Abstract:
This specification (WS-ReliableMessaging) describes a protocol that allows messages to be transferred reliably between nodes implementing this protocol in the presence of software component, system, or network failures. The protocol is described in this specification in a transport-independent manner allowing it to be implemented using different network technologies. To support interoperable Web services, a SOAP binding is defined within this specification.

The protocol defined in this specification depends upon other Web services specifications for the identification of service endpoint addresses and policies. How these are identified and retrieved are detailed within those specifications and are out of scope for this document.

By using the XML [XML], SOAP [SOAP 1.1], [SOAP 1.2] and WSDL [WSDL 1.1] extensibility model, SOAP-based and WSDL-based specifications are designed to be composed with each other to define a rich Web services environment. As such, WS-ReliableMessaging by itself does not define all the features required for a complete messaging solution. WS-ReliableMessaging is a building block that is used in conjunction with other specifications and application-specific protocols to accommodate a wide variety of requirements and scenarios related to the operation of distributed Web services.

Status:
This document is a work in progress and will be updated to reflect issues as they are resolved by the Web Services Reliable Exchange (WS-RX) Technical Committee.
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1 Introduction

It is often a requirement for two Web services that wish to communicate to do so reliably in the presence of software component, system, or network failures. The primary goal of this specification is to create a modular mechanism for reliable transfer of messages. It defines a messaging protocol to identify, track, and manage the reliable transfer of messages between a source and a destination. It also defines a SOAP binding that is required for interoperability. Additional bindings can be defined.

This mechanism is extensible allowing additional functionality, such as security, to be tightly integrated. This specification integrates with and complements the WS-Security [WS-Security], WS-Policy [WS-Policy], and other Web services specifications. Combined, these allow for a broad range of reliable, secure messaging options.

1.1 Notational Conventions

The keywords "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [KEYWORDS].

This specification uses the following syntax to define normative outlines for messages:

- The syntax appears as an XML instance, but values in italics indicate data types instead of values.
- Characters are appended to elements and attributes to indicate cardinality:
  - "?" (0 or 1)
  - "*" (0 or more)
  - "+" (1 or more)
- The character "|" is used to indicate a choice between alternatives.
- The characters "[" and "]" are used to indicate that contained items are to be treated as a group with respect to cardinality or choice.
- An ellipsis (i.e. "...") indicates a point of extensibility that allows other child or attribute content specified in this document. Additional children elements and/or attributes MAY be added at the indicated extension points but they MUST NOT contradict the semantics of the parent and/or owner, respectively. If an extension is not recognized it SHOULD be ignored.
- XML namespace prefixes (See Section 1.2) are used to indicate the namespace of the element being defined.

Elements and Attributes defined by this specification are referred to in the text of this document using XPath 1.0 [XPATH 1.0] expressions. Extensibility points are referred to using an extended version of this syntax:

- An element extensibility point is referred to using {any} in place of the element name. This indicates that any element name can be used, from any namespace other than the wsrm: namespace.
- An attribute extensibility point is referred to using @{any} in place of the attribute name. This indicates that any attribute name can be used, from any namespace other than the wsrm: namespace.
1.2 Namespace

The XML namespace [XML-ns] URI that MUST be used by implementations of this specification is:

```
http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-rx/wsrm/200604
```

Dereferencing the above URI will produce the Resource Directory Description Language [RDDL 2.0] document that describes this namespace.

Table 1 lists the XML namespaces that are used in this specification. The choice of any namespace prefix is arbitrary and not semantically significant.

### Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prefix</th>
<th>Namespace</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>(Either SOAP 1.1 or 1.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S11</td>
<td><a href="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/">http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S12</td>
<td><a href="http://www.w3.org/2003/05/soap-envelope">http://www.w3.org/2003/05/soap-envelope</a></td>
</tr>
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<td>wsrm</td>
<td><a href="http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-rx/wsrm/200604">http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-rx/wsrm/200604</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wsa</td>
<td><a href="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wsse</td>
<td><a href="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-secext-1.0.xsd">http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-secext-1.0.xsd</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>xs</td>
<td><a href="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema">http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The normative schema for WS-ReliableMessaging can be found at:

```
http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-rx/wsrm/200604/wsrm-1.1-schema-200604.xsd
```

All sections explicitly noted as examples are informational and are not to be considered normative.

1.3 Compliance

An implementation is not compliant with this specification if it fails to satisfy one or more of the MUST or REQUIRED level requirements defined herein. A SOAP Node MUST NOT use the XML namespace identifier for this specification (listed in Section 1.2) within SOAP Envelopes unless it is compliant with this specification.

Normative text within this specification takes precedence over normative outlines, which in turn take precedence over the XML Schema [XML Schema Part 1, Part 2] descriptions.
2 Reliable Messaging Model

Many errors can interrupt a conversation. Messages can be lost, duplicated or reordered. Further the host systems can experience failures and lose volatile state.

The WS-ReliableMessaging specification defines an interoperable protocol that requires a Reliable Messaging (RM) Source and Reliable Messaging Destination to ensure that each message transmitted by the RM Source is accepted by an RM Destination, or barring acceptance, that an RM Source can, except in the most extreme circumstances, accurately determine the disposition of each message transmitted as perceived by the RM Destination, so as to resolve any in-doubt status regarding receipt of the messages transmitted. Note that this specification places no restriction on the scope of the RM Source or RM Destination entities. For example, either can span multiple WSDL Ports or endpoints.

The protocol enables the implementation of a broad range of reliability features which include ordered delivery, duplicate elimination, and guaranteed receipt. The protocol can also be implemented with a range of robustness characteristics ranging from in-memory persistence that is scoped to a single process lifetime, to replicated durable storage that is recoverable in all but the most extreme circumstances. It is expected that the endpoints will implement as many or as few of these reliability characteristics as necessary for the correct operation of the application using the protocol. Regardless of which of the reliability features is enabled, the wire protocol does not change.

Figure 1 below illustrates the entities and events in a simple reliable exchange of messages. First, the Application Source Sends a message for reliable transfer. The Reliable Messaging Source accepts the message and transmits it one or more times. After accepting the message, the RM Destination Acknowledges it. Finally, the RM Destination delivers the message to the Application Destination. The exact roles the entities play and the complete meaning of the events will be defined throughout this specification.

![Figure 1: Reliable Messaging Model](image)

2.1 Glossary

The following definitions are used throughout this specification:

- **Accept**: The act of qualifying a message by the RM Destination such that it becomes eligible for delivery and acknowledgement.
- **Acknowledgement**: The communication from the RM Destination to the RM Source indicating the successful receipt of a message.
- **Application Destination**: The endpoint to which a message is Delivered.
Application Source: The endpoint that sends a message.
Deliver: The act of transferring a message from the RM Destination to the Application Destination.
Endpoint: As defined in the WS-Addressing specification [WS-Addressing]; a Web service endpoint is a (referenceable) entity, processor, or resource to which Web service messages can be addressed. Endpoint references convey the information needed to address a Web service endpoint.
Receive: The act of reading a message from a network connection and accepting it.
RM Destination: For any one reliably sent message the endpoint that receives the message.
RM Source: The endpoint that transmits the message.
Send: The act of submitting a message to the RM Source for reliable transfer.
Transmit: The act of writing a message to a network connection.

2.2 Protocol Preconditions
The correct operation of the protocol requires that a number of preconditions MUST be established prior to the processing of the initial sequenced message:
• For any single message exchange the RM Source MUST have an endpoint reference that uniquely identifies the RM Destination endpoint.
• The RM Source MUST have successfully created a Sequence with the RM Destination.
• The RM Source MUST be capable of formulating messages that adhere to the RM Destination’s policies.
• If a secure exchange of messages is REQUIRED, then the RM Source and RM Destination MUST have a security context.

2.3 Protocol Invariants
During the lifetime of a Sequence, two invariants are REQUIRED for correctness:
• The RM Source MUST assign each message within a Sequence a message number (defined below) beginning at 1 and increasing by exactly 1 for each subsequent message. These numbers MUST be assigned in the same order in which messages are sent by the Application Source.
• Within every acknowledgement it issues, the RM Destination MUST include one or more acknowledgement ranges that contain the message number of every message accepted by the RM Destination. The RM Destination MUST exclude the message numbers of any messages it has not accepted.

2.4 Example Message Exchange
Figure 2 illustrates a possible message exchange between two reliable messaging endpoints A and B.
1. The protocol preconditions are established. These include policy exchange, endpoint resolution, and establishing trust.

2. The RM Source requests creation of a new Sequence.

3. The RM Destination creates a new Sequence and returns its unique identifier.

4. The RM Source begins transmitting messages in the Sequence beginning with MessageNumber 1. In the figure above, the RM Source sends 3 messages in the Sequence.

5. The 2nd message in the Sequence is lost in transit.

6. The 3rd message is the last in this Sequence and the RM Source includes an AckRequested header to ensure that it gets a timely SequenceAcknowledgement for the Sequence.

7. The RM Destination acknowledges receipt of message numbers 1 and 3 as a result of receiving the RM Source's AckRequested header.

8. The RM Source retransmits the unacknowledged message with MessageNumber 2. This is a new message from the perspective of the underlying transport, but it has the same Sequence Identifier and MessageNumber so the RM Destination can recognize it as a duplicate of the earlier message, in case the original and retransmitted messages are both received. The RM Source includes an AckRequested header in the retransmitted message so the RM Destination will expedite an acknowledgement.
9. The RM Destination receives the second transmission of the message with MessageNumber 2 and
   acknowledges receipt of message numbers 1, 2, and 3.

10. The RM Source receives this acknowledgement and sends a TerminateSequence message to the
    RM Destination indicating that the Sequence is completed and reclaims any resources associated
    with the Sequence.

11. The RM Destination receives the TerminateSequence message indicating that the RM Source will
    not be sending any more messages. The RM Destination sends a TerminateSequenceResponse
    message to the RM Source and reclaims any resources associated with the Sequence.

The RM Source will expect to receive acknowledgements from the RM Destination during the course of a
message exchange at occasions described in Section 3 below. Should an acknowledgement not be
received in a timely fashion, the RM Source MUST re-transmit the message since either the message or
the associated acknowledgement might have been lost. Since the nature and dynamic characteristics of
the underlying transport and potential intermediaries are unknown in the general case, the timing of re-
transmissions cannot be specified. Additionally, over-aggressive re-transmissions have been
demonstrated to cause transport or intermediary flooding which are counterproductive to the intention of
providing a reliable exchange of messages. Consequently, implementers are encouraged to utilize
adaptive mechanisms that dynamically adjust re-transmission time and the back-off intervals that are
appropriate to the nature of the transports and intermediaries envisioned. For the case of TCP/IP
transports, a mechanism similar to that described as RTTM in RFC 1323 [RTTM] SHOULD be
considered.

Now that the basic model has been outlined, the details of the elements used in this protocol are now
provided in Section 3.
3 RM Protocol Elements

The following protocol elements define extensibility points at various places. Implementations MAY add child elements and/or attributes at the indicated extension points but MUST NOT contradict the semantics of the parent and/or owner, respectively. If a receiver does not recognize an extension, the receiver SHOULD ignore the extension.

Some RM header blocks may be added to messages that happen to be targeted to the same endpoint to which those headers are to be sent (a concept often referred to as "piggy-backing"), thus saving the overhead of an additional message exchange. Reference parameters MUST be considered when determining whether two EPRs are targeted to the same endpoint.

When the RM protocol, defined in this specification, is composed with the WS-Addressing specification, the following rules prescribe the constraints on the value of the wsa:Action header:

1. When an endpoint generates a message that carries an RM protocol element, that is defined in section 3 below, in the body of a SOAP envelope that endpoint MUST include in that envelope a wsa:Action SOAP header block whose value is an IRI that is a concatenation of the WS-RM namespace URI, followed by a "/", followed by the value of the local name of the child element of the SOAP body. For example, for a Sequence creation request message as described in section 3.1 below, the value of the wsa:Action IRI would be:

   http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-rx/wsrmp/200602/CreateSequence

2. When an endpoint generates a SequenceAcknowledgement message that has no element content in the SOAP body, then the value of the wsa:Action IRI MUST be:

   http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-rx/wsrmp/200602/SequenceAcknowledgement

3. When an endpoint generates an AckRequested message that has no element content in the SOAP body, then the value of the wsa:Action IRI MUST be:

   http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-rx/wsrmp/200602/AckRequested

4. When an endpoint generates an RM fault as defined in section 4 below, the value of the wsa:Action IRI MUST be as defined in section 4 below.

3.1 Sequence Creation

The RM Source MUST request creation of an outbound Sequence by sending a CreateSequence element in the body of a message to the RM Destination which in turn responds either with a message containing CreateSequenceResponse or a CreateSequenceRefused fault. The RM Source MAY include an offer to create an inbound Sequence within the CreateSequence message. This offer is either accepted or rejected by the RM Destination in the CreateSequenceResponse message.

The SOAP version used for the CreateSequence message SHOULD be used for all subsequent messages in or for that Sequence, sent by either the RM Source or the RM Destination.

The following exemplar defines the CreateSequence syntax:

```xml
<wsrm:CreateSequence ...>
  <wsrm:AcksTo> wsa:EndpointReferenceType </wsrm:AcksTo>
  <wsrm:Expires ...> xs:duration </wsrm:Expires> ?
  <wsrm:Offer ...>
    <wsrm:Identifier ...> xs:anyURI </wsrm:Identifier>
    <wsrm:Endpoint> wsa:EndpointReferenceType </wsrm:Endpoint>
    <wsrm:Expires ...> xs:duration </wsrm:Expires> ?
    <wsrm:IncompleteSequenceBehavior>
      wsrmp:IncompleteSequenceBehaviorType
    </wsrm:IncompleteSequenceBehavior>
  </wsrm:Offer>
</wsrm:CreateSequence>
```
This element requests creation of a new Sequence between the RM Source that sends it, and the RM Destination to which it is sent. The RM Source MUST NOT send this element as a header block. The RM Destination MUST respond either with a `CreateSequenceResponse` response message or a `CreateSequenceRefused` fault.

The RM Source MUST include this element in any CreateSequence message it sends. This element is of type `wsa:EndpointReferenceType` (as specified by WS-Addressing). It specifies the endpoint reference to which messages containing `SequenceAcknowledgement` header blocks and faults related to the created Sequence are to be sent, unless otherwise noted in this specification (for example, see Section 3.2).

Implementations MUST NOT use an endpoint reference in the AcksTo element that would prevent the sending of Sequence Acknowledgements back to the RM Source. For example, using the WS-Addressing "http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing/none" IRI would make it impossible for the RM Destination to ever send Sequence Acknowledgements.

This element, if present, of type `xs:duration` specifies the RM Source’s requested duration for the Sequence. The RM Destination MAY either accept the requested duration or assign a lesser value of its choosing. A value of ‘PT0S’ indicates that the Sequence will never expire. Absence of the element indicates an implied value of ‘PT0S’.

This is an extensibility mechanism to allow additional attributes, based on schemas, to be added to the element.

This element, if present, enables an RM Source to offer a corresponding Sequence for the reliable exchange of messages transmitted from RM Destination to RM Source.

The RM Source MUST set the value of this element to an absolute URI (conformant with RFC3986 [URI]) that uniquely identifies the offered Sequence.

This is an extensibility mechanism to allow additional attributes, based on schemas, to be added to the element.

An RM Source MUST include this element, of type `wsa:EndpointReferenceType` (as specified by WS-Addressing) This element specifies the endpoint reference to which WS-RM protocol messages related to the offered Sequence are to be sent.
Implementations MUST NOT use an endpoint reference in the Endpoint element that would prevent the sending of WS-RM protocol messages. For example, using the WS-Addressing "http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing/none" IRI would make it impossible for the RM Destination to ever send WS-RM protocol messages (e.g. TerminateSequence) to the RM Source for the Offered Sequence. Implementations MAY use the WS-RM anonymous URI template and doing so implies that messages will be retrieved using a mechanism such as the MakeConnection message (see section 3.7).

```
<wsrm:createSequence>
  <wsrm:offer/>
  <wsrm:expires/>
</wsrm:createSequence>
```

This element, if present, of type xs:duration specifies the duration for the offered Sequence. A value of 'PT0S' indicates that the offered Sequence will never expire. Absence of the element indicates an implied value of 'PT0S'.

```
<wsrm:createSequence/>
```

This is an extensibility mechanism to allow additional attributes, based on schemas, to be added to the element.

```
<wsrm:createSequence/>
```

This is an extensibility mechanism to allow different (extensible) types of information, based on a schema, to be passed.

```
<wsrm:createSequence/>
```

This is an extensibility mechanism to allow different (extensible) types of information, based on a schema, to be passed.

```
<wsrm:createSequence/>
```

This is an extensibility mechanism to allow additional attributes, based on schemas, to be added to the element.

```
<wsrm:createSequenceResponse/>
```

A CreateSequenceResponse is sent in the body of a response message by an RM Destination in response to receipt of a CreateSequence request message. It carries the Identifier of the created Sequence and indicates that the RM Source can begin sending messages in the context of the identified Sequence.
The following exemplar defines the CreateSequenceResponse syntax:

```
<wsrm:CreateSequenceResponse ...>
  <wsrm:Identifier ...> xs:anyURI </wsrm:Identifier>
  <wsrm:Expires ...> xs:duration </wsrm:Expires>
  <wsrm:IncompleteSequenceBehavior>
    wsrm:IncompleteSequenceBehaviorType
    <wsrm:IncompleteSequenceBehavior>
      <wsrm:Accept .../>
      <wsrm:AcksTo> wsa:EndpointReferenceType </wsrm:AcksTo>
      ...
    </wsrm:Accept>
  </wsrm:IncompleteSequenceBehavior>
</wsrm:CreateSequenceResponse>
```

This element is sent in the body of the response message in response to a CreateSequence request message. It indicates that the RM Destination has created a new Sequence at the request of the RM Source. The RM Destination MUST NOT send this element as a header block.

/wsrm:CreateSequenceResponse/wsrm:Identifier

The RM Destination MUST include this element within any CreateSequenceResponse message it sends. The RM Destination MUST set the value of this element to the absolute URI (conformant with RFC3986) that uniquely identifies the Sequence that has been created by the RM Destination.

/wsrm:CreateSequenceResponse/wsrm:Identifier/@{any}

This is an extensibility mechanism to allow additional attributes, based on schemas, to be added to the element.

/wsrm:CreateSequenceResponse/wsrm:Expires

This element, if present, of type xs:duration accepts or refines the RM Source's requested duration for the Sequence. It specifies the amount of time after which any resources associated with the Sequence SHOULD be reclaimed thus causing the Sequence to be silently terminated. At the RM Destination this duration is measured from a point proximate to Sequence creation and at the RM Source this duration is measured from a point approximate to the successful processing of the CreateSequenceResponse. A value of 'PT0S' indicates that the Sequence will never expire. Absence of the element indicates an implied value of 'PT0S'. The RM Destination MUST set the value of this element to be equal to or less than the value requested by the RM Source in the corresponding CreateSequence message.

/wsrm:CreateSequenceResponse/wsrm:Expires/@{any}

This is an extensibility mechanism to allow additional attributes, based on schemas, to be added to the element.

/wsrm:CreateSequenceResponse/wsrm:IncompleteSequenceBehavior

This element, if present, specifies the behavior that the destination will exhibit upon the closure or termination of an incomplete Sequence. For the purposes of defining the values used, the term 'discard' refers to behavior equivalent to the Application Destination never processing a particular message.

A value of "DiscardEntireSequence" indicates that the entire Sequence MUST be discarded if the Sequence is closed, or terminated, when there are one or more gaps in the final SequenceAcknowledgement.

A value of "DiscardFollowingFirstGap" indicates that messages in the Sequence beyond the first gap MUST be discarded when there are one or more gaps in the final SequenceAcknowledgement.
The default value of "NoDiscard" indicates that no acknowledged messages in the Sequence will be discarded.

This element, if present, enables an RM Destination to accept the offer of a corresponding Sequence for the reliable exchange of messages transmitted from RM Destination to RM Source.

Note: If a CreateSequenceResponse is returned without a child Accept in response to a CreateSequence that did contain a child Offer, then the RM Source MAY immediately reclaim any resources associated with the unused offered Sequence.

The RM Destination MUST include this element, of type wsa:EndpointReferenceType (as specified by WS-Addressing). It specifies the endpoint reference to which messages containing SequenceAcknowledgement header blocks and faults related to the created Sequence are to be sent, unless otherwise noted in this specification (for example, see Section 3.2).

Implementations MUST NOT use an endpoint reference in the AcksTo element that would prevent the sending of Sequence Acknowledgements back to the RM Source. For example, using the WS-Addressing "http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing/none" IRI would make it impossible for the RM Destination to ever send Sequence Acknowledgements.

This is an extensibility mechanism to allow different (extensible) types of information, based on a schema, to be passed.

This is an extensibility mechanism to allow different (extensible) types of information, based on a schema, to be passed.

This is an extensibility mechanism to allow additional attributes, based on schemas, to be added to the element.

### 3.2 Closing A Sequence

There are times during the use of an RM Sequence that the RM Source or RM Destination will wish to discontinue using a Sequence. Simply terminating the Sequence discards the state managed by the RM Destination, leaving the RM Source unaware of the final ranges of messages that were successfully transferred to the RM Destination. To ensure that the Sequence ends with a known final state either the RM Source or RM Destination MAY choose to close the Sequence before terminating it.

If the RM Source wishes to close the Sequence, then it sends a CloseSequence element, in the body of a message, to the RM Destination. This message indicates that the RM Destination MUST NOT accept any new messages for the specified Sequence, other than those already accepted at the time the CloseSequence element is interpreted by the RM Destination. Upon receipt of this message, or subsequent to the RM Destination closing the Sequence of its own volition, the RM Destination MUST
include a final SequenceAcknowledgement (within which the RM Destination MUST include the Final element) header block on any messages associated with the Sequence destined to the RM Source, including the CloseSequenceResponse message or on any Sequence fault transmitted to the RM Source.

While the RM Destination MUST NOT accept any new messages for the specified Sequence it MUST still process RM protocol messages. For example, it MUST respond to AckRequested, TerminateSequence as well as CloseSequence messages. Note, subsequent CloseSequence messages have no effect on the state of the Sequence.

In the case where the RM Destination wishes to discontinue use of a Sequence it is RECOMMENDED that it close the Sequence. Please see Final and the SequenceClosed fault. Whenever possible the SequenceClosed fault SHOULD be used in place of the SequenceTerminated fault to allow the RM Source to still receive Acknowledgements.

The following exemplar defines the CloseSequence syntax:

```
<wsrm:CloseSequence ...>
  <wsrm:Identifier ...> xs:anyURI </wsrm:Identifier>
  ...
</wsrm:CloseSequence>
```

This element is sent by an RM Source to indicate that the RM Destination MUST NOT accept any new messages for this Sequence. A SequenceClosed fault MUST be generated by the RM Destination when it receives a message for a Sequence that is already closed.

```
/wsrm:CloseSequence/wsrm:Identifier/@{any}
```

This is an extensibility mechanism to allow additional attributes, based on schemas, to be added to the element.

```
/wsrm:CloseSequence/{any}
```

This is an extensibility mechanism to allow different (extensible) types of information, based on a schema, to be passed.

```
/wsrm:CloseSequence@{any}
```

This is an extensibility mechanism to allow additional attributes, based on schemas, to be added to the element.

A CloseSequenceResponse is sent in the body of a response message by an RM Destination in response to receipt of a CloseSequence request message. It indicates that the RM Destination has closed the Sequence.

The following exemplar defines the CloseSequenceResponse syntax:

```
<wsrm:CloseSequenceResponse ...>
  <wsrm:Identifier ...> xs:anyURI </wsrm:Identifier>
  ...
</wsrm:CloseSequenceResponse>
```

This element is sent in the body of a response message by an RM Destination in response to receipt of a CloseSequence request message. It indicates that the RM Destination has closed the Sequence.
The RM Destination MUST include this element in any CloseSequenceResponse message it sends. The RM Destination MUST set the value of this element to the absolute URI (conformant with RFC3986) of the Sequence that is being closed.

This is an extensibility mechanism to allow additional attributes, based on schemas, to be added to the element.

This is an extensibility mechanism to allow different (extensible) types of information, based on a schema, to be passed.

This is an extensibility mechanism to allow additional attributes, based on schemas, to be added to the element.

### 3.3 Sequence Termination

When the RM Source has completed its use of the Sequence it sends a `TerminateSequence` element, in the body of a message, to the RM Destination to indicate that the Sequence is complete and that it will not be sending any further messages related to the Sequence. The RM Destination can safely reclaim any resources associated with the Sequence upon receipt of the `TerminateSequence` message. Under normal usage the RM Source will complete its use of the Sequence when all of the messages in the Sequence have been acknowledged. However, the RM Source is free to Terminate or Close a Sequence at any time regardless of the acknowledgement state of the messages.

The following exemplar defines the `TerminateSequence` syntax:

```
<wsrm:TerminateSequence ...>
  <wsrm:Identifier ...> xs:anyURI </wsrm:Identifier>
  ...
</wsrm:TerminateSequence>
```

This element is sent by an RM Source to indicate it has completed its use of the Sequence. It indicates that the RM Destination can safely reclaim any resources related to the identified Sequence. The RM Source MUST NOT send this element as a header block. The RM Source MAY retransmit this element. Once this element is sent, other than this element, the RM Source MUST NOT send any additional message to the RM Destination referencing this Sequence.

The RM Source MUST include this element in any `TerminateSequence` message it sends. The RM Source MUST set the value of this element to the absolute URI (conformant with RFC3986) of the Sequence that is being terminated.

This is an extensibility mechanism to allow additional attributes, based on schemas, to be added to the element.
This is an extensibility mechanism to allow different (extensible) types of information, based on a schema, to be passed.

This is an extensibility mechanism to allow additional attributes, based on schemas, to be added to the element.

A TerminateSequenceResponse is sent in the body of a response message by an RM Destination in response to receipt of a TerminateSequence request message. It indicates that the RM Destination has terminated the Sequence.

The following exemplar defines the TerminateSequenceResponse syntax:

```
<wsrm:TerminateSequenceResponse ...>
  <wsrm:Identifier ...> xs:anyURI </wsrm:Identifier>
  ...
</wsrm:TerminateSequenceResponse>
```

This element is sent in the body of a response message by an RM Destination in response to receipt of a TerminateSequence request message. It indicates that the RM Destination has terminated the Sequence. The RM Destination MUST NOT send this element as a header block.

The RM Destination MUST include this element in any TerminateSequenceResponse message it sends. The RM Destination MUST set the value of this element to the absolute URI (conformant with RFC3986) of the Sequence that is being terminated.

This is an extensibility mechanism to allow additional attributes, based on schemas, to be added to the element.

This is an extensibility mechanism to allow different (extensible) types of information, based on a schema, to be passed.

This is an extensibility mechanism to allow additional attributes, based on schemas, to be added to the element.

On receipt of a TerminateSequence message an RM Destination MUST respond with a corresponding TerminateSequenceResponse message or generate a fault UnknownSequenceFault if the Sequence is not known.

### 3.4 Sequences

The RM protocol uses a Sequence header block to track and manage the reliable transfer of messages. The RM Source MUST include a Sequence header block in all messages for which reliable transfer is REQUIRED. The RM Source MUST identify Sequences with unique Identifier elements and the RM Source MUST assign each message within a Sequence a MessageNumber element that increments by 1 from an initial value of 1. These values are contained within a Sequence header block accompanying each message being transferred in the context of a Sequence.

The RM Source MUST NOT include more than one Sequence header block in any message.
A following exemplar defines its syntax:

```xml
<wsrm:Sequence ...>
  <wsrm:Identifier ...> xs:anyURI </wsrm:Identifier>
  <wsrm:MessageNumber> wsrm:MessageNumberType </wsrm:MessageNumber>
  ...
</wsrm:Sequence>
```

The following describes the content model of the Sequence header block.

/wsrm:Sequence
This protocol element associates the message in which it is contained with a previously established RM Sequence. It contains the Sequence's unique identifier and the containing message's ordinal position within that Sequence. The RM Destination MUST understand the Sequence header block. The RM Source MUST assign a `mustUnderstand` attribute with a value `1/true` (from the namespace corresponding to the version of SOAP to which the Sequence SOAP header block is bound) to the Sequence header block element.

/wsrm:Sequence/wsrm:Identifier
An RM Source that includes a Sequence header block in a SOAP envelope MUST include this element in that header block. The RM Source MUST set the value of this element to the absolute URI (conformant with RFC3986) that uniquely identifies the Sequence.

/wsrm:Sequence/wsrm:Identifier/@{any}
This is an extensibility mechanism to allow additional attributes, based on schemas, to be added to the element.

/wsrm:Sequence/wsrm:MessageNumber
The RM Source MUST include this element within any Sequence headers it creates. This element is of type `MessageNumberType`. It represents the ordinal position of the message within a Sequence. Sequence message numbers start at 1 and monotonically increase by 1 throughout the Sequence. See Section 4.5 for Message Number Rollover fault.

/wsrm:Sequence/{any}
This is an extensibility mechanism to allow different types of information, based on a schema, to be passed.

/wsrm:Sequence/@{any}
This is an extensibility mechanism to allow additional attributes, based on schemas, to be added to the element.

The following example illustrates a Sequence header block.

```xml
<wsrm:Sequence>
  <wsrm:Identifier>http://example.com/abc</wsrm:Identifier>
  <wsrm:MessageNumber>10</wsrm:MessageNumber>
</wsrm:Sequence>
```

### 3.5 Request Acknowledgement

The purpose of the `AckRequested` header block is to signal to the RM Destination that the RM Source is requesting that a `SequenceAcknowledgement` be sent.

The RM Source MAY request an acknowledgement message from the RM Destination at any time by including an `AckRequested` header block in any message targeted to the RM Destination. An RM
Destination that receives a message that contains an AckRequested header block MUST send a message containing a SequenceAcknowledgement header block to the AcksTo endpoint reference (see Section 3.1) for a known Sequence or else generate an UnknownSequence fault. If a non-mustUnderstand fault occurs when processing an RM header that was piggy-backed on another message, a fault MUST be generated, but the processing of the original message MUST NOT be affected. It is RECOMMENDED that the RM Destination return a AcknowledgementRange or None element instead of a Nack element (see Section 3.6).

The following exemplar defines its syntax:

```xml
<wsrm:AckRequested ...
  <wsrm:Identifier ...> xs:anyURI </wsrm:Identifier>
...
</wsrm:AckRequested>
```

This element requests an acknowledgement for the identified Sequence.

An RM Source that includes a AckRequested header block in a SOAP envelope MUST include this element in that header block. The RM Source MUST set the value of this element to the absolute URI, (conformant with RFC3986), that uniquely identifies the Sequence to which the request applies.

This is an extensibility mechanism to allow additional attributes, based on schemas, to be added to the element.

This is an extensibility mechanism to allow different (extensible) types of information, based on a schema, to be passed.

This is an extensibility mechanism to allow additional attributes, based on schemas, to be added to the element.

### 3.6 Sequence Acknowledgement

The RM Destination informs the RM Source of successful message receipt using a SequenceAcknowledgement header block. The RM Destination MAY transmit the SequenceAcknowledgement header block independently or it MAY include the SequenceAcknowledgement header block on any message targeted to the AcksTo EPR.

Acknowledgements can be explicitly requested using the AckRequested directive (see Section 3.5). If a non-mustUnderstand fault occurs when processing an RM header that was piggy-backed on another message, a fault MUST be generated, but the processing of the original message MUST NOT be affected.

A RM Destination MAY include a SequenceAcknowledgement header block on any SOAP envelope targeted to the endpoint referenced by the AcksTo EPR.

During creation of a Sequence the RM Source MAY specify the WS-Addressing anonymous IRI as the address of the AcksTo EPR for that Sequence. When the RM Source specifies the WS-Addressing anonymous IRI as the address of the AcksTo EPR, the RM Destination MUST transmit any SequenceAcknowledgement headers for the created Sequence in a SOAP envelope to be transmitted...
on the protocol binding-specific channel. Such a channel is provided by the context of a received message
containing a SOAP envelope that contains a Sequence header block and/or a AckRequested header
block for that same Sequence identifier.

The following exemplar defines its syntax:

```
<wsrm:SequenceAcknowledgement ...>
  <wsrm:Identifier ...> xs:anyURI </wsrm:Identifier>
  [ [ [ <wsrm:AcknowledgementRange ... 
      Upper="wsrm:MessageNumberType"
      Lower="wsrm:MessageNumberType"/> + 
      | <wsrm:None/> ] ]
      <wsrm:Final/> ? ]
  | <wsrm:Nack> wsrm:MessageNumberType </wsrm:Nack> + ]
... 
</wsrm:SequenceAcknowledgement>
```

The following describes the content model of the SequenceAcknowledgement header block.

/wsrm:SequenceAcknowledgement
This element contains the Sequence acknowledgement information.

/wsrm:SequenceAcknowledgement/wsrm:Identifier
An RM Destination that includes a SequenceAcknowledgement header block in a SOAP envelope
MUST include this element in that header block. The RM Destination MUST set the value of this element
to the absolute URI (conformant with RFC3986) that uniquely identifies the Sequence. The RM
Destination MUST NOT include multiple SequenceAcknowledgement header blocks that share the
same value for Identifier within the same SOAP envelope.

/wsrm:SequenceAcknowledgement/wsrm:Identifier/@{any}
This is an extensibility mechanism to allow additional attributes, based on schemas, to be added to the
element.

/wsrm:SequenceAcknowledgement/wsrm:AcknowledgementRange
The RM Destination MAY include one or more instances of this element within a
SequenceAcknowledgement header block. It contains a range of Sequence MessageNumbers
successfully accepted by the RM Destination. The ranges SHOULD NOT overlap. The RM Destination
MUST NOT include this element if a sibling Nack or None element is also present as a child of
SequenceAcknowledgement.

/wsrm:SequenceAcknowledgement/wsrm:AcknowledgementRange/@Upper
The RM Destination MUST set the value of this attribute equal to the message number of the highest
contiguous message in a Sequence range accepted by the RM Destination.

/wsrm:SequenceAcknowledgement/wsrm:AcknowledgementRange/@Lower
The RM Destination MUST set the value of this attribute equal to the message number of the lowest
contiguous message in a Sequence range accepted by the RM Destination.

/wsrm:SequenceAcknowledgement/wsrm:AcknowledgementRange/@{any}
This is an extensibility mechanism to allow additional attributes, based on schemas, to be added to the
element.

/wsrm:SequenceAcknowledgement/wsrm:None
The RM Destination MUST include this element within a SequenceAcknowledgement header block if the RM Destination has not accepted any messages for the specified Sequence. The RM Destination MUST NOT include this element if a sibling AcknowledgementRange or Nack element is also present as a child of the SequenceAcknowledgement.

(wsrm:SequenceAcknowledgement/wsrm:Final)

The RM Destination MAY include this element within a SequenceAcknowledgement header block. This element indicates that the RM Destination is not receiving new messages for the specified Sequence. The RM Source can be assured that the ranges of messages acknowledged by this SequenceAcknowledgement header block will not change in the future. The RM Destination MUST include this element when the Sequence is closed. The RM Destination MUST NOT include this element when sending a Nack; it can only be used when sending AcknowledgementRange elements or a None.

(wsrm:SequenceAcknowledgement/wsrm:Nack)

The RM Destination MAY include this element within a SequenceAcknowledgement header block. If used, the RM Destination MUST set the value of this element to a MessageNumberType representing the MessageNumber of an unreceived message in a Sequence. The RM Destination MUST NOT include a Nack element if a sibling AcknowledgementRange or None element is also present as a child of SequenceAcknowledgement. Upon the receipt of a Nack, an RM Source SHOULD retransmit the message identified by the Nack. The RM Destination MUST NOT issue a SequenceAcknowledgement containing a Nack for a message that it has previously acknowledged within a AcknowledgementRange. The RM Source SHOULD ignore a SequenceAcknowledgement containing a Nack for a message that has previously been acknowledged within a AcknowledgementRange.

(wsrm:SequenceAcknowledgement/{any})

This is an extensibility mechanism to allow different (extensible) types of information, based on a schema, to be passed.

(wsrm:SequenceAcknowledgement/@{any})

This is an extensibility mechanism to allow additional attributes, based on schemas, to be added to the element.

The following examples illustrate SequenceAcknowledgement elements:

- Message numbers 1...10 inclusive in a Sequence have been accepted by the RM Destination.

```
<wsrm:SequenceAcknowledgement>
  <wsrm:Identifier>http://example.com/abc</wsrm:Identifier>
  <wsrm:AcknowledgementRange Upper="10" Lower="1"/>
</wsrm:SequenceAcknowledgement>
```

- Message numbers 1.2, 4..6, and 8..10 inclusive in a Sequence have been accepted by the RM Destination, messages 3 and 7 have not been accepted.

```
<wsrm:SequenceAcknowledgement>
  <wsrm:Identifier>http://example.com/abc</wsrm:Identifier>
  <wsrm:AcknowledgementRange Upper="10" Lower="1"/>
  <wsrm:AcknowledgementRange Upper="6" Lower="4"/>
  <wsrm:AcknowledgementRange Upper="10" Lower="8"/>
</wsrm:SequenceAcknowledgement>
```

- Message number 3 in a Sequence has not been accepted by the RM Destination.

```
<wsrm:SequenceAcknowledgement>
  <wsrm:Identifier>http://example.com/abc</wsrm:Identifier>
</wsrm:SequenceAcknowledgement>
```
3.7 MakeConnection

When an endpoint is not directly addressable (e.g. behind a firewall or not able to allow incoming connections), an anonymous URI in the EPR address property can indicate such an endpoint. The WS-Addressing anonymous URI is one such anonymous URI. This specification defines a URI template (the WS-RM anonymous URI) which may be used to uniquely identify anonymous endpoints.

This URI template in an EPR indicates a protocol-specific back-channel will be established through a mechanism such as MakeConnection, defined below. When using this URI template, "{uuid}" MUST be replaced by a UUID value as defined by RFC4122[UUID]. This UUID value uniquely distinguishes the endpoint. A sending endpoint SHOULD transmit messages at endpoints identified with the URI template using a protocol-specific back-channel, including but not limited to those established with a MakeConnection message. Note, this URI is semantically similar to the WS-Addressing anonymous URI if a protocol-specific back-channel is available.

The MakeConnection is a one-way operation that establishes a contextualized back-channel for the transmission of messages according to matching criteria (defined below). In the non-faulting case, if no matching message is available then no SOAP envelopes will be returned on the back-channel. A common usage will be a client RM Destination sending MakeConnection to a server RM Source for the purpose of receiving asynchronous response messages.

The following exemplar defines the MakeConnection syntax:

```xml
<wsrm:MakeConnection ...>
  <wsrm:Identifier ...> xs:anyURI </wsrm:Identifier> ?
  <wsrm:Address ...> xs:anyURI </wsrm:Address> ?
  ...
</wsrm:MakeConnection>
```

This element allows the sender to create a transport-specific back-channel that can be used to return a message that matches the selection criteria. Endpoints MUST NOT send this element as a header block.

This element specifies the WS-RM Sequence Identifier that establishes the context for the transport-specific back-channel. The Sequence Identifier should be compared with the Sequence Identifiers associated with the messages held by the sending endpoint, and if there is a matching message it will be returned. If this element is omitted from the message then the Address MUST be included in the message.

This is an extensibility mechanism to allow additional attributes, based on schemas, to be added to the element.

This element specifies the URI (wsa:Address) of the initiating endpoint. Endpoints MUST NOT return messages on the transport-specific back-channel unless they have been addressed to this URI. This Address property and a message’s WS-Addressing destination property are considered identical when they are exactly the same character-for-character. Note that URIs which are not identical in this sense may in fact be functionally equivalent. Examples include URI references which differ only in case, or
which are in external entities which have different effective base URIs. If this element is omitted from the
message then the Identifier MUST be included in the message.

/wsrm:MakeConnection/wsrm:Address/@{any}

This is an extensibility mechanism to allow additional attributes, based on schemas, to be added to the
element.

/wsrm:MakeConnection/{any}

This is an extensibility mechanism to allow different (extensible) types of information, based on a schema,
to be passed. This allows fine-tuning of the messages to be returned, additional selection criteria included
here are logically ANDed with the Address and/or Identifier. If an extension is not supported by the
endpoint then it should return a UnsupportedSelection fault.

/wsrm:MakeConnection/@{any}

This is an extensibility mechanism to allow additional attributes, based on schemas, to be added to the
element.

If both Identifier and Address are present, then the endpoint processing the MakeConnection
message MUST insure that any SOAP Envelope flowing on the backchannel MUST be associated with
the given Sequence and MUST be addressed to the given URI.

The management of messages that are awaiting the establishment of a back-channel to their receiving
endpoint is an implementation detail that is outside the scope of this specification. Note, however, that
these messages form a class of asynchronous messages that is not dissimilar from “ordinary"
asynchronous messages that are waiting for the establishment of a connection to their destination
endpoints.

This specification places no constraint on the types of messages that can be returned on the transport-
specific back-channel. As in an asynchronous environment, it is up to the recipient of the
MakeConnection message to decide which messages are appropriate for transmission to any particular
endpoint. However, the endpoint processing the MakeConnection message MUST insure that the
messages match the selection criteria as specified by the child elements of the MakeConnection
element.

3.8 MessagePending

When MakeConnection is used, and a message is returned on the transport-specific back-channel, the
MessagePending header SHOULD be included on the returned message as an indicator whether there
are additional messages waiting to be retrieved using the same selection criteria that was specified in the
MakeConnection element.

The following exemplar defines the MessagePending syntax:

```xml
<wsrm:MessagePending pending="xs:boolean" ...>
  ...
</wsrm:MessagePending>
```

This element indicates whether additional messages are waiting to be retrieved.

/wsrm:MessagePending@pending

This attribute, when set to ‘true’, indicates that there is at least one message waiting to be retrieved. When
this attribute is set to ‘false’ it indicates there are currently no messages waiting to be retrieved.
/wsrm:MessagePending/{any}
This is an extensibility mechanism to allow different (extensible) types of information, based on a schema, to be passed.

/wsrm:MessagePending/@{any}
This is an extensibility mechanism to allow additional attributes, based on schemas, to be added to the element.

The absence of the MessagePending header has no implication as to whether there are additional messages waiting to be retrieved.
4 Faults

Faults for the CreateSequence message exchange are treated as defined in WS-Addressing. Create Sequence Refused is a possible fault reply for this operation. Unknown Sequence is a fault generated by endpoints when messages carrying RM header blocks targeted at unrecognized or terminated Sequences are detected. WSRM Required is a fault generated an RM Destination that requires the use of WS-RM on a received message that did not use the protocol. All other faults in this section relate to known Sequences. RM Destinations that generate Sequence faults SHOULD send those faults to the same [destination] as SequenceAcknowledgement messages.

Entities that generate WS-ReliableMessaging faults MUST include as the [action] property the default fault action IRI defined below. The value from the W3C Recommendation is below for informational purposes:

http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-rx/wsrn/200604/fault

The faults defined in this section are generated if the condition stated in the preamble is met. Fault handling rules are defined in section 6 of WS-Addressing SOAP Binding.

The definitions of faults use the following properties:

[Code] The fault code.

[Subcode] The fault subcode.


[Detail] The detail element(s). If absent, no detail element is defined for the fault. If more than one detail element is defined for a fault, implementations MUST include the elements in the order that they are specified.

Entities that generate WS-ReliableMessaging faults MUST set the [Code] property to either "Sender" or "Receiver". These properties are serialized into text XML as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOAP Version</th>
<th>Sender</th>
<th>Receiver</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SOAP 1.1</td>
<td>S11:Client</td>
<td>S11:Server</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOAP 1.2</td>
<td>S:Sender</td>
<td>S:Receiver</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The properties above bind to a SOAP 1.2 fault as follows:

```xml
<S:Envelope>
  <S:Header>
    <wsa:Action>
      http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-rx/wsrn/200604/fault
    </wsa:Action>
    <!-- Headers elided for clarity. -->
  </S:Header>
  <S:Body>
    <S:Fault>
      <S:Code>
        <S:Value> [Code] </S:Value>
        <S:Subcode>
          <S:Value> [Subcode] </S:Value>
        </S:Subcode>
      </S:Code>
      <S:Reason>
        <S:Text xml:lang="en"> [Reason] </S:Text>
      </S:Reason>
      <S:Detail>
        [Detail]
      </S:Detail>
    </S:Fault>
  </S:Body>
</S:Envelope>
```
The properties above bind to a SOAP 1.1 fault as follows when the fault is triggered by processing an RM header block:

```
</S11:Envelope>
</S11:Body>
</S11:Fault>
</S11:Header>
</wsrm:SequenceFault>
</wsrm:Detail> ...
</wsrm:SequenceFault>
<!-- Headers elided for clarity. -->
</S11:Header>
</S11:Body>
</S11:Envelope>
```

The properties bind to a SOAP 1.1 fault as follows when the fault is generated as a result of processing a CreateSequence request message:

```
</S11:Envelope>
</S11:Body>
</S11:Fault>
</S11:Header>
</S11:Fault>
</S11:Body>
</S11:Envelope>
```

### 4.1 SequenceFault Element

The purpose of the `SequenceFault` element is to carry the specific details of a fault generated during the reliable messaging specific processing of a message belonging to a Sequence. WS-ReliableMessaging nodes MUST use the `SequenceFault` container only in conjunction with the SOAP 1.1 fault mechanism. WS-ReliableMessaging nodes MUST NOT use the `SequenceFault` container in conjunction with the SOAP 1.2 binding.

The following exemplar defines its syntax:

```
<wsrm:SequenceFault ...>
<wsrm:Detail> ... </wsrm:Detail> ?
...
</wsrm:SequenceFault>
```

The following describes the content model of the `SequenceFault` element.

**/wsrm:SequenceFault**

This is the element containing Sequence information for WS-ReliableMessaging

**/wsrm:SequenceFault/wsrm:FaultCode**

WS-ReliableMessaging nodes that generate a `SequenceFault` MUST set the value of this element to a qualified name from the set of fault [Subcodes] defined below.
This element, if present, carries application specific error information related to the fault being described.

The application specific error information related to the fault being described.

This is an extensibility mechanism to allow additional attributes, based on schemas, to be added to the element.

### 4.2 Sequence Terminated

The endpoint that generates this fault SHOULD make every reasonable effort to notify the corresponding endpoint of this decision.

Properties:

- [Code] Sender or Receiver
- [Subcode] wsrm:SequenceTerminated
- [Reason] The Sequence has been terminated due to an unrecoverable error.
- [Detail]

```xml
<wsrm:Identifier ...> xs:anyURI </wsrm:Identifier>
```

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Generated by</th>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Action Upon Generation</th>
<th>Action Upon Receipt</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RM Source or RM Destination.</td>
<td>Encountering an unrecoverable condition or detection of violation of the protocol.</td>
<td>Sequence termination.</td>
<td>MUST terminate the Sequence if not otherwise terminated.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 4.3 Unknown Sequence

Properties:

- [Code] Sender
- [Subcode] wsrm:UnknownSequence
- [Reason] The value of wsrm:Identifier is not a known Sequence identifier.
- [Detail]

```xml
<wsrm:Identifier ...> xs:anyURI </wsrm:Identifier>
```
### 4.4 Invalid Acknowledgement

An example of when this fault is generated is when a message is received by the RM Source containing a `SequenceAcknowledgement` covering messages that have not been sent.

- **[Code]** Sender
- **[Subcode]** wsrm:InvalidAcknowledgement
- **[Reason]** The `SequenceAcknowledgement` violates the cumulative acknowledgement invariant.
- **[Detail]**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Generated by</th>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Action Upon Generation</th>
<th>Action Upon Receipt</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RM Source or RM Destination.</td>
<td>In response to a message containing an unknown or terminated Sequence identifier.</td>
<td>None.</td>
<td>MUST terminate the Sequence if not otherwise terminated.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

```xml
<wsrm:SequenceAcknowledgement ...> ... </wsrm:SequenceAcknowledgement>
```

### 4.5 Message Number Rollover

If the condition listed below is reached, the RM Destination MUST generate this fault.

- **Properties:**
- **[Code]** Sender
- **[Subcode]** wsrm:MessageNumberRollover
- **[Reason]** The maximum value for wsrm:MessageNumber has been exceeded.
- **[Detail]**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Generated by</th>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Action Upon Generation</th>
<th>Action Upon Receipt</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RM Source.</td>
<td>In response to a <code>SequenceAcknowledgement</code> that violates the invariants stated in 2.3 or any of the requirements in 3.6 about valid combinations of AckRange, Nack and None in a single <code>SequenceAcknowledgement</code> element or with respect to already received such elements.</td>
<td>Unspecified.</td>
<td>Unspecified.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

```xml
<wsrm:Identifier ...> xs:anyURI </wsrm:Identifier>
<wsr:MaxMessageNumber> wsr:MessageNumberType </wsrm:MaxMessageNumber>
```
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Generated by</th>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Action Upon Generation</th>
<th>Action Upon Receipt</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RM Destination.</td>
<td>Message number in /wsrm:Sequence/wsrm:MessageNumber of a received message exceeds the internal limitations of an RM Destination or reaches the maximum value of 9,223,372,036,854,775,807.</td>
<td>RM Destination SHOULD continue to accept undelivered messages until the Sequence is closed or terminated.</td>
<td>RM Source SHOULD continue to retransmit undelivered messages until the Sequence is closed or terminated. The RM Source MUST NOT send any new messages.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 4.6 Create Sequence Refused

#### Properties:

[Code] Sender

[Subcode] wsrm:CreateSequenceRefused

[Reason] The create Sequence request has been refused by the RM Destination.

[Detail]

```
<xs:any/>
```

### 4.7 Sequence Closed

This fault is generated by an RM Destination to indicate that the specified Sequence has been closed.

This fault MUST be generated when an RM Destination is asked to accept a message for a Sequence that is closed or when an RM Destination is asked to close a Sequence that is already closed.

#### Properties:

[Code] Sender

[Subcode] wsrm:SequenceClosed

[Reason] The Sequence is closed and can not accept new messages.

[Detail]

```
<wsrm:Identifier...> xs:anyURI </wsrm:Identifier>
```
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Generated by</th>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Action Upon Generation</th>
<th>Action Upon Receipt</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RM Destination.</td>
<td>In response to a message that belongs to a Sequence that is already closed.</td>
<td>Unspecified.</td>
<td>Sequence closed.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 4.8 WSRM Required

If an RM Destination requires the use of WS-RM, this fault is generated when it receives an incoming message that did not use this protocol.

**Properties:**

- [Code] Sender
- [Subcode] wsrm:WSRMRequired
- [Reason] The RM Destination requires the use of WSRM.
- [Detail] `xs:any`

### 4.9 Unsupported Selection

The QName of the unsupported element(s) are included in the detail.

**Properties:**

- [Code] Receiver
- [Subcode] wsrm:UnsupportedSelection
- [Reason] The extension element used in the message selection is not supported by the RM Source
- [Detail] `<wsrm:UnsupportedElement> xs:QName </wsrm:UnsupportedElement> +`
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Generated by</th>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Action Upon Generation</th>
<th>Action Upon Receipt</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RM Source or RM Destination.</td>
<td>In response to a MakeConnection message containing a selection criteria in the extensibility section of the message that is not supported.</td>
<td>Unspecified.</td>
<td>Unspecified.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5 Security Threats and Countermeasures

This specification considers two sets of security requirements, those of the applications that use the WS-RM protocol and those of the protocol itself.

This specification makes no assumptions about the security requirements of the applications that use WS-RM. However, once those requirements have been satisfied within a given operational context, the addition of WS-RM to this operational context should not undermine the fulfillment of those requirements; the use of WS-RM should not create additional attack vectors within an otherwise secure system.

There are many other security concerns that one may need to consider when implementing or using this protocol. The material below should not be considered as a "check list". Implementers and users of this protocol are urged to perform a security analysis to determine their particular threat profile and the appropriate responses to those threats.

Implementers are also advised that there is a core tension between security and reliable messaging that can be problematic if not addressed by implementations; one aspect of security is to prevent message replay but one of the invariants of this protocol is to resend messages until they are acknowledged. Consequently, if the security sub-system processes a message but a failure occurs before the reliable messaging sub-system receives that message, then it is possible (and likely) that the security sub-system will treat subsequent copies as replays and discard them. At the same time, the reliable messaging sub-system will likely continue to expect and even solicit the missing message(s). Care should be taken to avoid and prevent this condition.

5.1 Threats and Countermeasures

The primary security requirement of this protocol is to protect the specified semantics and protocol invariants against various threats. The following sections describe several threats to the integrity and operation of this protocol and provide some general outlines of countermeasures to those threats. Implementers and users of this protocol should keep in mind that all threats are not necessarily applicable to all operational contexts.

5.1.1 Integrity Threats

In general, any mechanism which allows an attacker to alter the information in a Sequence Traffic Message, Sequence Lifecycle Message, or Sequence-related fault, or which allows an attacker to alter the correlation of a RM Protocol Header Block to its intended message represents a threat to the WS-RM protocol.

For example, if an attacker is able to swap Sequence headers on messages in transit between the RM Source and RM Destination then they have undermined the implementation's ability to guarantee the first invariant described in Section 2.3. The result is that there is no way of guaranteeing that messages will be delivered to the Application Destination in the same order that they were sent by the Application Source.

5.1.1.1 Countermeasures

Integrity threats are generally countered via the use of digital signatures some level of the communication protocol stack. Note that, in order to counter header swapping attacks, the signature SHOULD include both the SOAP body and any relevant SOAP headers (e.g. Sequence header). Because some headers (AckRequested, SequenceAcknowledgement) are independent of the body of the SOAP message in which they occur, implementations MUST allow for signatures that cover only these headers.
5.1.2 Resource Consumption Threats

The creation of a Sequence with an RM Destination consumes various resources on the systems used to implement that RM Destination. These resources can include network connections, database tables, message queues, etc. This behavior can be exploited to conduct denial of service attacks against an RM Destination. For example, a simple attack is to repeatedly send CreateSequence messages to an RM Destination. Another attack is to create a Sequence for a service that is known to require in-order message delivery and use this Sequence to send a stream of very large messages to that service, making sure to omit message number “1” from that stream.

5.1.2.1 Countermeasures

There are a number of countermeasures against the described resource consumption threats. The technique advocated by this specification is for the RM Destination to restrict the ability to create a Sequence to a specific set of entities/principals. This reduces the number of potential attackers and, in some cases, allows the identity of any attackers to be determined.

The ability to restrict Sequence creation depends, in turn, upon the RM Destination’s ability identify and authenticate the RM Source that issued the CreateSequence message.

5.1.3 Sequence Spoofing Threats

Sequence spoofing is a class of threats in which the attacker uses knowledge of the Identifier for a particular Sequence to forge Sequence Lifecycle or Traffic Messages. For example the attacker creates a fake TerminateSequence message that references the target Sequence and sends this message to the appropriate RM Destination. Some sequence spoofing attacks also require up-to-date knowledge of the current MessageNumber for their target Sequence.

In general any Sequence Lifecycle Message, RM Protocol Header Block, or sequence-correlated SOAP fault (e.g. InvalidAcknowledgement) can be used by someone with knowledge of the Sequence identifier to attack the Sequence. These attacks are “two-way” in that an attacker may choose to target the RM Source by, for example, inserting a fake SequenceAcknowledgement header into a message that it sends to the AcksTo EPR of an RM Source.

5.1.3.1 Sequence Hijacking

Sequence hijacking is a specific case of a sequence spoofing attack. The attacker attempts to inject Sequence Traffic Messages into an existing Sequence by inserting fake Sequence headers into those messages.

Note that “sequence hijacking” should not be equated with “security session hijacking”. Although a Sequence may be bound to some form of a security session in order to counter the threats described in this section, applications MUST NOT rely on WS-RM-related information to make determinations about the identity of the entity that created a message; applications SHOULD rely only upon information that is established by the security infrastructure to make such determinations. Failure to observe this rule creates, among other problems, a situation in which the absence of WS-RM may deprive an application of the ability to authenticate its peers even though the necessary security processing has taken place.

5.1.3.2 Countermeasures

There are a number of countermeasures against sequence spoofing threats. The technique advocated by this specification is to consider the Sequence to be a shared resource that is jointly owned by the RM
Source that initiated its creation (i.e. that sent the CreateSequence message) and the RM Destination that serves as its terminus (i.e. that sent the CreateSequenceResponse message). To counter sequence spoofing attempts the RM Destination SHOULD ensure that every message or fault that it receives that refers to a particular Sequence originated from the RM Source that jointly owns the referenced Sequence. For its part the RM Source SHOULD ensure that every message or fault that it receives that refers to a particular Sequence originated from the RM Destination that jointly owns the referenced Sequence.

For the RM Destination to be able to identify its sequence peer it MUST be able to identify and authenticate the entity that sent the CreateSequence message. Similarly for the RM Source to identify its sequence peer it MUST be able to identify and authenticate the entity that sent the CreateSequenceResponse message. For either the RM Destination or the RM Source to determine if a message was sent by its sequence peer it MUST be able to identify and authenticate the initiator of that message and, if necessary, correlate this identity with the sequence peer identity established at sequence creation time.

5.2 Security Solutions and Technologies

The security threats described in the previous sections are neither new nor unique. The solutions that have been developed to secure other SOAP-based protocols can be used to secure WS-RM as well. This section maps the facilities provided by common web services security solutions against countermeasures described in the previous sections.

Before continuing this discussion, however, some examination of the underlying requirements of the previously described countermeasures is necessary. Specifically it should be noted that the technique described in Section 5.1.2.1 has two components. Firstly, the RM Destination identifies and authenticates the issuer of a CreateSequence message. Secondly, the RM Destination to performs an authorization check against this authenticated identity and determines if the RM Source is permitted to create Sequences with the RM Destination. Since the facilities for performing this authorization check (runtime infrastructure, policy frameworks, etc.) lie completely within the domain of individual implementations, any discussion of such facilities is considered to be beyond the scope of this specification.

5.2.1 Transport Layer Security

This section describes how the facilities provided by SSL/TLS [RFC 4346] can be used to implement the countermeasures described in the previous sections. The use of SSL/TLS is subject to the constraints defined in Section 4 of the Basic Security Profile 1.0 [BSP 1.0].

The description provided here is general in nature and is not intended to serve as a complete definition on the use of SSL/TLS to protect WS-RM. In order to interoperate implementations need to agree on the choice of features as well as the manner in which they will be used. The mechanisms described in the Web Services Security Policy Language [SecurityPolicy] MAY be used by services to describe the requirements and constraints of the use of SSL/TLS.

5.2.1.1 Model

The basic model for using SSL/TLS is as follows:

1. The RM Source establishes an SSL/TLS session with the RM Destination.
2. The RM Source uses this SSL/TLS session to send a CreateSequence message to the RM Destination.
3. The RM Destination establishes an SSL/TLS session with the RM Source and sends an asynchronous CreateSequenceResponse using this session. Alternately it may respond with a synchronous CreateSequenceResponse using the session established in (1).

4. For the lifetime of the Sequence the RM Source uses the SSL/TLS session from (1) to transmit any and all messages or faults that refer to that Sequence.

5. For the lifetime of the Sequence the RM Destination either uses the SSL/TLS session established in (3) to transmit any and all messages or faults that refer to that Sequence or, for synchronous exchanges, the RM Destination uses the SSL/TLS session established in (1).

5.2.1.2 Countermeasure Implementation

Used in its simplest fashion (without relying upon any authentication mechanisms), SSL/TLS provides the necessary integrity qualities to counter the threats described in Section 5.1.1. Note, however, that the nature of SSL/TLS limits the scope of this integrity protection to a single transport level session. If SSL/TLS is the only mechanism used to provide integrity, any intermediaries between the RM Source and the RM Destination MUST be trusted to preserve the integrity of the messages that flow through them.

As noted, the technique described in Sections 5.1.2.1 involves the use of authentication. This specification advocates either of two mechanisms for authenticating entities using SSL/TLS. In both of these methods the SSL/TLS server (the party accepting the SSL/TLS connection) authenticates itself to the SSL/TLS client using an X.509 certificate that is exchanged during the SSL/TLS handshake.

- **HTTP Basic Authentication**: This method of authentication presupposes that a SOAP/HTTP binding is being used as part of the protocol stack beneath WS-RM. Subsequent to the establishment of the the SSL/TLS session, the sending party authenticates itself to the receiving party using HTTP Basic Authentication [RFC 2617]. For example, a RM Source might authenticate itself to a RM Destination (e.g. when transmitting a Sequence Traffic Message) using BasicAuth. Similarly the RM Destination might authenticate itself to the RM Source (e.g. when sending an acknowledgement) using BasicAuth.

- **SSL/TLS Client Authentication**: In this method of authentication, the party initiating the connection authenticates itself to the party accepting the connection using an X.509 certificate that is exchanged during the SSL/TLS handshake.

To implement the countermeasures described in section 5.1.2.1 the RM Source must authenticate itself using one the above mechanisms. The authenticated identity can then be used to determine if the RM Source is authorized to create a Sequence with the RM Destination.

This specification advocates implementing the countermeasures described in section 5.1.3.2 by requiring an RM node's Sequence peer to be equivalent to their SSL/TLS session peer. This allows the authorization decisions described in section 5.1.3.2 to be based on SSL/TLS session identity rather than on authentication information. For example, an RM Destination can determine that a Sequence Traffic Message rightfully belongs to its referenced Sequence if that message arrived over the same SSL/TLS session that was used to carry the CreateSequence message for that Sequence. Note that requiring a one-to-one relationship between SSL/TLS session peer and Sequence peer constrains the lifetime of a SSL/TLS-protected Sequence to be less than or equal to the lifetime of the SSL/TLS session that is used to protect that Sequence.

This specification does not preclude the use of other methods of using SSL/TLS to implement the countermeasures (such as associating specific authentication information with a Sequence) although such methods are not covered by this document.
1189 Issues specific to the life-cycle management of SSL/TLS sessions (such as the resumption of a SSL/TLS
1190 session) are outside the scope of this specification.

1191 5.2.2 SOAP Message Security

1192 The mechanisms described in WS-Security may be used in various ways to implement the
1193 countermeasures described in the previous sections. This specification advocates using the protocol
1194 described by WS-SecureConversation [WS-SecureConversation] (optionally in conjunction with WS-Trust
1195 [Trust]) as a mechanism for protecting Sequences. The use of WS-Security (as an underlying component
1196 of WS-SecureConversation) is subject to the constraints defined in the Basic Security Profile 1.0.

1197 The description provided here is general in nature and is not intended to serve as a complete definition on
1198 the use of WS-SecureConversation/WS-Trust to protect WS-RM. In order to interoperate implementations
1199 need to agree on the choice of features as well as the manner in which they will be used. The
1200 mechanisms described in the Web Services Security Policy Language MAY be used by services to
1201 describe the requirements and constraints of the use of WS-SecureConversation.

1202 5.2.2.1 Model

1203 The basic model for using WS-SecureConversation is as follows:

1204 1. The RM Source and the RM Destination create a WS-SecureConversation security context. This
1205 may involve the participation of third parties such as a security token service. The tokens
1206 exchanged may contain authentication claims (e.g. X.509 certificates or Kerberos service tickets).
1207 2. During the CreateSequence exchange, the RM Source SHOULD explicitly identify the security
1208 context that will be used to protect the Sequence. This is done so that, in cases where the
1209 CreateSequence message is signed by more than one security context, the RM Source can
1210 indicate which security context should be used to protect the newly created Sequence.
1211 3. For the lifetime of the Sequence the RM Source and the RM Destination use the session key(s)
1212 associated with the security context to sign (as defined by WS-Security) at least the body and any
1213 relevant WS-RM-defined headers of any and all messages or faults that refer to that Sequence.

1214 5.2.2.2 Countermeasure Implementation

1215 Without relying upon any authentication information, the per-message signatures provide the necessary
1216 integrity qualities to counter the threats described in Section 5.1.1.

1217 To implement the countermeasures described in section 5.1.2.1 some mutually agreed upon form of
1218 authentication claims must be provided by the RM Source to the RM Destination during the establishment
1219 of the Security Context. These claims can then be used to determine if the RM Source is authorized to
1220 create a Sequence with the RM Destination.

1221 This specification advocates implementing the countermeasures described in section 5.1.3.2 by requiring
1222 an RM node’s Sequence peer to be equivalent to their security context session peer. This allows the
1223 authorization decisions described in section 5.1.3.2 to be based on the identity of the message’s security
1224 context rather than on any authentication claims that may have been established during security context
1225 initiation. Note that other methods of using WS-SecurityConversation to implement the countermeasures
1226 (such as associating specific authentication claims to a Sequence) are possible but not covered by this
1227 document.

1228 As with transport security, the requisite equivalence of a security context peer and with a Sequence peer
1229 limits the lifetime of a Sequence to the lifetime of the protecting security context. Unlike transport security,
the association between a Sequence and its protecting security context cannot always be established
implicitly at Sequence creation time. This is due to the fact that the CreateSequence and
CreateSequenceResponse messages may be signed by more than one security context.

Issues specific to the life-cycle management of WS-SecurityConversation security contexts (such as
amending or renewing contexts) are outside the scope of this specification.
6 Securing Sequences

As noted in Section 5, the RM Source and RM Destination should be able to protect their shared Sequences against the threat of Sequence Spoofing attacks. There are a number of OPTIONAL means of achieving this objective depending upon the underlying security infrastructure.

6.1 Securing Sequences Using WS-Security

One mechanism for protecting a Sequence is to include a security token using a \texttt{wsse:SecurityTokenReference} element from WS-Security (see section 9 in WS-SecureConversation) in the \texttt{CreateSequence} element. This establishes an association between the created (and, if present, offered) Sequence(s) and the referenced security token, such that the RM Source and Destination MUST use the security token as the basis for authorization of all subsequent interactions related to the Sequence(s). The \texttt{wsse:SecurityTokenReference} explicitly identifies the token as there may be more than one token on a \texttt{CreateSequence} message or inferred from the communication context (e.g. transport protection).

It is RECOMMENDED that a message independent referencing mechanism be used to identify the token, if the token being referenced supports such mechanism.

The following exemplar defines the \texttt{CreateSequence} syntax when extended to include a \texttt{wsse:SecurityTokenReference}:

\begin{verbatim}
<wsrm:CreateSequence ...
  <wsrm:AcksTo ...> wsa:EndpointReferenceType </wsrm:AcksTo>
  <wsrm:Expires ...> xs:duration </wsrm:Expires> ?
  <wsrm:Offer ...
    <wsrm:Identifier ...> xs:anyURI </wsrm:Identifier>
    <wsrm:Expires ...> xs:duration </wsrm:Expires> ?
    ...
  </wsrm:Offer> ?
...</n
<wsse:SecurityTokenReference>
  ...
</wsse:SecurityTokenReference> ?
...
</wsrm:CreateSequence>
\end{verbatim}

This element uses the extensibility mechanism defined for the \texttt{CreateSequence} element (defined in section 3.1) to communicate an explicit reference to the security token, using a \texttt{wsse:SecurityTokenReference} as documented in WS-Security [WSSecurity], that the RM Source and Destination MUST use to authorize messages for the created (and, if present, the offered) Sequence(s). All subsequent messages related to the created (and, if present, the offered) Sequence(s) MUST demonstrate proof-of-rights to the referenced key (e.g., using the key or deriving from the key).

When a RM Source transmits a \texttt{CreateSequence} that has been extended to include a \texttt{wsse:SecurityTokenReference} it SHOULD ensure that the RM Destination both understands and will conform with the requirements listed above. In order to achieve this, the RM Source SHOULD include the \texttt{UsesSequenceSTR} element as a SOAP header block within the \texttt{CreateSequence} message. This element MUST include a \texttt{soap:mustUnderstand} attribute with a value of 'true'. Thus the RM Source can be assured that a RM Destination that responds with a \texttt{CreateSequenceResponse} understands and conforms with the requirements listed above. Note that an RM Destination understanding this header does not mean that it has processed and understood any WS-Security headers, the fault behavior defined in WS-Security still applies.
The following exemplar defines the `UsesSequenceSTR` syntax:

```xml
<wsrm:UsesSequenceSTR ... />
```

This element SHOULD be included as a SOAP header block in `CreateSequence` messages that use the extensibility mechanism described above in this section. The `soap:mustUnderstand` attribute value MUST be 'true'. The receiving RM Destination MUST understand and correctly implement the extension described above or else generate a `soap:MustUnderstand` fault, thus aborting the requested Sequence creation.

The following is an example of a `CreateSequence` message using the `wsse:SecurityTokenReference` extension and the `UsesSequenceSTR` header block:

```xml
<soap:Envelope ...>
  <soap:Header>
    ...
    <wsrm:UsesSequenceSTR soap:mustUnderstand='true'/>
    ...
  </soap:Header>
  <soap:Body>
    <wsrm:CreateSequence>
      <wsrm:AcksTo>
      </wsrm:AcksTo>
    </wsrm:CreateSequence>
    <wsse:SecurityTokenReference>
      ...
    </wsse:SecurityTokenReference>
  </soap:Body>
</soap:Envelope>
```

### 6.2 Securing Sequences Using SSL/TLS

One mechanism for protecting a Sequence is to bind the Sequence to the underlying SSL/TLS session(s).

The RM Source indicates to the RM Destination that a Sequence is to be bound to the underlying SSL/TLS session(s) via the `UsesSequenceSSL` header block. If the RM Source wishes to bind a Sequence to the underlying SSL/TLS sessions(s) it MUST include the `UsesSequenceSSL` element as a SOAP header block within the `CreateSequence` message.

The following exemplar defines the `UsesSequenceSSL` syntax:

```xml
<wsrm:UsesSequenceSSL soap:mustUnderstand="true" ... />
```

The RM Source MAY include this element as a SOAP header block of a `CreateSequence` message to indicate to the RM Destination that the resulting Sequence is to be bound to the SSL/TLS session that was used to carry the `CreateSequence` message. If included, the RM Source MUST mark this header with a `soap:mustUnderstand` attribute with a value of 'true'. The receiving RM Destination MUST understand and correctly implement the functionality described in Section 5.2.1 or else generate a `soap:MustUnderstand` fault, thus aborting the requested Sequence creation.

Note that the use inclusion of the above header by the RM Source implies that all Sequence-related information (Sequence Lifecycle or Acknowledgment messages or Sequence-related faults) flowing from the RM Destination to the RM Source will be bound to the SSL/TLS session that is used to carry the `CreateSequenceResponse` message.
7 References

7.1 Normative

[KEYWORDS]
S. Bradner, "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels," RFC 2119, Harvard University, March 1997

[SOAP 1.1]

[SOAP 1.2]

[URI]

[UUID]
P. Leach, M. Mealling, R. Salz, "A Universally Unique IDentifier (UUID) URN Namespace," RFC 4122, Microsoft, Refactored Networks - LLC, DataPower Technology Inc, July 2005

[XML]

[XML-ns]

[XML-Schema Part1]

[XML-Schema Part2]

[XPath 1.0]

[WSDL 1.1]
W3C Note, "Web Services Description Language (WSDL 1.1)," 15 March 2001.

[WS-Addressing]

7.2 Non-Normative

[BSP 1.0]

[RRDDL 2.0]
Johnathan Borden, Tim Bray, eds. “Resource Directory Description Language (RDDL) 2.0,” January 2004

[RFC 2617]


[RFC 4346]


[WS-Policy]

W3C Member Submission, "Web Services Policy Framework (WS-Policy)," April 2006.

[WS-PolicyAttachment]


[WS-Security]


[RTTM]


[SecurityPolicy]


[SecureConversation]


[Trust]

A. Schema

The normative schema that is defined for WS-ReliableMessaging using [XML-Schema Part1] and [XML-Schema Part2] is located at:

http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-rx/wsrm/200604/wsrm-1.1-schema-200604.xsd

The following copy is provided for reference.
<xs:schema xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
xmlns:wsa="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing"
xmlns:wsrm="http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-rx/wsrm/200604"
targetNamespace="http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-rx/wsrm/200604"
elementFormDefault="qualified" attributeFormDefault="unqualified">
    <xs:import namespace="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing"
schemaLocation="http://www.w3.org/2006/03/addressing/ws-addr.xsd"/>

    <!-- Protocol Elements -->
    <xs:complexType name="SequenceType">
        <xs:sequence>
            <xs:element ref="wsrm:Identifier"/>
            <xs:element name="MessageNumber" type="wsrm:MessageNumberType"/>
            <xs:any namespace="##other" processContents="lax" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
        </xs:sequence>
    </xs:complexType>

    <xs:element name="Sequence" type="wsrm:SequenceType"/>
    <xs:element name="SequenceAcknowledgement">
        <xs:complexType>
            <xs:sequence>
                <xs:element ref="wsrm:Identifier"/>
                <xs:choice>
                    <xs:sequence>
                        <xs:choice>
                            <xs:element name="AcknowledgementRange" maxOccurs="unbounded">
                                <xs:complexType>
                                    <xs:sequence>
                                        <xs:element name="AcknowledgementRange">
                                            <xs:complexType>
                                                <xs:sequence>
                                                    <xs:element ref="wsrm:Identifier"/>
                                                    <xs:choice>
                                                        <xs:choice>
                                                            <xs:element name="AcknowledgementRange" maxOccurs="unbounded">
                                                                <xs:complexType>
                                                                    <xs:sequence>
                                                                        <xs:element name="AcknowledgementRange">
                                                                            <xs:complexType>
                                                                                <!-- Protocol Elements -->
                                                                            </xs:complexType>
                                                                        </xs:element>
                                                                    </xs:sequence>
                                                                </xs:complexType>
                                                            </xs:choice>
                                                        </xs:choice>
                                                    </xs:sequence>
                                                </xs:complexType>
                                            </xs:sequence>
                                        </xs:element>
                                    </xs:sequence>
                                </xs:complexType>
                            </xs:element>
                        </xs:choice>
                    </xs:sequence>
                </xs:choice>
            </xs:sequence>
        </xs:complexType>
    </xs:element>
</xs:schema>
<xs:sequence/>
<xs:attribute name="Upper" type="xs:unsignedLong" use="required"/>
<xs:attribute name="Lower" type="xs:unsignedLong" use="required"/>
<xs:anyAttribute namespace="##other" processContents="lax"/>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="None">
<xs:complexType>
<xs:sequence/>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
</xs:choice>
<xs:element name="Final" minOccurs="0">
<xs:complexType>
<xs:sequence/>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
</xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="Nack" type="xs:unsignedLong" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</xs:choice>
<xs:element name="AckRequested" type="wsrm:AckRequestedType"/>
<xs:complexType name="MessagePendingType">
<xs:sequence>
<xs:any namespace="##other" processContents="lax" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
<xs:attribute name="pending" type="xs:boolean"/>
<xs:anyAttribute namespace="##other" processContents="lax"/>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="Identifier">
<xs:complexType>
<xs:annotation>
<xs:documentation>
This type is for elements whose [children] is an anyURI and can have
arbitrary attributes.
</xs:documentation>
</xs:annotation>
<xs:simpleContent>
<xs:extension base="xs:anyURI">
<xs:anyAttribute namespace="##other" processContents="lax"/>
</xs:extension>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="Address"/>
<xs:complexType>
  <xs:extension base="wsrm:Identifier">
    <xs:attribute name="wsrm:Version" type="xs:string"/>
    <xs:attribute name="wsrm:Vendor" type="xs:string"/>
  </xs:extension>
</xs:complexType>

<xs:element name="SequenceFault" type="wsrm:SequenceFaultType"/>
<xs:element name="CreateSequence" type="wsrm:CreateSequenceType"/>
<xs:element name="CreateSequenceResponse" type="wsrm:CreateSequenceResponseType"/>
<xs:element name="CloseSequence" type="wsrm:CloseSequenceType"/>
<xs:element name="CloseSequenceResponse" type="wsrm:CloseSequenceResponseType"/>
<xs:element name="TerminateSequence" type="wsrm:TerminateSequenceType"/>
<xs:element name="TerminateSequenceResponse" type="wsrm:TerminateSequenceResponseType"/>
<xs:complexType name="CreateSequenceType">
  <xs:sequence>
    <xs:element ref="wsrm:AcksTo" />
    <xs:element ref="wsrm:Expires" minOccurs="0" />
    <xs:element name="Offer" type="wsrm:OfferType" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded">
      <xs:annotation>
        <xs:documentation>
          It is the authors intent that this extensibility be used to transfer a Security Token Reference as defined in WS-Security.
        </xs:documentation>
      </xs:annotation>
      <xs:any namespace="##other" processContents="lax" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded" />
    </xs:sequence>
    <xs:anyAttribute namespace="##other" processContents="lax" />
  </xs:complexType>
</xs:complexType>

<xs:complexType name="CreateSequenceResponseType">
  <xs:sequence>
    <xs:element ref="wsrm:Identifier" />
    <xs:element ref="wsrm:Expires" minOccurs="0" />
    <xs:element name="IncompleteSequenceBehavior" type="wsrm:IncompleteSequenceBehaviorType" minOccurs="0" />
    <xs:element name="Accept" type="wsrm:AcceptType" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded" />
    <xs:sequence>
      <xs:annotation>
        <xs:documentation>
          
        </xs:annotation>
        <xs:any namespace="##other" processContents="lax" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded" />
      </xs:sequence>
    </xs:sequence>
    <xs:anyAttribute namespace="##other" processContents="lax" />
  </xs:complexType>
</xs:complexType>

<xs:complexType name="CloseSequenceType">
  <xs:sequence>
    <xs:element ref="wsrm:Identifier" />
    <xs:any namespace="##other" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded" />
  </xs:sequence>
  <xs:anyAttribute namespace="##other" processContents="lax" />
</xs:complexType>

<xs:complexType name="CloseSequenceResponseType">
  <xs:sequence>
    <xs:element ref="wsrm:Identifier" />
    <xs:any namespace="##other" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded" />
  </xs:sequence>
  <xs:anyAttribute namespace="##other" processContents="lax" />
</xs:complexType>

<xs:complexType name="TerminateSequenceType">
  <xs:sequence>
    <xs:element ref="wsrm:Identifier" />
    <xs:any namespace="##other" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded" />
  </xs:sequence>
  <xs:anyAttribute namespace="##other" processContents="lax" />
</xs:complexType>

<xs:complexType name="TerminateSequenceResponseType">
  <xs:sequence>
    <xs:element ref="wsrm:Identifier" />
    <xs:any namespace="##other" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded" />
  </xs:sequence>
  <xs:anyAttribute namespace="##other" processContents="lax" />
</xs:complexType>

<xs:element name="AcksTo" type="wsa:EndpointReferenceType" />

<xs:complexType name="OfferType" >
</xs:complexType>
<xs:sequence>
  <xs:element ref="wsrm:Identifier"/>
  <xs:element name="Endpoint" type="wsa:EndpointReferenceType"/>
  <xs:element ref="wsrm:Expires" minOccurs="0"/>
  <xs:element name="IncompleteSequenceBehavior" type="wsrm:IncompleteSequenceBehaviorType" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
  <xs:any namespace="##other" processContents="lax" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name="AcceptType">
  <xs:sequence>
    <xs:element ref="wsrm:AcksTo"/>
    <xs:any namespace="##other" processContents="lax" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
  </xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
<xs:element name="Expires">
  <xs:complexType>
    <xs:simpleContent>
      <xs:extension base="xs:duration">
        <xs:any namespace="##other" processContents="lax"/>
      </xs:extension>
    </xs:simpleContent>
  </xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
<xs:simpleType name="IncompleteSequenceBehaviorType">;
  <xs:restriction base="xs:string">
    <xs:enumeration value="DiscardEntireSequence"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="DiscardFollowingFirstGap"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="NoDiscard"/>
  </xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
<xs:element name="UsesSequenceSTR">
  <xs:sequence/>
  <xs:anyAttribute namespace="##other" processContents="lax"/>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="UsesSequenceSSL">
  <xs:sequence/>
  <xs:anyAttribute namespace="##other" processContents="lax"/>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="UnsupportedElement">
  <xs:simpleType>
    <xs:restriction base="xs:QName"/>
  </xs:simpleType>
</xs:element>
</xs:schema>
The normative WSDL 1.1 definition for WS-ReliableMessaging is located at:

http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-rx/wsrm/200604/wsdll/wsrm-1.1-wsdl-200604.wsdl

The following non-normative copy is provided for reference.
<wsdl:definitions xmlns:wsdl="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/wsdl/
xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
xmlns:wsa="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing"
xmlns:rm="http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-rx/wsrm/200604"
xmlns:tns="http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-rx/wsrm/200604/wsdl"
targetNamespace="http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-rx/wsrm/200604/wsdl">

<wSDL:types>
  <xs:schema>
    <xs:import namespace="http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-rx/wsrm/200604"
                 schemaLocation="http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-rx/wsrm/200604/wsdl-1.1-schema-200604.xsd"/>

    <xs:schema>
      <wSDL:message name="CreateSequence">
        <wSDL:part name="create" element="rm:CreateSequence"/>
      </wSDL:message>

      <wSDL:message name="CreateSequenceResponse">
        <wSDL:part name="createResponse" element="rm:CreateSequenceResponse"/>
      </wSDL:message>

      <wSDL:message name="CloseSequence">
        <wSDL:part name="close" element="rm:CloseSequence"/>
      </wSDL:message>

      <wSDL:message name="CloseSequenceResponse">
        <wSDL:part name="closeResponse" element="rm:CloseSequenceResponse"/>
      </wSDL:message>
    </xs:schema>
  </xs:schema>
</wSDL:types>
C. Message Examples

C.1 Create Sequence

Create Sequence

```xml
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<S:Envelope xmlns:S="http://www.w3.org/2003/05/soap-envelope"
xmlns:wsrm="http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-rx/wsrm/200604"
xmlns:wsa="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">
<S:Header>
  <wsa:MessageID>
  http://Business456.com/guid/0baaf88d-483b-4ecf-a6d8-a7c2eb546817
  </wsa:MessageID>
  <wsa:To>http://example.com/serviceB/123</wsa:To>
  <wsa:ReplyTo>
  </wsa:ReplyTo>
</S:Header>
<S:Body>
  <wsrm:CreateSequence>
    <wsrm:AcksTo>
    </wsrm:AcksTo>
  </wsrm:CreateSequence>
</S:Body>
</S:Envelope>
```

Create Sequence Response

```xml
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<S:Envelope xmlns:S="http://www.w3.org/2003/05/soap-envelope"
xmlns:wsrm="http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-rx/wsrm/200604"
xmlns:wsa="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">
<S:Header>
  <wsa:To>http://Business456.com/serviceA/789</wsa:To>
  <wsa:RelatesTo>
    http://Business456.com/guid/0baaf88d-483b-4ecf-a6d8-a7c2eb546817
  </wsa:RelatesTo>
  <wsa:Action>
    http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-rx/wsrm/200604/CreateSequenceResponse
  </wsa:Action>
</S:Header>
<S:Body>
  <wsrm:CreateSequenceResponse>
  </wsrm:CreateSequenceResponse>
</S:Body>
</S:Envelope>
```

C.2 Initial Transmission

The following example WS-ReliableMessaging headers illustrate the message exchange in the above figure. The three messages have the following headers; the third message is identified as the last message in the Sequence:

Message 1
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<S:Envelope xmlns:S="http://www.w3.org/2003/05/soap-envelope"
xmils:wsrm="http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-rx/wsrm/200604"
xmils:wsa="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">
  <S:Header>
    <wsa:MessageID>http://Business456.com/guid/71e0654e-5ce8-477b-bb9d-34f05cfc9e</wsa:MessageID>
    <wsa:To>http://example.com/serviceB/123</wsa:To>
    <wsa:From>
    </wsa:From>
    <wsa:Action>http://example.com/serviceB/123/request</wsa:Action>
    <wsrm:Sequence>
      <wsrm:MessageNumber>1</wsrm:MessageNumber>
    </wsrm:Sequence>
  </S:Header>
  <S:Body/>
</S:Envelope>

Message 2
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<S:Envelope xmlns:S="http://www.w3.org/2003/05/soap-envelope"
xmils:wsrm="http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-rx/wsrm/200604"
xmils:wsa="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">
  <S:Header>
    <wsa:MessageID>http://Business456.com/guid/daa7d0b2-c8e0-476e-a9a4-d164154e38de</wsa:MessageID>
    <wsa:To>http://example.com/serviceB/123</wsa:To>
    <wsa:From>
    </wsa:From>
    <wsa:Action>http://example.com/serviceB/123/request</wsa:Action>
    <wsrm:Sequence>
      <wsrm:MessageNumber>2</wsrm:MessageNumber>
    </wsrm:Sequence>
  </S:Header>
  <S:Body/>
</S:Envelope>

Message 3
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<S:Envelope xmlns:S="http://www.w3.org/2003/05/soap-envelope"
xmils:wsrm="http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-rx/wsrm/200604"
xmils:wsa="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">
  <S:Header>
    <wsa:MessageID>http://Business456.com/guid/0baaf88d-483b-4ecf-a6d8-a7c2eb546819</wsa:MessageID>
    <wsa:To>http://example.com/serviceB/123</wsa:To>
    <wsa:From>
    </wsa:From>
    <wsa:Action>http://example.com/serviceB/123/request</wsa:Action>
    <wsrm:Sequence>
    </wsrm:Sequence>
  </S:Header>
  <S:Body/>
</S:Envelope>
C.3 First Acknowledgement

Message number 2 has not been accepted by the RM Destination due to some transmission error so it responds with an acknowledgement for messages 1 and 3:

```xml
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<S:Envelope xmlns:S="http://www.w3.org/2003/05/soap-envelope"
    xmlns:wsrm="http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-rx/wsrm/200604"
    xmlns:wsa="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">
    <S:Header>
        <wsa:MessageID>http://example.com/guid/0baaf88d-483b-4ecf-a6d8-a7c2eb546810</wsa:MessageID>
        <wsa:To>http://Business456.com/serviceA/789</wsa:To>
        <wsa:From><wsa:Address>http://example.com/serviceB/123</wsa:Address></wsa:From>
        <wsa:Action>http://example.com/serviceB/123/request</wsa:Action>
</S:Envelope>
```

C.4 Retransmission

The RM Sourcediscovers that message number 2 was not accepted so it resends the message and requests an acknowledgement:

```xml
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<S:Envelope xmlns:S="http://www.w3.org/2003/05/soap-envelope"
    xmlns:wsrm="http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-rx/wsrm/200604"
    xmlns:wsa="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">
    <S:Header>
        <wsa:MessageID>http://Business456.com/guid/daa7d0b2-c8e0-476e-a9a4-d164154e38de</wsa:MessageID>
        <wsa:To>http://example.com/serviceB/123</wsa:To>
        <wsa:Action>http://example.com/serviceB/123/request</wsa:Action>
    </S:Header>
</S:Envelope>
```
C.5 Termination

The RM Destination now responds with an acknowledgement for the complete Sequence which can then be terminated:

```xml
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<S:Envelope xmlns:S="http://www.w3.org/2003/05/soap-envelope"
            xmlns:wsrm="http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-rx/wsrm/200604"
            xmlns:wsa="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">
  <S:Header>
    <wsa:MessageID>http://example.com/guid/0baaf88d-483b-4ecf-a6d8-a7c2eb546811</wsa:MessageID>
    <wsa:To>http://Business456.com/serviceA/789</wsa:To>
    <wsa:From><wsa:Address>http://example.com/serviceB/123</wsa:Address></wsa:From>
    <wsrm:SequenceAcknowledgement>
      <wsrm:AcknowledgementRange Upper="3" Lower="1"/>
    </wsrm:SequenceAcknowledgement>
  </S:Header>
  <S:Body/>
</S:Envelope>
```

Terminate Sequence

```xml
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<S:Envelope xmlns:S="http://www.w3.org/2003/05/soap-envelope"
            xmlns:wsrm="http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-rx/wsrm/200604"
            xmlns:wsa="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">
  <S:Header>
    <wsa:MessageID>http://Business456.com/guid/0baaf88d-483b-4ecf-a6d8-a7c2eb546812</wsa:MessageID>
    <wsa:To>http://example.com/serviceB/123</wsa:To>
    <wsrm:TerminateSequence>
    </wsrm:TerminateSequence>
  </S:Header>
  <S:Body/>
</S:Envelope>
```

Terminate Sequence Response
<S:Envelope xmlns:S="http://www.w3.org/2003/05/soap-envelope"
xmlns:wsrm="http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-rx/wsrm/200604"
xmlns:wsa="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">
<S:Header>
<wsa:MessageID>http://Business456.com/guid/0baaf88d-483b-4ecf-a6d8-a7c2eb546813</wsa:MessageID>
<wsa:To>http://example.com/serviceA/789</wsa:To>
<wsa:RelatesTo>http://Business456.com/guid/0baaf88d-483b-4ecf-a6d8-a7c2eb546812</wsa:RelatesTo>
<S:Body>
<wsrm:TerminateSequenceResponse>
</wsrm:TerminateSequenceResponse>
</S:Body>
</S:Envelope>
## D. State Tables

This appendix specifies the non-normative state transition tables for RM Source and RM Destination.

Each cell in the tables in this appendix uses the following convention:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legend</th>
<th>action to take</th>
<th>next state</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Legend</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 2 RM Source State Transition Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Events</th>
<th>States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>Connecting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Create Sequence</td>
<td>Transmit N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecting</td>
<td>Transmit N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Create Sequence Response</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Create Sequence Refused Fault</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Message</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retransmit of unack message</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SeqAck (non-final)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nack</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reached max msg number</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Events</td>
<td>States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Message Number Rollover Fault</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Close Sequence</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Close Sequence Response</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SeqAck (final)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sequence Closed Fault</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown Sequence Fault</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sequence Terminated Fault</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terminate Sequence</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terminate Sequence Response</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elapse Expires duration</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Table 2 above, the rows consists of events that occur at the RM Source throughout the lifetime of an RM Sequence and the columns consists of various RM Source states. Each cell in the table above lists...
the action that the RM Source takes on occurrence of a particular event and the next state that it transitions.

Table 3 RM Destination State Transition Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Events</th>
<th>States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creation request not satisfied</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Message (with message number within range)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ack requested</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Message (with message number outside of range)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Close Sequence</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Close Sequence itself</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terminate Sequence</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown Sequence Fault</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sequence Terminated Fault</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elapse Expires duration</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In Table 3 above, the rows consist of events that occur at the RM Destination throughout the lifetime of an RM Sequence and the columns consist of various RM Destination states. Each cell in the table above lists the action that the RM Destination takes on occurrence of a particular event and the next state that it transitions.
E. Acknowledgments

This document is based on initial contribution to OASIS WS-RX Technical Committee by the following authors:

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## F. Revision History

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>By Whom</th>
<th>What</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>wd-01</td>
<td>2005-07-07</td>
<td>Christopher Ferris</td>
<td>Initial version created based on submission by the authors.</td>
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<td>ws-02</td>
<td>2005-07-21</td>
<td>Doug Davis</td>
<td>i011 (PT0S) added</td>
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<td>wd-02</td>
<td>2005-08-16</td>
<td>Anish Karmarkar</td>
<td>Trivial editorial changes</td>
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<td>2005-09-15</td>
<td>Doug Davis</td>
<td>i019 and i028 (CloseSeq) added</td>
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<td>2005-09-26</td>
<td>Gilbert Pilz</td>
<td>i005 (Source resend of nacks messages when ack already received) added</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Doug Davis</td>
<td>i027 (InOrder delivery assurance spanning multiple sequences) added</td>
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<td>Doug Davis</td>
<td>i020 (Semantics of &quot;At most once&quot; Delivery Assurance) added</td>
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<td>wd-05</td>
<td>2005-09-27</td>
<td>Doug Davis</td>
<td>i034 (Fault while processing a piggy-backed RM header) added</td>
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<td>2005-09-27</td>
<td>Doug Davis</td>
<td>i033 (Processing model of NACKs) added</td>
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<td>Doug Davis</td>
<td>i031 (AckRequested schema inconsistency) added</td>
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<td>wd-05</td>
<td>2005-09-27</td>
<td>Doug Davis</td>
<td>i025 (SeqAck/None) added</td>
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<tr>
<td>wd-05</td>
<td>2005-09-27</td>
<td>Doug Davis</td>
<td>i029 (Remove dependency on WS-Security) added</td>
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<td>wd-05</td>
<td>2005-09-27</td>
<td>Doug Davis</td>
<td>i039 (What does 'have a mL attribute' mean) added</td>
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<td>wd-05</td>
<td>2005-09-27</td>
<td>Doug Davis</td>
<td>i040 (Change 'optional'/'required' to 'OPTIONAL'/'REQUIRED') added</td>
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<td>wd-05</td>
<td>2005-09-30</td>
<td>Anish Karmarkar</td>
<td>i017 (Change NS to <a href="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wsrn/200510/">http://docs.oasis-open.org/wsrn/200510/</a>)</td>
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<td>wd-05</td>
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<td>Anish Karmarkar</td>
<td>i045 (Include SecureConversation as a reference and move it to non-normative citation)</td>
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<td>Anish Karmarkar</td>
<td>i046 (change the type of wsrn:FaultCode element)</td>
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<td>wd-06</td>
<td>2005-11-02</td>
<td>Gilbert Pilz</td>
<td>Start wd-06 by changing title page from cd-01.</td>
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<td>wd-06</td>
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<td>Gilbert Pilz</td>
<td>i047 (Reorder spec sections)</td>
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<td>Doug Davis</td>
<td>i071 – except for period in Appendix headings</td>
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<td>Fix bulleted list (#2) in section 2.3</td>
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<td>i074 (Use of [tcShortName] in artifact locations namespaces, etc)</td>
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<td>i071 – Fixed styles and formatting for TOC. Fixed styles of the appendix headings.</td>
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<td>Removed dup definition of &quot;Receive&quot;</td>
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<td>Gilbert Pilz</td>
<td>Fixed lost formatting from heading for Namespace section. Fixed style of text body elements to match OASIS example documents. Fixed tables to match OASIS example documents.</td>
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<td>Gilbert Pilz</td>
<td>Updated fix for i074 to eliminate trailing '/. Added corresponding text around action IRI composition.</td>
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<td>Use non-fixed fields for date values on both title page and body footers.</td>
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<td>wd-08</td>
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<td>Add back in RM Source to glossary</td>
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<td>Steve Winkler</td>
<td>Doug added Steve's editorial nits</td>
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<td>i076 – didn't add text about &quot;replies&quot; since the RMD to RMS sequence could be used for any message not just replies</td>
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<td>wd-08</td>
<td>2005-12-27</td>
<td>Gilbert Pilz</td>
<td>Moved schema and WSDL files to their own artifacts. Converted source document to OpenDocument Text format. Changed line numbers to be a single style.</td>
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<td>wd-08</td>
<td>2005-12-28</td>
<td>Anish Karmarkar</td>
<td>Included a section link to c:\temp\wsrm-1.1-schema-200510.xsd and to c:\temp\wsrm-1.1-wsdl-200510.wsdl</td>
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<td>wd-08</td>
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<td>Fixed formatting for included sections.</td>
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<td>Gilbert Pilz</td>
<td>Created links for unused references. Fixed exemplars for CloseSequence and CloseSequenceResponse.</td>
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<td>wd-09</td>
<td>2006-01-11</td>
<td>Doug Davis</td>
<td>Minor tweaks to text/typos.</td>
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<td>wd-10</td>
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<td>Doug Davis</td>
<td>Accept all changes from wd-09 Make some minor editorial tweaks from Marc's comments.</td>
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<td>Issue 095 resolution</td>
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<td>wd-10</td>
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<td>Gilbert Pilz</td>
<td>Issue 088 – added namespace URI link to namespace URI; added text explaining that this URI could be dereferenced to produce the RDDL doc; added non-normative reference to RDDL 2.0</td>
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<td>Anish Karmarkar</td>
<td>Namespace changed to 200602 for both WSDL and XSD docs.</td>
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<td>Anish Karmarkar</td>
<td>Issue i087 as it applies to WSRM spec.</td>
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<td>Anish Karmarkar</td>
<td>Added titles and minor text for state table (issue i058).</td>
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<td>Doug Davis</td>
<td>Accept all changes for new WD Minor typos fixed</td>
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<td>Doug Davis</td>
<td>s/\close/\close/g – per Marc Goodner Added first ref to [URI] – per Marc G again</td>
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<td>Doug Davis</td>
<td>Fixed typo around the use of &quot;above&quot; and &quot;below&quot;</td>
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<td>Added space in &quot;SOAP1.x&quot; – Paul Cotton</td>
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<td>Used &quot;generated&quot; instead of &quot;issue&quot; or &quot;send&quot; when talking about faults.</td>
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<td>Update references to WS-Addressing to the Proposed Recommendations; update WS-RM namespace to “200604”.</td>
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<td>Gilbert Pilz</td>
<td>i093 part 2; reflects decisions from 2006-05-25 meeting</td>
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<td>Accept all changes; bump WD number</td>
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<td>s/&quot;none&quot;/&quot;full-uri&quot;/ - per Marc Goodner</td>
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<td>Accept all changed, dump WD number</td>
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<td>Nits – remove tabs, extra [yy]'s ...</td>
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<td>Remove extra &quot;OPTIONAL&quot;s – Matt Lovett</td>
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<td>Remove blank rows/columns from state table. Fix italics in state table</td>
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<td>Doug Davis</td>
<td>Typo – section D was empty</td>
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