Conformance Requirements for the OASIS Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) V2.0 – Errata Composite

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Editors:

Prateek Mishra, Principal Identity
Rob Philpott, RSA Security
~~Jahan Moreh, Sigaba (errata document editor)~~
Eve Maler, Sun Microsystems (errata ~~composite document~~ editor)

Contributors to the Errata:

Nick Ragouzis, Enosis Group
Thomas Wisniewski, Entrust
Greg Whitehead, HP
Heather Hinton, IBM
Connor P. Cahill, Intel
Scott Cantor, Internet2
Eric Tiffany, Liberty Alliance
Tom Scavo, NCSA/University of Illinois
Jeff Hodges, Neustar
Ari Kermaier, Oracle
Prateek Mishra, Oracle
Brian Campbell, Ping Identity
Jim Lien, RSA Security
Rob Philpott, RSA Security
Jahan Moreh, Sigaba
Emily Xu, Sun Microsystems
David Staggs, Veteran's Health Administration

SAML V2.0 Contributors:

Conor P. Cahill, AOL
John Hughes, Atos Origin
Hal Lockhart, BEA Systems
Michael Beach, Boeing
Rebekah Metz, Booz Allen Hamilton
Rick Randall, Booz Allen Hamilton
Thomas Wisniewski, Entrust
Irving Reid, Hewlett-Packard
Paula Austel, IBM
Maryann Hondo, IBM
Michael McIntosh, IBM

Tony Nadalin, IBM
Nick Ragouzis, Individual
Scott Cantor, Internet2
RL 'Bob' Morgan, Internet2
Peter C Davis, Neustar
Jeff Hodges, Neustar
Frederick Hirsch, Nokia
John Kemp, Nokia
Paul Madsen, NTT
Steve Anderson, OpenNetwork
Prateek Mishra, Principal Identity
John Linn, RSA Security
Rob Philpott, RSA Security
Jahan Moreh, Sigaba
Anne Anderson, Sun Microsystems
Eve Maler, Sun Microsystems
Ron Monzillo, Sun Microsystems
Greg Whitehead, Trustgenix

Abstract:

The SAML V2.0 Conformance specification provides the technical requirements for SAML V2.0 conformance and specifies the entire set of documents comprising SAML V2.0. This document, known as an "errata composite", combines corrections to reported errata with the original specification text. By design, the corrections are limited to clarifications of ambiguous or conflicting specification text. This document shows deletions from the original specification as struck-through text, and additions as ~~blue~~colored underlined text. The "[~~P~~E*nn*]" designations embedded in the text refer to particular errata and their dispositions.

Status:

This errata composite document is a **working draft** based on the original OASIS Standard document that had been produced by the Security Services Technical Committee and approved by the OASIS membership on 1 March 2005. While the errata corrections appearing here are non-normative, they reflect ~~the consensus of the TC about how to interpret the specification and are likely to be incorporated into any future standards track revision of the SAML specifications.~~changes specified by the Approved Errata document (currently at Working Draft revision 02), which is on an OASIS standardization track. In case of any discrepancy between this document and the Approved Errata, the latter has precedence. See also the Errata Working Document (currently at revision 39), which provides background on the changes specified here.

This document includes ~~errata~~ corrections ~~through revision 33 of the~~for errata ~~document, including P~~E11, ~~P~~E25, ~~P~~E28, ~~P~~E29, ~~P~~E42, and ~~P~~E50.

Committee members should submit comments and potential errata to the security-services@lists.oasis-open.org list. Others should submit them by following the instructions at http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/comments/form.php?wg_abbrev=security.

For information on whether any patents have been disclosed that may be essential to implementing this specification, and any offers of patent licensing terms, please refer to the Intellectual Property Rights web page for the Security Services TC (http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/security/ipr.php).

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1 Introduction

This normative specification describes features that are mandatory and optional for implementations claiming conformance to SAML V2.0 and also specifies the entire set of documents comprising SAML V2.0.

1.1 Overview and Specification of SAML V2.0

The SAML V2.0 standard consists of the following documents:

- This specification: Conformance Requirements for the OASIS Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) V2.0
- Assertions and Protocols for the OASIS Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) V2.0 [SAMLCore]
  - SAML assertions schema [SAMLAssn-xsd]
  - SAML protocols schema [SAMLProt-xsd]
- Bindings for the OASIS Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) V2.0 [SAMLBind]
- Profiles for the OASIS Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) V2.0 [SAMLProf]
  - SAML ECP profile schema [SAMLECP-xsd]
  - SAML X.500/LDAP attribute profile schema [SAMLX500-xsd]
  - SAML DCE PAC attribute profile schema [SAMLDCE-xsd]
  - SAML XACML attribute profile schema [SAMLXAC-xsd]
- Metadata for the OASIS Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) V2.0 [SAMLMeta]
- SAML metadata schema [SAMLMeta-xsd]
- Authentication Context for the OASIS Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) V2.0 [SAMLAuthnCxt]
  - SAML authentication context schema [SAMLAC-xsd]
  - SAML authentication context schema types [SAMLACTyp-xsd]
  - SAML context class schema for Internet Protocol [SAMLAC-IP]
  - SAML context class schema for Internet Protocol Password [SAMLAC-IPP]
  - SAML context class schema for Kerberos [SAMLAC-Kerb]
  - SAML context class schema for Mobile One Factor Unregistered [SAMLAC-MOFU]
  - SAML context class schema for Mobile Two Factor Unregistered [SAMLAC-MTFU]
  - SAML context class schema for Mobile One Factor Contract [SAMLAC-MOFC]
  - SAML context class schema for Mobile Two Factor Contract [SAMLAC-MTFC]
  - SAML context class schema for Password [SAMLAC-Pass]
  - SAML context class schema for Password Protected Transport [SAMLAC-PPT]
  - SAML context class schema for Previous Session [SAMLAC-Prev]
  - SAML context class schema for Public Key – X.509 [SAMLAC-X509]
  - SAML context class schema for Public Key – PGP [SAMLAC-PGP]
  - SAML context class schema for Public Key – SPKI [SAMLAC-SPKI]
  - SAML context class schema for Public Key – XML Signature [SAMLAC-XSig]
  - SAML context class schema for Smartcard [SAMLAC-Smart]
  - SAML context class schema for Smartcard PKI [SAMLAC-SmPKI]
  - SAML context class schema for Software PKI [SAMLAC-SwPKI]

- SAML context class schema for Telephony [SAMLAC-Tele]
- SAML context class schema for Telephony (“Nomadic”) [SAMLAC-TNom]
- SAML context class schema for Telephony (Personalized) [SAMLAC-TPers]
- SAML context class schema for Telephony (Authenticated) [SAMLAC-TAuthn]
- SAML context class schema for Secure Remote Password [SAMLAC-SRP]
- SAML context class schema for SSL/TLS Certificate-Based Client Authentication [SAMLAC-SSL]
- SAML context class schema for Time Sync Token [SAMLAC-TST]

- Security and Privacy Considerations for the OASIS Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) V2.0 [SAMLSec]
- Glossary for the OASIS Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) V2.0 [SAMLGloss]

The term “SAML V2.0” or “SAML2” is often used informally to refer to the standard specified by the above documents, or subsets thereof. However, the SAML V2.0 standard should be formally identified in other documents by a normative reference to this document.

Additional non-normative documents, such as a Technical Overview [SAMLTechOvw], are available to provide assistance to developers and others in understanding SAML. These documents are available at the SAML website, http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/security.

SAML V2.0 defines a number of named profiles. Each profile (other than attribute profiles) describes details of selected SAML message flows and can also be viewed as indivisible functionality that could be implemented by a software component. Implementation of a profile involves use of a binding for each message exchange included in the profile. A binding can be viewed as a specific implementation technique for achieving a message exchange.

Section 2 of this document enumerates all of the different profiles defined by [SAMLProfiles]. For each profile, the relevant SAML V2.0 message flows are listed, and for each message flow the set of possible bindings is also described. The combination of profile, message exchange and a selected binding is termed a SAML V2.0 *feature*.

Section 3 describes the conformance matrix for SAML V2.0. A number of different *operational modes* or roles are identified. The conformance matrix describes describes the feature set that must be implemented by each operational mode.

1.2 Notation

The keywords "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this specification are to be interpreted in this specification and all of the SAML V2.0 specifications as described in IETF RFC 2119 [RFC 2119]:

> *…they MUST only be used where it is actually required for interoperation or to limit behavior which has potential for causing harm (e.g., limiting retransmissions)…*

These keywords are thus capitalized when used to unambiguously specify requirements over protocol and application features and behavior that affect the interoperability and security of implementations. When these words are not capitalized, they are meant in their natural-language sense.

2 SAML V2.0 Profiles and Possible Implementations

The following table enumerates all of the profiles defined by the SAML profiles specification [SAMLProf]. For each profile, the message protocol flows (defined in the assertions and protocols specification [SAMLCore]) found within the profile are also described. For each message flow, a list of relevant bindings (defined in the bindings specification [SAMLBind]) is given in the final column.

Table 1: Possible Implementations

Profile	Message Flows	Binding
Web SSO	`<AuthnRequest>` from SP to IdP	HTTP redirect
		HTTP POST
		HTTP artifact
	IdP `<Response>` to SP	HTTP POST
		HTTP artifact
Enhanced Client/Proxy SSO	ECP to SP, SP to ECP to IdP	PAOS
	IdP to ECP to SP, SP to ECP	PAOS
Identity Provider Discovery	Cookie setter	HTTP
	Cookie getter	HTTP
Single Logout	`<LogoutRequest>`	HTTP redirect
		HTTP POST
		HTTP artifact
		SOAP
	`<LogoutResponse>`	HTTP redirect
		HTTP POST
		HTTP artifact
		SOAP
Name Identifier Management	`<ManageNameIDRequest>`	HTTP redirect
		HTTP POST
		HTTP artifact
		SOAP
	`<ManageNameIDResponse>`	HTTP redirect
		SOAP
[E28]~~Artifact Resolution~~	~~`<ArtifactResolve>, <ArtifactResponse>`~~	~~SOAP~~
~~Authentication Query~~	~~`<AuthNQuery>, <Response>`~~	~~SOAP~~

Profile	Message Flows	Binding
~~Attribute Query~~	~~<AttributeQuery>, <Response>~~	~~SOAP~~
~~Authorization Decision Query~~	~~<AuthZDecisionQuery>, <Response>~~	~~SOAP~~
Assertion Query/Request	Artifact resolution: <ArtifactResolve>, <ArtifactResponse> Authentication query: <AuthnQuery>, <Response> Attribute query: <AttributeQuery>, <Response> Authorization decision query: <AuthzDecisionQuery>, <Response>	SOAP
Request for Assertion by Identifier	<AssertionIDRequest>, <Response>	SOAP
Name Identifier Mapping	<NameIDMappingRequest>, <NameIDMappingResponse>	SOAP
[E28]~~SAML URI binding~~	~~GET, HTTP Response~~	~~HTTP~~
UUID attribute profile		
DCE PAC attribute profile		
X.500 attribute profile		
XACML attribute profile		
[E28]~~Metadata~~	~~Consumption~~	
	~~Exchange~~	

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3 Conformance

This section describes the technical conformance requirements for SAML V2.0.

3.1 Operational Modes

This document uses the phrase “operational mode” to describe a role that a software component can play in conforming to SAML. The operational modes are as follows:

- IdP – Identity Provider
- IdP Lite – Identity Provider Lite
- SP – Service Provider
- SP Lite – Service Provider Lite
- ECP – Enhanced Client/Proxy
- SAML Attribute Authority
- SAML Authorization Decision Authority
- SAML Authentication Authority
- SAML Requester

3.2 Feature Matrix

The following matrices identify unique sets of conformance requirements by means of a triple taken from Table 1 with the form: profile, message(s), binding The message component is not always included when it is obvious from context.

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Table 2: Feature Matrix

Feature	IdP	IdP Lite	SP	SP Lite	ECP
Web SSO, <AuthnRequest>, HTTP redirect	MUST	MUST	MUST	MUST	N/A
Web SSO, <Response>, HTTP POST	MUST	MUST	MUST	MUST	N/A
Web SSO, <Response>, HTTP artifact	MUST	MUST	MUST	MUST	N/A
Artifact Resolution, SOAP	MUST	MUST	MUST	MUST	N/A
Enhanced Client/Proxy SSO, PAOS	MUST	MUST	MUST	MUST	MUST
Name Identifier Management [E11](IdP-initiated), HTTP redirect ~~(IdP-initiated)~~	MUST	MUST NOT	MUST	MUST NOT	N/A
Name Identifier Management (IdP-initiated), SOAP ~~(IdP-initiated)~~	MUST	MUST NOT	OPTIONAL	MUST NOT	N/A
Name Identifier Management (SP-initiated), HTTP redirect~~-~~	MUST	MUST NOT	MUST	MUST NOT	N/A
Name Identifier Management (SP-initiated), SOAP ~~(SP-initiated)~~	MUST	MUST NOT	OPTIONAL	MUST NOT	N/A
Single Logout (IdP-initiated),~~—~~ HTTP redirect	MUST	MUST	MUST	MUST	N/A
Single Logout (IdP-initiated),~~—~~ SOAP	MUST	OPTIONAL	MUST	OPTIONAL	N/A
Single Logout (SP-initiated),~~—~~ HTTP redirect	MUST	MUST	MUST	MUST	N/A
Single Logout (SP-initiated),~~—~~ SOAP	MUST	OPTIONAL	MUST	OPTIONAL	N/A
Identity Provider Discovery (cookie)	MUST	MUST	OPTIONAL	OPTIONAL	N/A
[E29]Request for Assertion by Identifier	OPTIONAL	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
SAML URI Binding	OPTIONAL	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
[E25]Metadata Structures	OPTIONAL	OPTIONAL	OPTIONAL	OPTIONAL	N/A
Metadata Interoperation	OPTIONAL	OPTIONAL	OPTIONAL	OPTIONAL	N/A

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218 The following table summarizes operational modes that extend the IdP or SP modes defined above.
219 These are to be understood as a combination of an IdP or SP mode from the table above with the
220 corresponding extended feature set below.

Table 3: Extended IdP, SP

Feature	IdP Extended	SP Extended
Identity Provider proxy (Section 3.4.1.5 [SAMLCore])	MUST	MUST
Name identifier mapping, SOAP	MUST	MUST

The following table summarizes conformance requirements for SAML authorities and requesters .

Table 4: SAML Authority and Requester Matrix

Feature	SAML Authentication Authority	SAML Attribute Authority	SAML Authorization Decision Authority	SAML Requester
Authentication Query, SOAP	MUST	[E42]~~OPTIONAL~~N/A	~~OPTIONAL~~N/A	OPTIONAL
Attribute Query, SOAP	~~OPTIONAL~~N/A	MUST	~~OPTIONAL~~N/A	OPTIONAL
Authorization Decision Query, SOAP	~~OPTIONAL~~N/A	~~OPTIONAL~~N/A	MUST	OPTIONAL
Request for Assertion by Identifier, SOAP	MUST	MUST	MUST	OPTIONAL
SAML URI Binding	MUST	MUST	MUST	OPTIONAL
[E25]Metadata Structures	OPTIONAL	OPTIONAL	OPTIONAL	OPTIONAL
Metadata Interoperation	OPTIONAL	OPTIONAL	OPTIONAL	OPTIONAL

3.3 Implementation of SAML-Defined Identifiers

All relevant operational modes MUST implement the following SAML-defined identifiers:

- All Attribute Name Format identifiers defined in Section 8.2 of [SAMLCore]
- All Name Identifier Format identifiers defined in Section 8.3 of [SAMLCore]

Conforming SAML implementations MUST permit the use of all identifier constants described in Sections 8.2 and 8.3 when producing and consuming SAML messages. SAML message producers MUST be able to create messages and SAML message consumers MUST be able to process messages with any of the constants defined in these sections.

Sections 8.3.7 (persistent name identifiers) and 8.3.8 (transient name identifiers) define normative processing rules for the producer of such identifiers. All normative processing rules in Sections 8.3.7 and 8.3.8 MUST be supported by conforming implementations. The remaining identifiers in Sections 8.2 and 8.3 specify no normative processing rules. Hence, generation and consumption of these identifiers is meaningful only when the generating and consuming parties have externally-defined agreement on the semantic interpretation of the identifiers.

> **Note:** In this context, "process" means that the implementation must successfully parse and handle the identifier without failing or returning an error. How the implementation

deals with the identifier once it is processed at this level is out of scope for this specification.

A SAML implementation may provide the facilities described above through direct implementation support for the identifiers or through the use of supported programming interfaces. Interfaces provided for this purpose must allow the SAML implementation to be programmatically extended to handle all identifiers in Sections 8.2 and 8.3 that are not natively handled by the implementation.

3.4 Implementation of Encrypted Elements

All relevant operational modes MUST be able to process or generate the following encrypted elements in any context where they are required to process or generate the corresponding unencrypted elements, namely `<saml:NameID>`, `<saml:Assertion>`, or `<saml:Attribute>`:

- `<saml:EncryptedID>`
- `<saml:EncryptedAssertion>`
- `<saml:EncryptedAttribute>`

3.5 Security Models for SOAP and URI Bindings

The following security models are mandatory to implement for all profiles implemented using the SOAP binding as well as for the SAML URI binding. SAML authorities and requesters MUST implement the following authentication methods:

- No client or server authentication.
- HTTP basic authentication [RFC 2617] with and without SSL 3.0 or TLS 1.0 (see Section 3 below). The SAML requester MUST preemptively send the authorization header with the initial request.
- HTTP over SSL 3.0 or TLS 1.0 server authentication with server-side certificate.
- HTTP over SSL 3.0 or TLS 1.0 mutual authentication with both server-side and a client-side certificate.

If a SAML authority uses SSL 3.0 or TLS 1.0, it MUST use a server-side certificate.

3.6 [E25]Metadata Structures

Implementations claiming conformance to SAML V2.0 may declare each operational mode's conformance to SAML V2.0 Metadata [SAMLMeta] through election of the Metadata Structures option.

With respect to each operational mode, such conformance entails the following:

- Implementing SAML metadata according to the extensible SAML V2.0 Metadata format in all cases where an interoperating peer has the option, as stated in SAML V2.0 specifications, of depending on the existence of SAML V2.0 Metadata. Electing the Metadata Structures option has the effect of requiring that such metadata be available to the interoperating peer. The Metadata Interoperation feature, described below, provides a means of satisfying this requirement.
- Referencing, consuming, and adhering to the SAML metadata, according to [SAMLMeta], of an interoperating peer when the known metadata relevant to that peer and the particular operation, and the current exchange, has expired or is no longer valid in cache, provided the metadata is available and is not prohibited by policy or the particular operation and that specific exchange.

3.7 Metadata Interoperation

Election of the Metadata Interoperation option requires the implementation to offer, in addition to any other

mechanism, the well-known location publication and resolution mechanism described in the SAML metadata specification [SAMLMeta].

4 XML Digital Signature and XML Encryption

SAML V2.0 uses XML Signature [XMLSig] to implement XML signing and encryption functionality for integrity, and source authentication. SAML V2.0 uses XML Encryption [XMLEnc] to implement confidentiality, including encrypted identifiers, encrypted assertions, and encrypted attributes. [E50]The algorithms listed below as being required for SAML V2.0 conformance are based on the mandated algorithms in the W3C recommendations for XML Signature and for XML Encryption, but modified by the SSTC to ensure interoperability of conformant SAML implementations. While the SAML-defined set of algorithms is a minimal set for conformance, additional algorithms supported by XML Signature and XML Encryption MAY be used. Note, however, that the use of non-mandated algorithms may introduce interoperability issues if those algorithms are not widely implemented. As additional algorithms become mandated for use in XML Signature and XML Encryption, the set required for SAML conformance may be extended.

4.1 XML Signature Algorithms

XML Signature mandates use of the following algorithms in Section 6.1; therefore they MUST be implemented by compliant SAML V2.0 implementations:

- Digest: SHA1
- MAC: HMAC-SHA1
- XML Canonicalization: CanonicalXML (Without comments),
- Transform: Enveloped Signature

In addition, to enable interoperability, the following MUST be implemented by compliant SAML V2.0 implementations:

- Signature: RSAwithSHA1 (recommended in XML Signature but needed for interoperability)

Although XML Signature mandates the DSAwithSHA1 signature algorithm, it is not required by SAML V2.0, but is RECOMMENDED.

4.2 XML Encryption Algorithms

XML Encryption mandates use of the following algorithms in Sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2; therefore they MUST be implemented by compliant SAML V2.0 implementations:

- Block Encryption: TRIPLE DES, AES-128, AES-256.
- Key Transport: RSA-v1.5, RSA-OAEP

5 Use of SSL 3.0 or TLS 1.0

In any SAML V2.0 use of SSL 3.0 [SSL3] or TLS 1.0 [RFC 2246], servers MUST authenticate to clients using a X.509 v3 certificate. The client MUST establish server identity based on contents of the certificate (typically through examination of the certificate's subject DN field). [E50]The set of algorithms required for SAML V2.0 conformance is equivalent to that defined in SAML V1.0 and SAML V1.1. These mandated algorithms were chosen by the SSTC because of their wide implementation support in the industry. While the algorithms defined below are the minimal set for SAML conformance, additional algorithms supported by SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0 MAY be used.

5.1 SAML SOAP and URI Binding

TLS-capable implementations MUST implement the TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA cipher suite and MAY implement the TLS_RSA_AES_128_CBC_SHA cipher suite [AES].

FIPS TLS-capable implementations MUST implement the corresponding TLS_RSA_FIPS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA cipher suite and MAY implement the corresponding TLS_RSA_FIPS_AES_128_CBC_SHA cipher suite [AES].

SSL-capable implementations MUST implement the SSL_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA cipher suite.

FIPS SSL-capable implementations MUST implement the FIPS cipher suite corresponding to the SSL SSL_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA cipher suite.

5.2 Web SSO Profiles of SAML

SSL-capable implementations of the Web SSO profile of SAML MUST implement the SSL_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA cipher suite. TLS-capable implementations MUST implement the TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA cipher suite.

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