attribute Assertion Request be allowed to specify "ANY" and/or "ALL"? If so, what
attributes should be returned and should an error be returned in for ANY and for ALL in each of
the following case:

- Subject possesses all requested attributes
- Subject possesses some of requested attributes, but the others exist
- Subject possesses some of requested attributes, but others do not exist
- Subject possesses some requested attributes which are not permitted to be returned to this relying party because of privacy policy
- Subject possesses none of requested attributes, but does possess others
- All of attributes possessed by this subject are not permitted to be returned to this relying party because of privacy policy
- Attribute Authority has no information about this subject

2119 An arguably common attribute authority implementation will be one layered over an LDAP-2120 based directory service. The LDAP-based directory semantics presented to such an attribute authority are noted in [F3], below. Multiple attrs, of an entry, may be requested in a given LDAP 2121 search/read request. Note that there are no errors returned about whether or not specific attributes 2122 2123 were found in the entry or not; LDAP does return errors about whether the entry itself was found, 2124 or not. If SAML mandates that the Attr Authority MUST return errors about each individually requested attribute, then that will make layering an Attr Authority over an LDAP-based directory 2125 2126 arguably harder. One approach would be to store each individual attribute of a subject in an 2127 individual directory entry subordinate to an entry representing the subject. Whether forcing such a design on Attr Authority designers/implementors/deployers is reasonable or not is debatable. 2128

2129

2130 [F3] nuances of LDAPv3 responses wrt attributes 2131 2132 >From http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2251.txt, section 4.5.1, pages 25 & 26... 2133 2134 SearchRequest ::= [APPLICATION 3] SEQUENCE { 2135 baseObject LDAPDN, 2136 scope ENUMERATED { 2137 baseObject (0), 2138 singleLevel (1), 2139 (2) }, wholeSubtree

2140 derefAliases ENUMERATED { 2141 neverDerefAliases (0), 2142 derefInSearching (1), 2143 derefFindingBaseObj (2), 2144 (3) }, derefAlways 2145 sizeLimit INTEGER (0 .. maxInt), 2146 timeLimit INTEGER (0 .. maxInt), 2147 typesOnly BOOLEAN, 2148 Filter, filter attributes AttributeDescriptionList } 2149 2150 2151 +-----+ 2152 This is where the client specifies the list of attrs to return 2153 from each directory entry that matches the baseobject and/or 2154 filter. 2155 2156 >From rfc2251, section 4.5.1, pages 29... 2157 2158 - attributes: A list of the attributes to be returned from each entry 2159 which matches the search filter. There are two special values which 2160 may be used: an empty list with no attributes, and the attribute 2161 description string "*". Both of these signify that all user 2162 attributes are to be returned. (The "*" allows the client to 2163 request all user attributes in addition to specific operational 2164 attributes). 2165 2166 Attributes MUST be named at most once in the list, and are returned 2167 at most once in an entry. If there are attribute descriptions in 2168 the list which are not recognized, they are ignored by the server. 2169 2170 If the client does not want any attributes returned, it can specify 2171 a list containing only the attribute with OID "1.1". This OID was 2172 chosen arbitrarily and does not correspond to any attribute in use. 2173 2174 Client implementors should note that even if all user attributes are 2175 requested, some attributes of the entry may not be included in 2176 search results due to access control or other restrictions. 2177 Furthermore, servers will not return operational attributes, such 2178 as objectClasses or attributeTypes, unless they are listed by name, 2179 since there may be extremely large number of values for certain 2180 operational attributes. (A list of operational attributes for use 2181 in LDAP is given in [5].) 2182 2183 _____ 2184 [end of F3] 2185 This was identified as F2F#3-20, F2F#3-24 and F2F#3-25. 2186 2187 PRO-03 asks if core-12 satisfies this issue. 2188 PRO-05 asks: Is the all or "error" semantics (in core-12) for the ALL qualifier appropriate? Colors: Gray Blue Yellow 92

- 2189 Should we just follow LDAP semantics for this type of query?
- 2190 Status: Open
- 2191 ISSUE:[DS-12-02: CombineAttrAssnReqs]

2192 It has been proposed (WhiteboardTranscription-01.pdf section 4.0) that it be possible 1) to

2193 request all of the attributes of a subject and also 2) to request ANY and/or ALL attributes (with

2194 specific error semantics. Can requests of type 1 and 2 be accommodated in a single request

- 2195 structure? If not, the reasons for having distinct types should be documented.
- 2196 This was identified as F2F#3-21.
- 2197 PRO-03 asks if core-12 satisfies this issue.
- 2198 **Possible Resolutions**:
- 2199 **1**. Combine the requests.
- 2200 2. Leave them as distinct types and document the reason.
- 2201 Status: Open
- 2202 ISSUE:[DS-12-03: AttrSchemaReqs]
- 2203 Should it be possible to request only the Attribute schema?
- 2204 This was identified as F2F#3-22.
- 2205 **Possible Resolutions**:
- 2206 **1.** Allow Attribute Schema Requests.
- 2207 2. Do not allow Attribute Schema Requests.
- 2208 Status: Open
- 2209 ISSUE:[DS-12-04: AttrNameReqs]
- 2210 Should it be possible to request only attribute names and not values? It is not clear whether these
- 2211 would be all the attributes the Attribute Authority knows about or just the ones pertaining to a
- 2212 particular subject. It is not clear what this would be used for. No usecase seems to require it.
- 2213 This was identified as F2F#3-23.
- 2214 This was identified as PRO-04.
- 2215 **Possible Resolutions**:
 - Colors: Gray Blue Yellow

- 2216 3. Allow Attribute Name Requests.
- 2217 4. Do not allow Attribute Name Requests.
- 2218 Status: Open
- 2219 ISSUE:[DS-12-05: AttrNameValueSyntax]

What is the syntax of attribute names and values? Should attribute names be qualified by an xml
namespace? Should an attribute value be a monolithic opaque thing, with any internal syntax
agreed to out-of-band, or something with perceivable-in-protocol-context internal structure?
Does the use of XPath [http://www.w3.org/TR/xpath] in AttrAssnReqs mitigate the
restrictiveness of having attr values being monolithic opaque things, presumably where the value
is actually XML encoded and having arbitrarily complexity?

- One possible approach is to use XPath in AttrAssnReqs.
- Another approach is to define a very simple name/value pairs. A problem with this is that, if the users/developers want to formulate any kind of structured values, they have to flatten them into the SAML-defined thing. Thus the concern is how do we allow for flexible (i.e. complex) value structures without unduly complicating AttrAssnReqs & AttrAssnResps?
- 2232 This was identified as F2F#3-28, F2F#3-29 and F2F#3-37.
- 2233 PRO-06 asks if the simple queries proposed in core-12 are sufficient.
- 2234 Status: Open
- 2235 ISSUE:[DS-12-06: RequestALLAttrbs]
- How should a request for all available attributes be made? Some have objected to the idea that if no attributes are specified it means "all".
- This should not be confused with the Completeness Specifier AllOrNothing (formerly ALL)
 which controls what should be returned when a request cannot be fully satisfied.
- 2240 **Potential Resolutions**:
- 1. Declare an empty list of attributes to mean "all attributes."
- 2242 2. Define a reserved keyword, such as "AllAttributes" for this purpose.
- 2243 Status: Open
- 2244

2244 Group 13: Dynamic Sessions

2245 ISSUE:[DS-13-01: SessionsinEffect]

How can a relying party determine if dynamic sessions are in effect? If dynamic sessions are in effect it will be necessary to determine if the session has ended, even if the relevant Assertions have not yet expired. However, if dynamic sessions are not in use, attempting to check session state is likely to increase response times unnecessarily.

- 2250 This was identified as F2F#3-3.
- 2251 **Proposed Resolutions:**
- 2252 1. Define a field in Assertion Headers to indicate dynamic sessions.
- 2253 2. Configure the implementation based on some out of band information.
- 2254 Status: Open

Group 14:General – Multiple Message Types

2256 ISSUE:[DS-14-01: Conditions]

Should Assertions contain Conditions and if so, what items should be included under conditionsand what should the semantics of conditions be?

It has been proposed that Conditions and Advice be fields that allow additional information relative to the Assertion to be included. The distinction being that a relying party could safely ignore items in Advice that it does not understand, but should discard an Assertion if it does not understand all the Conditions.

In addition to general design and rationale, the following questions have been posed. Should
 Audience be under Conditions? Should Validity Interval be under Conditions? What sort of
 extensibility should be allowed: upward compatibility between SAML versions? Proprietary
 extensions? Other types?

- 2267 At F2F #3, the following straw poll results were obtained:
- Yes, we want something with the semantic of "conditions" to appear in Assertions.
- Yes, we need to re-work the design of conditions.
- Yes, we want to place the validity interval into the conditions (However, it was noted that doesn't this make validity interval optional? Do we want that?)
- "Maybe" to providing a general conditions framework
- "Maybe" to putting audiences into conditions
- 2274 This was identified as F2F#3-17 and F2F#3-18.
- 2275 Note this is closely related to DS-11-03.
- 2276 Core-12 addresses this issue with ConditionsType. CONS-07 asks: Does the ConditionsType
- 2277 meet the TC's requirements? If not, why not?
- 2278 Status: Open
- 2279 **ISSUE:[DS-14-02: AuthenticatorRequired]**

2280 It has been proposed that an Assertion may contain an Authenticator element which can be used

in any of a number of ways to associate the Assertion with a request, either directly or indirectly

2282 via some cryptographic primitive. Should this element be a part of SAML?

2283 Basically the question is whether the complexity associated with supporting this mechanism is

96

- 2284 absolutely required or simply "nice to have."
- 2285 This has been identified as F2F#3-14.
- 2286 Potential Resolutions:
- 2287 1. Include the Authenticator element.
- 2288 2. Do not include the Authenticator element.
- 2289 Status: Open
- 2290 ISSUE:[DS-14-03: AuthenticatorName]
- Assuming DS-14-02 is resolved affirmatively, should the Authenticator be called something else? Suggestions include: HolderofKey and Subject Authenticator.
- 2293 This has been identified as F2F#3-10.
- 2294 Also identified as CONS-09.
- 2295 Status: Open
- 2296 ISSUE:[DS-14-04: Aggregation]
- Do we need an explicit element for aggregating multiple assertions into a single object as part of
 the SAML specification? If so, what is the type of this element?
- 2299 This was identified as CONS-01.
- 2300 Status: Open
- 2301 ISSUE:[DS-14-05: Version]
- Does the specification (core-12) need to further specify the version element? If so, what are these
 requirements? Should this be a string? Or is an unsignedint enough?
- 2304 This was identified as CONS-06
- 2305 Status: Open
- 2306 ISSUE:[DS-14-06: ProtocolIDs]
- 2307 Core-12 proposes a <Protocol> element with the AuthenticatorType. CONS-10 suggests that the
- 2308 TC will develop a namespace identifier (e.g., protocol) and set of standard namespace specific
- 2309 strings for the <Protocol> element above. If not, what approach should be taken here?

- 2310 Status: Open
- 2311 ISSUE:[DS-14-07: BearerIndication]
- 2312 Core-12 proposes the following for identifying a ``bearer'' assertion: A distinguished URI
- 2313 urn:protocol:bearer be used as the value of the <Protocol> element in <Authenticator> with no
- 2314 other sub-elements. CONS-11 asks: Is this an acceptable design?
- 2315 Status: Open

2316 ISSUE:[DS-14-08: ReturnExpired]

- 2317 Should the specification make any normative statements about the expiry state of assertions
- 2318 returned in response to SAMLRequests? Is it a requirement that only unexpired assertions are
- 2319 returned, or is the client responsible for checking? (*Seems pretty clear that the client will have to*
- 2320 check anyway at time-of-use, so forcing the responder to check before replying seems like extra
- 2321 *processing.*)
- Note that regardless of how this issue is settled, Asserting Parties will be free to discard expired
 Assertions at any time.
- 2324 Identified as PRO-01.
- 2325 **Possible Resolutions**:
- 232623271. The specification will state that Asserting Parties MUST return only Assertions that have not expired.
- 2328 2. The specification will state that Asserting Parties MAY return expired Assertions.
- 2329 3. The specification will make no statement about returning expired Assertions.
- 2330 Status: Open
- 2331 ISSUE:[DS-14-09: OtherID]
- PRO-01 states: in some instances (such as the web browser profile) it is necessary to lookup an
- assertion using an identifier other than the <AssertionID>. Typically, such an identifier is opaque and may have been created in some proprietary way by an asserting party. Do we need an
- additional element in SAMLRequestType to model this type of lookup?
- 2336 Status: Open
- 2337 ISSUE:[DS-14-10: StatusCodes]
- 2338 PRO-07 asks: are the status codes listed for StatusCodeType (in core-12) sufficient? If not how

- 2339 do we want to define a bigger list: keep it open with well-known values, use someone else's list,
- 2340 define an extension system, etc.
- 2341 See also ISSUE: [F2F#3-33, 34]. (Not clear the relationship. These issues are about Advice. ed.)
- 2342 Status: Open
- 2343 ISSUE:[DS-14-11: CompareElements]

Should SAML specify the rules for comparing various identifiers, such as Assertion IDs, Issuer,
 Security Domain, Subject Name? Currently these are all specified as strings. Issues include:

- Upper and lower case equivalence
- Leading and trailing whitespace
- Imbedded whitespace
- 2349 **Possible Resolutions**:
- 2350 **1.** Declare only exact binary matching.
- 2351 2. Define a set of matching rules.
- 2352 Status: Open

2353 Miscellaneous Issues

2354 Group 1: Terminology

- 2355 ISSUE:[MS-1-01: MeaningofProfile]
- 2356 The bindings group has selected the terminology:
- SAML Protocol Binding, to describe the layering of SAML request-response messages on "top" of a substrate protocol, Example: SAML HTTP Binding (SAML requestresponse messages layered on HTTP).
- a profile for SAML, to describe the attachment of SAML assertions to a packaging
 framework or protocol, Example: SOAP profile for SAML, web browser profile for
 SAML
- This terminology needs to be reflected in the requirements document, where the generic term
 "bindings" is used. It needs also to be added to the glossary document.
- The conformance group has used the term Profile to define a set of SAML capabilities, with a corresponding set of test cases, for which an implementation or application can declare conformance. This use of profile is consistent with other conformance programs, as well as in ISO/IEC 8632. In order to resolve this conflict, the conformance group has proposed, in sstc-
- 2369 draft-conformance-spec-004, to substitute the word partition instead.
- 2370 Status: Open

2371 Group 2: Administrative

2372 ISSUE:[MS-2-01: RegistrationService]

2373 There is a need for a permanent registration service for publishing bindings and profiles. The

- bindings group specification will provide guidelines for creating a protocol binding or profile,
 but we also need to point to some form of registration service.
- 2376 DS-7-02: AuthN Method also implies a need to register AuthN methods.
- 2377 How can we take this forward? Is OASIS wiling to host a registry?
- 2378 Another possibility is IANA.
- 2379 Status: Open

2380 Group 3: Conformance

2381 ISSUE:[MS-3-01: BindingConformance]

Should protocol bindings be the subject of conformance? The bindings sub group is defining
both SAML Bindings and SAML Profiles. It has been proposed that both of these would be the
subject of independent conformance tests.

2385 The following definitions have been proposed:

SAML Binding: SAML Request/Response Protocol messages are mapped onto underlying
 communication protocols. (SOAP, BEEP)

SAML Profile: formats for combining assertions with other data objects. These objects may be
 communicated between various system entities. This might involve intermediate parties.

This suggests that a Profile is a complete specification of the SAML aspects of some use case. It provides all the elements needed to implement a real world scenario, including the semantics of the various SAML Assertions, Requests and Responses.

- A Binding would simply specify how SAML Assertions, Requests and Responses would be
 carried by some protocol. A Binding might be used as a building block in one or more Profiles,
 or be used by itself to implement some use case not covered by SAML. In the later case, it would
 be necessary for the parties involved to agree on all aspects of the use case not covered by the
 Binding.
- 2398 Thus conformance testing of Bindings might be undesirable for two related reasons:
- The number of independent test scenarios is already large. It seems undesirable to test something that does not solve a complete, real-world problem.
- Parties would be able to claim "SAML Conformance" by conforming to a Binding,
 although they would not be able to actually interoperate with others in a practical
 situation, except by reference to a private agreement. This would likely draw a negative
 response from end users and other observers.
- 2405 The advantages of testing the conformance of Bindings include:
- Simplifying testing procedures when a Binding is used in several Profiles that a given party wishes to conform to.
- Allow SAML to be used in scenarios not envisioned by the Profiles.
- 2409 This was identified as F2F#3-2.
- 2410 **Possible Resolutions**:
 - Colors: Gray Blue Yellow

2411 1. Make Bindings the subject of conformance

2412 2. Do not make Bindings the subject of conformance.

2413 Status: Open

- 2414 ISSUE:[MS-3-02: Browser Partition]
- Should the Web Browser be a SAML Conformance Partition, different from the Authentication
 Authority partition?
- 2417 This was identified as F2F#3-7.
- 2418 Status: Open

2419 Group 4: XMLDSIG

- 2420 ISSUE:[MS-4-01: XMLDsigProfile]
- 2421 SAML should define an XMLDsig profile specifying which options may be used in SAML, in
- 2422 order to achieve interoperability.
- 2423 One aspect of this is: which of the signature types: enveloped, enveloping and detached should 2424 be supported? See also Issues UC-7-01 and UC-7-02.
- 2425 Status: Open
- 2426

2426 **Document History**

2427	• 5 Feb 2001 First version for Strawman 2.
2428	• 26 Feb 2001 Made the following changes:
2429	• Changed references to [SAML] to SAML.
2430	• Added rewrites of Group 1 per Darren Platt.
2431	• Added rewrites of Group 3 per David Orchard.
2432	• Added rewrites of Group 5 per Prateek Mishra.
2433	• Added rewrites of Group 11 per Irving Reid.
2434	• Converted the abbreviation "AuthC" (for "authentication") to "AuthN."
2435	• Added Group 13.
2436	• Added UC-1-12:SignOnService.
2437 2438	• Converted candidate requirement naming scheme from [R-Name] (as used in the main document) to [CR-issuenumber-Name], per David Orchard.
2439	• Added UC-0-02:Terminology.
2440	• Added UC-0-03:Arrows.
2441 2442	• Updated UC-9-02:PrivacyStatement with suggested requirements from Bob Morgan and Bob Blakley.
2443	• Added UC-1-13:ProxyModel per Irving Reid.
2444	• Added status indications for each issue.
2445	• Recorded votes and conclusions for issue groups 1, 3, and 5.
2446	• Added Zahid Ahmed's use cases for B2B transactions.
2447	• Added Maryann Hondo's use case scenario for ebXML.
2448	• Added comments to votes by Jeff Hodges, Bob Blakley.
2449	• 10 Apr 2001 Made the following changes:

105

	draft-sstc-saml-issues-06.doc
2450 2451	• Added re-written versions of issue group 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 13 by Darren Platt and Evan Prodromou.
2452	• Added re-written versions of issue groups 11 and 12 by Irving Reid.
2453	• Added re-written version of issue group 4 by Prateek Mishra.
2454	• Added voting results for groups 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13.
2455	• 22 May 2001 Made the following changes:
2456	• Changed introduction to reflect conversion to general issues list
2457	Added color scheme
2458	• Closed large number of issues per F2F #2
2459	Changed OSSML to SAML everywhere
2460	• Added design issues section and groups 1-4
2461	• Added UC-13-07
2462	• Various minor edits
2463	• 25 May 2001 Made the following changes
2464	• Various format improvements
2465	• Closed all Group 0 issues
2466	• Added DS-4-04
2467	• Did NOT promote blue issues to gray
2468	• 11 June 2001 Made the following changes
2469	• Various format improvements, CLOSED in headers
2470	• Renumber Anonymity to DS-1-02 (was a duplicate)
2471	Changed all Blue to Gray
2472 2473	• Downgraded from Yellow to White UC-13-07, DS-1-01, DS-1-02, DS-4-02 (no recent discussion)
2474	Closed DS-2-01 Wildcarded Resources

Colors: Gray Blue Yellow

	draft-sstc-saml-issues-06.doc
2475	• Added new text for DS-3-01, DS-3-02, DS-4-04
2476	• Added DS-2-02, Groups 5,6,7,8 and 9
2477	• 18 June 2001 Made the following changes
2478	• Changed from Blue to Gray DS-2-01
2479 2480 2481	 Downgraded from Yellow to White UC-13-07, DS-2-02, DS-3-01, DS-3-02, DS-3-03, DS-6-01, DS-6-02, DS-6-03, DS-6-04, DS-7-01, DS-7-02, DS-7-03, DS-8-01, DS-8-02, DS-9-01
2482	• Created Miscellaneous Issues section, added MS-1-01 and MS-2-01
2483	• Created issue DS-10-01
2484	• Modified DS-4-01 & DS-4-03
2485	• 9 August 2001 Made the following changes
2486	• Removed text and voting summaries from old, closed issues
2487 2488 2489	 Created issues DS-1-03, DS-1-04, DS-1-05, DS-4-05, DS-4-06, DS-4-07, DS-7-04, DS-7-05, DS-8-03, DS-8-04, DS-11-01 thru DS-11-05, DS-12-01 thru DS-12-05, DS-13-01, DS-14-01 thru DS-14-10, MS-3-01, MS-3-02
2490	• Modified DS-4-04, DS-8-02
2491	Color changes to reflect recent discussions
2492	• 22 August 2001 Made the following changes
2493 2494	 Created issues: UC-14-01, DS-7-06, DS-9-02, DS-9-03, DS-12-06, DS-14-11, MS-4-01